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		<title>Renaming TECRO Long Overdue</title>
		<link>https://fapa.org/renaming-tecro-long-overdue/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Chih-Jung Huang]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 Mar 2024 20:33:24 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Op-Ed]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TECRO Name Change to TRO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S.-Taiwan Relations]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://fapa.org/?p=21177</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>To counter China’s increasing threats and aggression toward Taiwan, the US should continue to reinforce its support for and normalize its relations with Taiwan. To that end, a good and long-overdue next step would be renaming the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO), Taiwan’s de facto embassy in the US, to the more accurate and respectful “Taiwan Representative Office,” and encourage other allies to follow suit.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://fapa.org/renaming-tecro-long-overdue/">Renaming TECRO Long Overdue</a> appeared first on <a href="https://fapa.org">Formosan Association for Public Affairs</a>.</p>
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<h6 class="has-text-align-right wp-block-heading">By Kao Su-mei (林素梅) | FAPA President</h6>
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<p>To counter China’s increasing threats and aggression toward Taiwan, the US should continue to reinforce its support for and normalize its relations with Taiwan. To that end, a good and long-overdue next step would be renaming the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO), Taiwan’s de facto embassy in the US, to the more accurate and respectful “Taiwan Representative Office,” and encourage other allies to follow suit.</p>
<p>After Taiwan and the US severed diplomatic ties in 1979, Taiwan established the oddly named Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA) as the counterpart to the US’ American Institute in Taiwan. Taiwan’s former embassy in Washington was then transformed into the CCNAA Office in the United States of America.</p>
<p>In 1994, as a result of the Taiwan Policy Review completed by then-US president Bill Clinton’s administration, the CCNAA Office in the US was renamed TECRO — a name that is also nondescript. However, the CCNAA headquarters in Taipei maintained its original name until 2019, when it was renamed the “Taiwan Council for US Affairs” to include the word “Taiwan” in its name.</p>
<p>The US should agree to rename TECRO to the more straightforward and correct Taiwan Representative Office for the following reasons:</p>
<p>First, TECRO is a misnomer because the word “Taipei” creates the strong inaccurate impression that the office only represents the capital, Taipei, and its residents, rather than the independent country of Taiwan and its people.</p>
<p>Surveys in recent years show that the overwhelming majority of people in Taiwan consider themselves primarily Taiwanese and believe that Taiwan is already an independent, sovereign country. By containing the word “Taipei,” the name TECRO falls short of paying due respect to the national identity and sovereign dignity of Taiwan.</p>
<p>Second, calling Taiwan’s de facto embassy in the US an “economic and cultural” representative office fails to accurately reflect the robust and comprehensive relations between the two nations. The US’ partnership with Taiwan encompasses far more than just economic and cultural ties. The US not only provides Taiwan with defensive arms, but has bolstered cooperation in science, technology, public health, energy and the environment, to name just a few.</p>
<p>And third, the name TECRO is inconsistent with the longstanding US policy of referring to Taiwan as “Taiwan.” Its renaming is thus long overdue.</p>
<p>Those opposed to the name change argue that renaming TECRO to include the word “Taiwan” would substantially change the US’ policy and position toward Taiwan. Their assumption ignores the simple fact that the US Congress and government have consistently referred to Taiwan as “Taiwan” for decades, especially after 1979.</p>
<p>This is evident in the titles of several US laws concerning US relations with Taiwan, such as the Taiwan Relations Act, the Taiwan Travel Act, the Taiwan Assurance Act and the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the US’ de facto embassy in Taiwan is called the American Institute in Taiwan.</p>
<p>Since Taiwan and the US severed diplomatic ties in 1979, the US Department of State has maintained a secretive set of “Taiwan Guidelines” — a lengthy and closely held memo originally written in 1979 and 1980, and circulated within US government agencies to regulate US officials’ interactions with their Taiwanese counterparts.</p>
<p>In a memorandum on the Taiwan Guidelines dated Oct. 3, 1990, the department wrote: “Consistent with the unofficial nature of U.S.-Taiwan ties, the U.S. Government no longer refers to Taiwan as the ‘Republic of China’&#8230; We refer to Taiwan simply as Taiwan, and to its leadership as ‘the Taiwan authorities.’”</p>
<p>Fourth, changing the name TECRO to the Taiwan Representative Office would not merely be a symbolic gesture, but a substantive move that would lend more respect to Taiwan’s national dignity and strengthen US leadership among democratic allies to support Taiwan against Chinese bullying and aggression.</p>
<p>Those who contend that renaming TECRO would merely be symbolic should understand that in the realm of diplomacy, symbolism — such as ceremony and protocol, including the proper use of titles and names — serves a crucial communicative function and is often employed to achieve something substantive and meaningful in international relations.</p>
<p>It has often been said that, regarding complex and sensitive Taiwan issues, symbolism is substance. In the absence of Taiwan-US diplomatic ties, changing TECRO’s name would be particularly meaningful for Taiwan. It could also signal more robust US support for Taiwan’s distinct existence in the global community in the face of increasing military and diplomatic aggression from China.</p>
<p>Renaming TECRO is an objective that Taiwanese Americans have been striving for for many years, and it is gaining support from members of Congress. The chance of changing TECRO’s name with help from Congress looks better than ever.</p>
<p>In December 2020, 78 members of the US House of Representatives wrote to then-US secretary of state Mike Pompeo to ask, among other things, that the name TECRO be changed to the Taiwan Representative Office.</p>
<p>Moreover, the Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act, passed by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in July 2021, and the America COMPETES Act, passed by the House in February 2022, also called for negotiations to rename TECRO.</p>
<p>In May last year, the Taiwan Representative Office Act was reintroduced in the US Senate and House simultaneously, urging the renaming of TECRO to the Taiwan Representative Office.</p>
<p>The bill also states that it would be the policy of the US, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances, to provide Taiwanese with “de facto diplomatic treatment” equivalent to foreign countries, nations, states, governments or similar entities.</p>
<p>Reality dictates that Taiwan possesses all the qualifications of statehood under international law — including a permanent population, a defined territory, a central government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states — and has been an independent sovereign country for decades. Taiwan deserves formal diplomatic ties with all other countries.</p>
<p>The US, as a leading democratic country, should guide the free world in normalizing relations with Taiwan and eventually recognize it diplomatically. It is time for the US to start negotiating a name change for TECRO to better reflect the mission’s actual purpose. If there was a Taiwan Representative Office in Washington, it would be a powerful display of US support for its longtime friend and democratic ally.</p>
<p>As Taiwan continues to stand firm against aggression from China, the name change would bolster the US’ commitment to Taiwan and inspire other democratic allies to do the same. Hopefully then, “Taiwan” representative offices would become a new normal the world over.</p>
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<h5 class="wp-block-heading">This article is first published in&nbsp;<span style="text-decoration: underline;"><a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2024/03/13/2003814836" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Taipei Times</a></span> (2024/03/13)</h5>
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		<p>The post <a href="https://fapa.org/renaming-tecro-long-overdue/">Renaming TECRO Long Overdue</a> appeared first on <a href="https://fapa.org">Formosan Association for Public Affairs</a>.</p>
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		<title>展望 2024 台美關係：美國應明確承認台灣自決權與獨立國格</title>
		<link>https://fapa.org/the-us-should-clearly-recognize-taiwans-right-of-self-determination-and-independent-statehood/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Chih-Jung Huang]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 03 Jan 2024 20:13:10 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Op-Ed]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://fapa.org/?p=20415</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>我們深信，為了更有效嚇阻中國吞併台灣，美國做為民主自由陣營的領袖，應對台採取「戰略清晰」，明確支持台灣人民的自決權，並早日外交承認台灣是個主權獨立國家的「真實現狀」。這不僅符合台灣與美國的共同國家利益，且唯有如此，才能有效抑制日益崛起的威權主義擴張。</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://fapa.org/the-us-should-clearly-recognize-taiwans-right-of-self-determination-and-independent-statehood/">展望 2024 台美關係：美國應明確承認台灣自決權與獨立國格</a> appeared first on <a href="https://fapa.org">Formosan Association for Public Affairs</a>.</p>
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<h6 class="has-text-align-right wp-block-heading">By 林素梅 (Su-Mei Kao) | 台灣人公共事務會會長 (FAPA President)</h6>
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<p>進入 2024 新的一年到來之際，回顧過去 2023 年台美關係，在軍事、經貿等方面無疑有許多重大成果與進展，但在增進台灣國際地位與空間上雖有所著墨，卻仍待未來持續加強與突破。</p>
<p>長期以來，總部位於美國華府的「台灣人公共事務會」（FAPA）不斷呼籲美國政府應更積極公開挑戰北京的「一個中國原則」，明確重申「台灣不是中國的一部分」。我們很高興見到，美國國務卿布林肯（Antony Blinken）在去年（2023 年）2 月特別強調，台海危機「並非中國基於其主權所聲稱的內政事務」，而是全世界都關切的國際議題。</p>
<h4>台美關係一年內取得重大突破　下一步應積極破除疑美論</h4>
<p>去年 4 月初，台灣總統蔡英文與時任美國眾議院議長麥卡錫（Kevin McCarthy）在加州進行了一場歷史性會晤。這是<strong>台灣總統與美國眾院議長在美國本土進行的首次會晤</strong>，亦是 2018 年《台灣旅行法》（Taiwan Travel Act）的進一步落實。</p>
<p>去年 7 月底，美國政府首度宣布動用「總統撥款權」（Presidential Drawdown Authority），將撥用美國自身既有軍事庫存，提供台灣 3.45 億美元的即時軍事援助。8 月底，美國亦首度<strong>宣布將透過通常用於援助主權獨立國家的「外國軍事融資」（Foreign Military Financing, FMF）計畫，提供台灣 8,000 萬美元的軍援。</strong></p>
<p>去年 8 月 7 日，《美台 21 世紀貿易倡議首批協定實施法》經拜登總統簽署生效，確認美國國會批准美台雙方於 6 月初在「21 世紀貿易倡議」架構下所達成的「首批協定」（First Agreement）。我們期盼，此首批協定及隨後的貿易談判，能為全面性的「美台自由貿易協定」（FTA）奠定扎實基礎。</p>
<p>去年底，美國參眾兩院通過《2024 財政年度國防授權法》（FY24 NDAA），並於 2023 年 12 月 22 日經拜登總統簽署生效，正式成為美國法律。<strong>該法案納入許多友台條款</strong>，要求擴大美台軍事合作，改善對台軍售交付進程，並授權美國國防部為台灣軍隊建立全面性的培訓計畫，以強化台灣自我防衛能力。</p>
<h4>期盼美國清楚認知　多數台灣人希望維持主權獨立的現狀</h4>
<p>在過去短短一年之內，台美兩國在軍事、經貿合作上取得如此重大突破，令人振奮。但我們亦認為，<strong>要更積極對抗中國對台灣的外交戰、資訊戰，更為有效破除「疑美論」</strong>，美國應同時逐步推動台美關係正常化，強化承認台灣的獨立國格，以最終實現台美建立正式邦交。</p>
<p>去年5月，美國參眾兩院提出跨黨派的《台灣代表處法》（Taiwan Representative Office Act），要求將台灣的「實質上」駐美大使館由「台北經濟文化代表處」（TECRO）更名為「台灣代表處」（TRO）。此外，美國眾議院在去年 7 月通過《台灣國際團結法》（Taiwan International Solidarity Act），力圖澄清 1971 年聯合國大會第 2758 號決議並未涉及台灣主權爭議與國際代表權問題，<strong>藉以對抗中國對台主權聲索，保障台灣的國際空間與參與。</strong></p>
<p>在這新的一年，FAPA 將持續為以上兩部友台法案推動倡議與請願，期盼美國國會能在今年順利完成立法，以更加尊重台灣的國家尊嚴與台灣人的國家認同。我們相信，美國政府與社會大眾必須正確地認識到，<strong>絕大多數的台灣人選擇並希望能維持「台灣主權獨立」的現狀，且堅決反對民主台灣淪為共產中國的一部分。</strong></p>
<p>我們亦主張，美國總統或國務卿應正式訪問台灣，並簽署美台聯合公報或發表共同聲明，<strong>清楚表明美國承認並支持台灣人民的自決權，否認中國毫無根據的對台主權宣稱，且明確承諾美軍將在中國侵台時共同保衛台灣。</strong></p>
<h4>「姑息政策」助長中國對台霸凌　美台正式外交關係才能真正威懾中國</h4>
<p>在 1954 年，美國總統艾森豪（Dwight Eisenhower）執政時，美國與台灣正式簽署共同防禦條約，在國際法上承諾美軍將保衛台灣，以遏制共產中國的武力擴張。艾森豪更於 1960 年訪問台灣，使他成為歷史上首位（也是至今唯一一位）訪台的在任美國總統。</p>
<p>1972 年，即便美國於當時仍與台灣保持正式外交關係，時任美國總統尼克森（Richard Nixon）與國務卿羅傑斯（William Rogers）卻依然訪問共產中國，並與之簽署上海公報，為美國與中華人民共和國的關係正常化鋪下道路。</p>
<p>其後，美國與台灣維繫邦交直到 1979 年 1 月 1 日，並維持共同防禦條約至 1980 年 1 月 1 日才終止。這清楚證明，<strong>美國與台灣之間的正式外交關係與明確軍事承諾，實際上能有效威懾中國侵略台灣，而非導致其全面武力犯台。</strong></p>
<p>四十多年來，美國為了安撫、綏靖專制的共產中國，不但一直避免正式承認台灣，並採取對台「戰略模糊」，且美國總統與國務卿亦總是刻意迴避訪台。然而，<strong>華府的此種對中「姑息政策」只會更加鼓舞中國的「戰狼外交」及對台霸凌</strong>，並助長其侵略行為與擴張野心。</p>
<p>我們深信，為了更有效嚇阻中國吞併台灣，美國做為民主自由陣營的領袖，<strong>應對台採取「戰略清晰」</strong>，明確支持台灣人民的自決權，並早日外交承認台灣是個主權獨立國家的「真實現狀」。這不僅符合台灣與美國的共同國家利益，且唯有如此，<strong>才能有效抑制日益崛起的威權主義擴張。</strong></p>
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<h6 class="wp-block-heading">原文刊載於<span style="text-decoration: underline;"><a href="https://pourquoi.tw/%e3%80%90%e6%9e%97%e7%b4%a0%e6%a2%85%e3%80%91%e5%b1%95%e6%9c%9b-2024-%e5%8f%b0%e7%be%8e%e9%97%9c%e4%bf%82%ef%bc%9a%e7%be%8e%e5%9c%8b%e6%87%89%e6%98%8e%e7%a2%ba%e6%89%bf%e8%aa%8d%e5%8f%b0%e7%81%a3/">報呱</a></span>（2024/01/03）</h6>
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		<p>The post <a href="https://fapa.org/the-us-should-clearly-recognize-taiwans-right-of-self-determination-and-independent-statehood/">展望 2024 台美關係：美國應明確承認台灣自決權與獨立國格</a> appeared first on <a href="https://fapa.org">Formosan Association for Public Affairs</a>.</p>
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		<title>Taiwan’s History and Status: Taiwan Has Never Been a Part of China</title>
		<link>https://fapa.org/taiwans-history-and-status-taiwan-has-never-been-a-part-of-china/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Chih-Jung Huang]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Nov 2023 20:14:48 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Op-Ed]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Diplomatic Recognition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[San Francisco Peace Treaty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Taiwan Independence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Taiwan’s Legal Status]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UNGA Resolution 2758]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>To correct some popular misunderstandings and to more effectively counter the PRC’s disinformation on Taiwan’s history and status, this article argues that: (1) Historically speaking, Taiwan has never been a part of “China”; and (2) legally speaking, both the Republic of China (ROC; 1912–1949) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC; 1949–present) have never acquired territorial sovereignty over Taiwan.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://fapa.org/taiwans-history-and-status-taiwan-has-never-been-a-part-of-china/">Taiwan’s History and Status: Taiwan Has Never Been a Part of China</a> appeared first on <a href="https://fapa.org">Formosan Association for Public Affairs</a>.</p>
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<h6 class="has-text-align-right wp-block-heading">By Chih-Jung Huang (黃致榮) | FAPA Policy Follow </h6>
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<p>On Nov. 15, US President Joe Biden reiterated the US’ commitment to maintaining cross-strait peace and the “status quo” during a meeting with Chinese dictator Xi Jinping (習近平) on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in San Francisco, California.</p>
<p>However, Biden refrained from making clear to Xi what Taiwan’s “status quo” exactly is (as the US defines it).</p>
<p>It is not the first time Taiwan’s legal status has become an issue of contention.</p>
<p>In September, Tesla CEO Elon Musk caused a media storm after he referred to Taiwan as “an integral part of China” during an interview. This ignorance about Taiwan’s history and status came after his suggestion in October last year to make Taiwan a “special administrative zone” of China, similar to that of Hong Kong.</p>
<p>Musk’s comments on Taiwan are in line with the propaganda of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which continues to threaten to annex Taiwan by force, and to promote its “one China principle” internationally to suppress Taiwan’s international recognition and participation.</p>
<p>To correct some popular misunderstandings and to more effectively counter the PRC’s disinformation on Taiwan’s history and status, this article argues that: (1) Historically speaking, Taiwan has never been a part of “China”; and (2) legally speaking, both the Republic of China (ROC; 1912–1949) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC; 1949–present) have never acquired territorial sovereignty over Taiwan.</p>
<p>The PRC government has no right to represent Taiwan, and only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent the 23 million Taiwanese people in the international arena. It has been long overdue for the free world to stand up together and counter China’s increasing bullying and aggression against Taiwan.</p>
<h4><strong>Taiwan up to 1895: From Indigenous Island to Conquered Colony</strong></h4>
<p>Contrary to the PRC’s claim that “Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times,” Taiwan’s indigenous peoples have inhabited the island for at least six thousand years, with various political entities exercising control over parts of it until colonial powers conquered increasingly large portions of Taiwan beginning in the 17th century.</p>
<p>The pre-modern Han Chinese empires knew very little about Taiwan, and had long regarded Taiwan as a “savage” island “beyond the seas.” That is why when the Dutch temporarily occupied the Penghu Islands (ie, the Pescadores) in 1622, an official of the Chinese Ming Empire (1368–1662) asked the Dutch forces to withdraw from Penghu and move to Taiwan, showing clearly that the Chinese then considered Taiwan to be a remote island outside the Chinese civilization and domain.</p>
<p>Dutch Formosa (1624–1662) in southwestern Taiwan and Spanish Formosa (1626–1642) in northern Taiwan were the first colonial endeavors that exercised control over some parts of the island. The Dutch promoted agriculture in Taiwan and encouraged Han Chinese peasants to move from coastal China to the island.</p>
<p>In 1662, former Ming loyalist general Koxinga, also known as Cheng Cheng-kung (鄭成功), ended Dutch rule of Taiwan. He established a new independent kingdom in Taiwan, known as the Tungning Kingdom (1662–1683) or the Kingdom of Formosa, which ruled parts of the island until it was conquered in 1683 by the Manchu Qing empire.</p>
<p>The Manchu Qing Empire (1616–1912) was in essence a “non-Chinese” empire that was originally founded in what would later be known as “Manchuria,” outside of China. When the Manchus captured the Ming’s principal capital at Beijing in 1644, the Qing Empire had already existed outside China for 28 years, starting in 1616. It was not until 1681 that the Manchu Qing conquered all of China (ie, China Proper).</p>
<p>The Manchu Qing Empire conquered the Tungning Kingdom in 1683, and officially annexed the former Tungning territory in 1684. The Qing later expanded its colonial rule over western Taiwan, but that did not make Taiwan a part of “China.” Just as the British Empire had colonized India and Sri Lanka at the same time, doing so did not make Sri Lanka a part of “India.”</p>
<p>The number of Han Chinese settlers in Taiwan was still very small at the beginning of the 17th century, but steadily increased during the Dutch, Tungning and Qing periods for over 200 years, creating a primarily Han society in western Taiwan.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, at least until the 1870s, the Qing Empire still regarded most of central and eastern Taiwan as the “savage territory” of the Taiwanese “raw barbarians” outside the Qing domains.</p>
<p>Moreover, despite the Manchu Qing designating western Taiwan as administratively a prefecture of Fujian Province in 1684, and created Taiwan Province in 1885, Taiwan continued to be perceived as a remote and often “rebellious” island, instead of an integral part of the Chinese “inner lands” or China Proper.</p>
<p>Having been defeated by the Japanese, the Manchu Qing Empire signed the Peace Treaty of Shimonoseki with the Japanese Empire on April 17, 1895, and agreed to cede the island of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores (Penghu) “in perpetuity and full sovereignty” to Japan.</p>
<p>On May 25, 1895, the political elites and local gentry in Taiwan established the Democratic Republic of Taiwan (also known as the Republic of Formosa). However, lacking competent leaders and international support, the short-lived republic was destroyed by Japanese troops in October 1895. Thereafter, Taiwan remained under Japanese colonial rule for 50 years until 1945.</p>
<h4><strong>Modern China’s Early Support of Taiwan Independence</strong></h4>
<p>Seeking to overthrow the Manchus’ alien rule over China, the Han Chinese revolutionaries officially established the Republic of China (ROC; 1912–1949) on Jan. 1, 1912, in the 14 seceding provinces in China Proper that had proclaimed independence in late 1911. That was followed by the end of the Manchu Qing Empire on Feb. 12, 1912, and the annexation of the former Qing Empire’s remaining territories by the ROC in March 1912.</p>
<p>Since Taiwan had already been legally ceded by the Qing to Japan in 1895, it was impossible for the newly-established ROC to claim and inherit territorial sovereignty over Taiwan as a successor to the Qing Empire.</p>
<p>Until 1942, the ROC government and the Chinese people had generally considered and recognized that Taiwan was a Japanese colony and outside of modern China’s national territory. Both the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) even initially supported Taiwan independence.</p>
<p>In 1926, a declaration from the KMT’s Second National Party Congress commented on Taiwan’s “national revolution,” along with those in Korea, Vietnam and the Philippines, expressing the KMT’s support for independence for the Taiwanese nationality.</p>
<p>In 1938, during a speech to the KMT’s Provisional Party Congress, Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) said: “We must enable the brethren in Korea and Taiwan to restore their independence and freedom so as to solidify the national defense of the Republic of China, and to establish peace in East Asia.”</p>
<p>In a 1936 interview with American journalist Edgar Snow, Mao Zedong (毛澤東) stated: “If the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies to Formosa [Taiwan].”</p>
<p>In an essay published in 1941, then-Chinese premier Zhou Enlai (周恩來) restated a well-established CCP position and wrote that: “We should sympathize with independence-liberation movements of other nation-states. We will &#8230; assist the anti-Japanese movements of Korea or Taiwan.”</p>
<p>Until the early 1940s, the ROC government and modern Chinese had never regarded and claimed Taiwan as “an integral part of China.” Instead, before 1942, the KMT and the CCP elites were generally indifferent to Taiwan and categorized Taiwanese and Chinese as distinct nationalities. Whenever they did mention Taiwan, it was always coupled with Korea, and they encouraged the Taiwanese and the Koreans to seek their own independence from Japanese imperialism.</p>
<h4><strong>The 1945 “Retrocession of Taiwan” to China Was Illegal and Invalid</strong></h4>
<p>Sometime in 1942, the ROC government and Chinese elites suddenly reimagined and expanded their “mental map of China” and began to claim that Taiwan should be “returned to China.” This was only because the defeat of Japan suddenly became possible after the US had declared war on Japan in December 1941.</p>
<p>The Cairo Declaration of 1943, and the Potsdam Proclamation of 1945 were merely “non-legally binding” wartime “statements of intention,” which expressed or reaffirmed, in part, the major Allied Powers’ “intention” that “Formosa [Taiwan], and the Pescadores [Penghu], be restored to the Republic of China” that, however, could not (and did not) make a cession of Taiwan from Japan to the ROC.</p>
<p>On Oct. 25, 1945, the ROC forces began to militarily occupy Taiwan at the direction of the “General Order No. 1,” issued by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur. However, right after Japanese forces in Taiwan surrendered, the ROC immediately and unilaterally proclaimed that Taiwan was “restored” and became a province of “China.”</p>
<p>Nonetheless, the ROC should not and could not convert its military occupation of Taiwan into what it called the “Retrocession of Taiwan,” which was a blatant violation of international law, because: (1) The law of belligerent occupation had long held that territorial sovereignty would not be transferred by military occupation; and (2) the ROC’s unilateral and forcible annexation of Taiwan would violate the Declaration by the United Nations of 1942 (hereinafter, the UN Declaration) and the Charter of the United Nations of 1945 (hereinafter, the UN Charter), both of which incorporated the principles of “self-determination” and “no territorial aggrandizement by force” (or prohibition of aggression and conquest).</p>
<p>The ROC’s military occupation of Taiwan did not constitute a transfer of sovereignty over Taiwan from Japan to China, and the so-called “Retrocession of Taiwan” to the ROC was illegal and should not be recognized by any other States and international organizations.</p>
<p>Under the ROC’s military occupation, Taiwan remained <i>de jure</i> a Japanese territory, normally pending a peace treaty to finalize Taiwan’s post-WWII status, which, according to the UN Declaration and the UN Charter, should accord with the freely expressed wish of Taiwanese.</p>
<h4><strong>Neither the San Francisco Peace Treaty, nor UNGA Resolution 2758 made or recognized Taiwan as a part of China</strong></h4>
<p>Following the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on Oct. 1, 1949, the end of the ROC government in China on Dec. 8, 1949, and the establishment of the so-called “ROC” government in Taipei, Taiwan on Dec. 9, 1949, the status of Taiwan became a more complicated international political and legal issue.</p>
<p>The Treaty of Peace with Japan (also known as the San Francisco Peace Treaty, or the Treaty of San Francisco) was signed between 48 Allied Powers and Japan on Sept. 8, 1951, and entered into force on April 28, 1952. Neither the “ROC” on Taiwan nor the PRC was a party to this treaty.</p>
<p>Article 2(b) of the treaty simply stated that “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.” The treaty intentionally did not transfer sovereignty over Taiwan to China, nor did it provide any other settlement for the status of Taiwan. The PRC, therefore, refused to recognize the Treaty of San Francisco, asserting that the treaty was illegal and invalid.</p>
<p>Subsequently, the position that Taiwan’s legal status remained “undetermined” was commonly shared by many countries such as the US and the UK, and the international community, at least in the immediate years after 1952.</p>
<p>On Oct. 25, 1971, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 2758 was passed to resolve the issue of “China’s representation” in the UN. The resolution recognized the representatives of the PRC government as “the only lawful representatives of China” to the UN.</p>
<p>UNGA Resolution 2758, however, said nothing about Taiwan being “an integral part of China,” nor did it give the PRC government the right to represent the people of Taiwan. It did not address the issue of “Taiwan’s representation” in the UN system, and did not touch upon the question of Taiwan’s sovereignty. In fact, it did not even include the word “Taiwan.”</p>
<p>At that time, the PRC knew clearly that UNGA Resolution 2758 did not contain the wordings it wanted to claim Taiwan, and was worried that Taiwan’s status would be left undetermined in the UN. For example, just a few days before the passing of the resolution, on Oct. 21, 1971 in Beijing, then-PRC premier Zhou Enlai told then-assistant to the US President for National Security Affairs Dr. Henry Kissinger that: “In that [Albanian draft] resolution it is not possible to put in a clause concerning the status of Taiwan, and if it is passed, the status of Taiwan is not yet decided.”</p>
<p>Earlier, on Aug. 21, 1971, the PRC even issued a statement expressing its unwillingness to join the UN if “a situation of ‘two Chinas,’ ‘one China, one Taiwan,’ or ‘the status of Taiwan remaining to be determined,’ or any other similar situation occur in the UN.” However, given that the PRC was not as internationally influential as it is today, it did not reject the UN resolution when it passed. Instead, the PRC took over the UN seat from the ROC on Taiwan.</p>
<p>It was only some time later that the PRC began to distort the meaning of UNGA Resolution 2758, misrepresenting the resolution to promote its “one China principle” and its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, and to suppress Taiwan’s international recognition and participation.</p>
<h4><strong>The Free World Should Counter China’s Fabricated Claim to Taiwan’s Sovereignty</strong></h4>
<p>History and international law clearly show that Taiwan has never been an integral part of China, and also that since its founding in 1949, the PRC has never acquired sovereignty over Taiwan by any treaty or UN resolution, nor has it ever ruled Taiwan for a single day.</p>
<p>Despite the CCP not regarding Taiwan as a part of China’s national territory until 1942, and even supporting Taiwan independence, and despite the PRC in 1971 worrying that UNGA Resolution 2758 would leave Taiwan’s status undetermined in the UN, the PRC went on to fabricate its historical and sovereignty claims over Taiwan regardless. Those claims are simply lies.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, along with its growing economic power and global influence, the PRC has highly succeeded in altering and manipulating the language used by other countries, international organizations (such as the UN), and private companies and individuals (such as Elon Musk) when referring to Taiwan’s status. Now, many of them, including internal UN references, no longer refer to Taiwan as just “Taiwan,” but rather “Taiwan, Province of China” or “Taiwan, China.”</p>
<p>To counter the PRC’s efforts to “internationalize” and “institutionalize” its “one China principle” and its fabricated claims over Taiwan, the free world should make it very clear that Taiwan is not a part of China, and support Taiwan’s right to self-determination and participation in international organizations.</p>
<p>This past July, the US House of Representatives unanimously passed the Taiwan International Solidarity Act, which aims to counter China’s claims over Taiwan and its efforts to exclude Taiwan from participating in international organizations. The bill, in part, clarifies that UNGA Resolution 2758 did not address the issues of Taiwan’s international representation and territorial sovereignty. Hopefully, this bill might soon pass the US Senate and become law.</p>
<p>One month later, the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee issued a new report in which it expressed its firm support for Taiwanese’s right to self-determination, and stated that “Taiwan is already an independent country.”</p>
<p>“Taiwan possesses all the qualifications of statehood, including a permanent population, a defined territory, government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states — it is only lacking greater international recognition,” the report said.</p>
<p>Since China has accelerated its military buildup and disinformation campaigns in preparation for a conquest of Taiwan, it is now more important and urgent than ever for the US and its allies to stand up to the PRC’s coercive diplomacy and reject Beijing’s complete lies about Taiwan’s history and status.</p>
<p>Without a doubt, the most direct and effective way to challenge the PRC’s “one China principle” and counter its fabricated claim over Taiwan’s sovereignty is to officially recognize and establish diplomatic relations with democratic Taiwan, and support Taiwan’s full membership in the UN and all other international organizations.</p>
<p>The US, as the leading democratic country, should have the courage and determination to lead the free world to diplomatically recognize Taiwan as an independent, sovereign country. It is not only the right thing to do. It is long overdue.</p>
<p> </p>
<p><i>Chih-Jung Huang is a non-resident Policy Fellow at the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA). He earned his doctorate degree from the University of Virginia School of Law. His doctoral thesis partly focused on the history and legal status of Taiwan.</i></p>
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<h5 class="wp-block-heading">This article is first published in <span style="text-decoration: underline;"><a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2023/11/28/2003809807" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Taipei Times</a></span> (2023/11/28)</h5>
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		<p>The post <a href="https://fapa.org/taiwans-history-and-status-taiwan-has-never-been-a-part-of-china/">Taiwan’s History and Status: Taiwan Has Never Been a Part of China</a> appeared first on <a href="https://fapa.org">Formosan Association for Public Affairs</a>.</p>
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		<title>What US Should Do about Taiwan</title>
		<link>https://fapa.org/what-us-should-do-about-taiwan/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Chih-Jung Huang]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 26 Oct 2023 16:50:37 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Op-Ed]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Diplomatic Recognition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Clarity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S.-Taiwan Relations]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>To more effectively deter China’s forcible annexation of Taiwan, the US president or the secretary of state should visit and conclude a joint communique or a statement with Taiwan to support Taiwanese’s right to self-determination, make it clear that Taiwan is not part of China, and pledge that US forces would defend the nation from a Chinese attack. Moreover, the US, as the leading democratic country, should diplomatically recognize Taiwan’s true “status quo” as an independent, sovereign country.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://fapa.org/what-us-should-do-about-taiwan/">What US Should Do about Taiwan</a> appeared first on <a href="https://fapa.org">Formosan Association for Public Affairs</a>.</p>
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<h6 class="has-text-align-right wp-block-heading">By Minze Chien (簡明子) | FAPA President</h6>
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<p>After a recent visit to Beijing, Stanford University political scientist Oriana Skylar Mastro wrote an op-ed in the New York Times on Monday last week, titled “This is what America is getting wrong about China and Taiwan.”</p>
<p>Unfortunately, her article wrongly advised the US to conclude a new (fourth) communique with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and acquiesce to China’s ambitions to annex Taiwan (under the guise of “peaceful unification”) to avoid a war with China.</p>
<p>A few days later, while speaking at Washington think tanks, former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) cited Mastro’s op-ed, and called upon the US to remain neutral on the Taiwan question and stop “weaponizing” Taiwan.</p>
<p>He also urged the US to encourage the Taiwanese government to resume “peaceful dialogue” with Beijing based on the so-called “1992 consensus.”</p>
<p>Nonetheless, as Vice President William Lai (賴清德) recently said, accepting the “1992 consensus,” with its “one China” principle, would be equivalent to giving up Taiwan’s sovereignty, and losing freedom and democracy.</p>
<p>It should be clear that China’s so-called “peaceful unification” with Taiwan under Beijing’s “one country, two systems” formula is an empty promise, a red herring and a complete lie. The PRC government has proven untrustworthy. Look at East Turkestan — known to China as Xinjiang — Tibet and Hong Kong.</p>
<p>More importantly, the overwhelming majority of Taiwanese want to keep Taiwan free as a sovereign and independent country. They have no interest in making democratic Taiwan part of communist China.</p>
<p>Mastro also repeated the myth that the three US-PRC joint communiques had helped the US avoid a war with China over Taiwan.</p>
<p>What are really crucial in preventing the PRC from invading Taiwan are the US’ commitment under the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances, along with US arms sales and military assistance to Taiwan.</p>
<p>In 1972, when the US still maintained diplomatic ties with Taiwan, then-US president Richard Nixon and US secretary of state William Rogers visited communist China, and concluded the Shanghai Communique to pave the way for normalization of relations with the authoritarian PRC.</p>
<p>After establishing US-PRC diplomatic ties in 1979, Washington created self-imposed restrictions on high-level exchanges with Taiwan. However, with the Taiwan Travel Act signed into US law in 2018, all those restrictions on high-level visits from and to Taiwan have effectively been lifted.</p>
<p>Now, other than conceding to China’s isolation of Taiwan, one cannot think of any other reason why US President Joe Biden and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken — and their predecessors — would refrain from visiting Taiwan and signing a joint communique to reaffirm the US’ commitment to Taiwan and begin the process of normalizing relations with the democratic nation.</p>
<p>Since Biden took office in 2021, Washington has closely watched China’s increasing aggression against Taiwan. The US has issued joint communiques and statements with its G7 partners and other allies to reiterate their commitments to maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.</p>
<p>However, oddly and sadly, none of these communiques and statements involved Taiwan.</p>
<p>China has built up its military for decades, threatening peace and changing the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait. It is therefore more crucial and urgent than ever for the US and its allies to stand up to China’s continued bullying and diplomatic isolation of Taiwan, and openly challenge Beijing’s “one China” principle that unrealistically claims Taiwan as an integral part of China.</p>
<p>Taiwan has long possessed all the qualifications of statehood under international law. It has existed as a sovereign and independent state for decades, and deserves full membership in international organizations and formal recognition by all other states.</p>
<p>Last month, the US announced its recognition of and new diplomatic ties with two Pacific island nations, the Cook Islands and Niue, as part of its push to counter growing Chinese influence in the region.</p>
<p>Today, the US maintains diplomatic relations with almost every country in the world, except for North Korea, Iran, Bhutan and Taiwan. As a full-fledged democratic and free country that respects human rights, Taiwan does not belong on that short list of nations that do not have diplomatic ties with the US.</p>
<p>In 1954, then-US president Dwight Eisenhower, signed a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, formally committing to defend Taiwan militarily to contain communist China after the Korean War. Eisenhower also visited Taiwan in 1960, making him the first and only sitting US president to do so in history.</p>
<p>The US maintained diplomatic relations and a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan until 1979 and 1980 respectively, showing clearly that the US’ formal and robust military ties with Taiwan could effectively deter Beijing rather than leading to China’s full invasion of Taiwan.</p>
<p>The only real reason the PRC has not invaded Taiwan is that China has not yet built the capability and does not have the confidence to make a successful conquest, especially when Beijing believes that US troops would intervene and help defend Taiwan.</p>
<p>Instead of concluding another confusing communique with communist China, the US president or the secretary of state should visit and conclude a joint communique or a statement with Taiwan to support Taiwanese’s right to self-determination, make it clear that Taiwan is not part of China, and pledge that US forces would defend the nation from a Chinese attack.</p>
<p>Washington should not let Beijing dictate US policy toward Taiwan. Avoiding diplomatic recognition of Taiwan to appease the PRC would only encourage more Chinese bullying and aggression.</p>
<p>To more effectively deter China’s forcible annexation of Taiwan, the US, as the leading democratic country, should diplomatically recognize Taiwan’s true “status quo” as an independent, sovereign country and adopt a policy of “strategic clarity” on Taiwan.</p>
<p>Doing so is in Washington’s interest, both for geostrategic reasons as well as to maintain US leadership in the world and contain rising authoritarianism.</p>
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<h5 class="wp-block-heading">This article is first published in <span style="text-decoration: underline;"><a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2023/10/26/2003808222" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Taipei Times</a></span> (2023/10/26)</h5>
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		<p>The post <a href="https://fapa.org/what-us-should-do-about-taiwan/">What US Should Do about Taiwan</a> appeared first on <a href="https://fapa.org">Formosan Association for Public Affairs</a>.</p>
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		<title>Taiwan’s Defense Dilemma</title>
		<link>https://fapa.org/taiwans-defense-dilemma/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jenny Li]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 17 Jun 2023 14:59:10 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Op-Ed]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://fapa.org/?p=19966</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>As the U.S. urges Taiwan to adopt a security strategy that requires foreign intervention, it also upholds a policy of strategic ambiguity, making it difficult for Taipei to commit to a purely defensive approach.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://fapa.org/taiwans-defense-dilemma/">Taiwan’s Defense Dilemma</a> appeared first on <a href="https://fapa.org">Formosan Association for Public Affairs</a>.</p>
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<h3 class="wp-block-heading">As the U.S. urges Taiwan to adopt a security strategy that requires foreign intervention, it also upholds a policy of strategic ambiguity, making it difficult for Taipei to commit to a purely defensive approach.</h3>
<h6 class="has-text-align-right">By Jenny Li (李爰錚) | FAPA Policy Associate</h6>
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<p>Taiwan is now entering a busy season of election campaigns. Replete with its usual excitement and drama, the 2024 presidential election arrives at a moment of heightened anxiety in the Taiwanese political space, with the <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/pentagon-colin-kahl-us-china-taiwan-invasion-timeline-1757793">possibility</a> of a Chinese invasion before mid-century. The defense policies adopted by Taiwan’s next president could make this election one of the most critical in recent history.</p>
<p>Whoever takes office next May will face a paramount dilemma in planning the country’s defense. Namely, Taiwan has limited time and resources to prepare for a cross-strait conflict, but the successful implementation of its current military doctrine requires considerable resources and time.</p>
<p>Under the most optimistic circumstances, fully preparing for a Chinese invasion would be challenging. Now, differing threat perceptions between the United States and Taiwan have slowed the development of a strategy previously regarded as a practical solution to Taiwan’s defense dilemma.</p>
<h4><strong>The Porcupine in a Pickle</strong></h4>
<p>The <a href="https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1814&amp;context=nwc-review">porcupine strategy</a>, despite obstacles it faces in becoming fully embraced, remains the most popular solution to Taiwan’s defense problem. The strategy relies on Taiwan’s unique island geography to create localized advantages, allowing Taiwanese forces to repel an otherwise quantitatively superior People’s Liberation Army (PLA).</p>
<p>In 2017, Admiral Lee Hsi-min, then general chief of staff of Taiwan, developed the  “<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/taiwans-overall-defense-concept-explained/">Overall Defense Concept (ODC)</a>” to formally codify the porcupine strategy into Taiwan’s defense doctrine. Unlike Taiwan’s <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/the-evolution-of-taiwans-military-strategy-convergence-and-dissonance/">past military</a> doctrines, which sought deep-strike capabilities and the destruction of its adversaries,  the ODC redefined its <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/%E8%87%BA%E7%81%A3%E7%9A%84%E5%8B%9D%E7%AE%97_%E4%BB%A5%E5%B0%8F%E5%88%B6%E5%A4%A7%E7%9A%84%E4%B8%8D%E5%B0%8D%E7%A8%B1/hXmGEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&amp;gbpv=1&amp;bsq=%E4%BD%BF%E6%95%B5%E4%BA%BA%E5%A5%AA%E8%87%BA%E4%BB%BB%E5%8B%99%E5%A4%B1%E6%95%97">military objectives</a> as denying the enemy a successful takeover of Taiwan. The ODC suggests Taiwan abandon plans to establish sea control and air superiority, taking a more cost-effective and defensive approach in thwarting Chinese aggression.</p>
<p>The ODC is a <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE295/RAND_PE295.pdf">deterrence-by-denial</a> strategy that integrates concepts of asymmetry into all levels of military conduct, including training, force structure, command and control, and logistics. It recognizes that Taiwan can no longer compete with China symmetrically and assumes that large weapons systems and immobile infrastructure will be <a href="https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/230109_Cancian_FirstBattle_NextWar.pdf?VersionId=WdEUwJYWIySMPIr3ivhFolxC_gZQuSOQ">destroyed</a> at the beginning of an invasion. To survive the early stages of a cross-strait conflict, the ODC prescribes the use of survivable and mobile weapons, commonly called “asymmetric weapons.”</p>
<p>But weapons alone do not offer guidance on military conduct. Acquiring weapons perceived as asymmetric is meaningless without an overall asymmetric approach to defense. Taiwan can only fully benefit from asymmetric warfare if it integrates the philosophy of asymmetry into a theater strategy.</p>
<p>For many involved in U.S. defense policy, the ODC presented an <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/hope-on-the-horizon-taiwans-radical-new-defense-concept/">opportunity</a> to work with Taiwan on a common concept of asymmetric defense. An early <a href="https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/s4428/BILLS-117s4428is.pdf">version</a> of the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 called for an assessment of Taiwan’s commitment to the ODC. In a recent <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan">wargame</a>, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) also encouraged Taiwanese forces to adopt asymmetry. But Taiwan has not been enthusiastic in the uptake of the ODC. Some argue that it has abandoned the strategy completely.</p>
<h4><strong>Taiwan’s Response to Asymmetric Defense</strong></h4>
<p>President Tsai Ing-wen has sought to move Taiwan toward asymmetric defense. In her May 2020 <a href="https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6004">inaugural address</a>, Tsai noted that Taiwan would accelerate the development of its asymmetric capabilities, reform its reserve and mobilization systems, and improve its military management institutions. But the ODC has since disappeared from Taiwanese defense literature.</p>
<p>Taiwan’s <a href="https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/tdnswp/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/2021-Taiwan-Quadrennial-Defense-Review-QDR.pdf">2021 Quadrennial Defense Review</a> (QDR), the latest such review, alludes to asymmetric capabilities and warfare but does not mention an asymmetric strategy. Instead, it designates “Resolute Defense and Multi-domain Deterrence” as its primary objective, calling for air superiority, sea control, and long-range strike capabilities. This is an ambitious doctrine. It would essentially pit Taiwanese forces against the PLA plane-to-plane, ship-to-ship, and soldier-to-soldier.</p>
<p>In April 2023, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/15/taiwan-china-invasion-leaked-documents/">leaked documents</a> from the Pentagon revealed an alarming assessment about Taiwan’s military readiness: Its air defenses are unlikely to prevent the Chinese military from asserting air superiority in the event of a conflict. As disconcerting as this assessment may seem, the leaks bolster the claim that Taiwan’s defense doctrine is overly optimistic. Given the PLA’s quantitative superiority, Taipei cannot afford to seek dominance in every domain. Even the United States would have difficulty fighting symmetrically against China in the manner that Taiwan’s QDR prescribes.</p>
<p>“Taiwan has abandoned asymmetric defense reform in all but name,” Michael Hunzeker <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/taiwans-defense-plans-are-going-off-the-rails/">wrote for War on the Rocks</a>. “Instead, [Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense] is now planning to deter an invasion by threatening to retaliate with missile strikes against the Chinese homeland and by pitting Taiwanese units in direct combat against the vastly superior People’s Liberation Army.”</p>
<p>A recent <a href="https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/03/06/taiwan-is-a-vital-island-that-is-under-serious-threat">report</a> by The Economist on Taiwan’s defense commented that “Taiwan’s government repeats American talking-points about asymmetric warfare,”  but “its army has yet to commit to it.”</p>
<p>It is difficult to assess whether Taiwan has genuinely abandoned asymmetric defense without knowing what’s discussed behind closed doors. Similarly, one cannot determine whether Taiwan’s slow adoption of an overall asymmetric defense strategy results from holdups in the weapons procurement process. Authoritative sources <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/02/22/taiwan-weapons-china-gallagher/?pwapi_token=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWJpZCI6IjQ5ODMxMjg4IiwicmVhc29uIjoiZ2lmdCIsIm5iZiI6MTY3NzA0MjAwMCwiaXNzIjoic3Vic2NyaXB0aW9ucyIsImV4cCI6MTY3ODMzNzk5OSwiaWF0IjoxNjc3MDQyMDAwLCJqdGkiOiJhYTc4YTVlMS1jYWExLTRmZWQtODY2Yi00ZmY1ZThkZjhlZTciLCJ1cmwiOiJodHRwczovL3d3dy53YXNoaW5ndG9ucG9zdC5jb20vbmF0aW9uYWwtc2VjdXJpdHkvMjAyMy8wMi8yMi90YWl3YW4td2VhcG9ucy1jaGluYS1nYWxsYWdoZXIvIn0.cc7c5s5Uqsx7Py6yCl0rWqjeOzvtD-cGsM3jwrNVlis&amp;fbclid=IwAR0tr3xfw6CILW6awIlDDnYDGttuiv9qXSWHE4iDNMRFOFsb-rdl0Zj1_og">suggest</a> significant delays in weapons deliveries to Taiwan. In any case, Taipei faces a defense dilemma that may impede Taiwan-U.S. cooperation during a conflict.</p>
<h4><strong>The Asymmetry Paradox</strong></h4>
<p>Could Taipei and Washington be defining asymmetry differently? The term “asymmetry” is imprecise and misleading. In war, two opposing forces rarely fight symmetrically at any time and space, though many political commentators have erroneously equated asymmetry to small and mobile weapons systems. Imprecision in language, however, is not the source of Taiwan’s defense dilemma.</p>
<p>Among other reasons, Taipei’s reluctance to adopt the ODC may stem from differing risk perceptions and tolerance from that of the United States. The ODC takes the worst-case scenario as its foundation of analysis, but Taiwanese policymakers must plan for a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/taiwan-china-wargames/">range</a> of potential PLA aggressions, from customs quarantines to full blockades and missile strikes. There is thus a strong <a href="https://voicettank.org/%E5%8F%B0%E7%81%A3%E4%BD%9C%E6%88%B0%E7%AD%96%E7%95%A5%E4%B8%AD%E7%9A%84%E4%B8%8D%E5%B0%8D%E7%A8%B1%E9%98%B2%E8%A1%9B%E8%BE%AF%E8%AB%96/">incentive</a> to maintain large conventional platforms that work against non-invasion scenarios. Conventional weapons can counter China’s increasingly coercive gray-zone activities. Their visibility also improves public morale and confidence in Taiwan’s defense.</p>
<p>By contrast, Washington is primarily concerned with a Chinese invasion because it is the scenario that presents the greatest security challenge. A successful naval blockade, for instance, may be an operational success but a strategic failure for Beijing because it falls short of achieving the political victory of taking over Taiwan yet risks international opprobrium and sanction. For the United States, Taiwan should thus focus on the invasion scenario and direct its limited resources to smaller weapons systems.</p>
<p>But the crux of Taiwan’s defense dilemma is <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/12/the-counter-intuitive-sensibility-of-taiwans-new-defense-strategy/">uncertainty</a> over whether the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense. Taking a primarily defensive approach in thwarting a PLA invasion, the ODC asks Taiwan to hold out for as long as possible, presumably awaiting the arrival of foreign military assistance. Yet there is uncertainty about whether and how the U.S. and its allies would support Taiwan during a cross-strait conflict. Taiwanese policymakers must prepare for every scenario; they cannot only prepare for the worst-case invasion scenario and take a purely defensive posture by only purchasing and using small and mobile weapons.</p>
<p>Taiwan’s defense dilemma, therefore, revolves around a paradox. As the United States urges Taiwan to adopt a strategy suited for an invasion scenario that requires foreign intervention, it also upholds a policy of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/18/taiwan-us-china-strategic-ambiguity-military-strategy-asymmetric-defense-invasion/">strategic ambiguity</a>, making it difficult for Taipei to settle on the ODC conclusively.</p>
<h4><strong>Moving Forward With Transparency</strong></h4>
<p>Taiwan cannot be expected to adopt a strategy that requires U.S. military assistance without promises of such assistance. Many have therefore proposed <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/american-support-taiwan-must-be-unambiguous">strategic clarity</a> as a solution to this paradox, including Taiwanese American organizations like the Formosan Association for Public Affairs, where I currently work as a policy associate. President Joe Biden has verbally <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/19/joe-biden-repeats-claim-that-us-forces-would-defend-taiwan-if-china-attacked">guaranteed</a> U.S. military assistance to Taiwan on multiple occasions, but that falls short of an official commitment. The United States’ role during a cross-strait conflict remains uncertain.</p>
<p>Today, cooperation between the U.S. and Taiwan has grown at the tactical level, but there are insufficient formal conversations on strategy. For Taiwan to develop a pragmatic defense strategy, Washington should offer greater transparency about the forms U.S. assistance to Taipei might take. A recent bipartisan <a href="https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202306090004">bill</a>, the Taiwan Protection and National Resilience Act of 2023, attempts to clarify U.S. options in the event of a cross-strait conflict. Investigation of U.S. options is a good start, but U.S. policymakers should also articulate these options to their Taiwanese counterparts. Discussions could be held in private if there are concerns about startling Beijing.</p>
<p>Taiwan needs transparency from the U.S. to achieve pragmatism and clarity in its defense strategy. This strategy must reflect the limited time and resources available to Taiwan, while allowing room for cooperation with the United States and its allies. Fortunately, both U.S. and Taiwanese policymakers are <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2023/01/04/2003791953">cognizant</a> of Taiwan’s defense dilemma, and efforts to resolve it appear to be underway. As Beijing grows increasingly bellicose toward its neighbors, Taiwan’s defense dilemma is one of the most significant challenges to Taiwan-U.S. cooperation today.</p>
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<h5 class="wp-block-heading">This article is first published in <span style="text-decoration: underline;"><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/06/taiwans-defense-dilemma/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">The Diplomat</a></span> (2023/06/17)</h5>
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		<p>The post <a href="https://fapa.org/taiwans-defense-dilemma/">Taiwan’s Defense Dilemma</a> appeared first on <a href="https://fapa.org">Formosan Association for Public Affairs</a>.</p>
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		<title>軍事協防之外，美國應重申台灣非中國領土，並承認台灣獨立現狀與國格</title>
		<link>https://fapa.org/the-us-should-recognize-taiwans-independence-and-statehood/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Chih-Jung Huang]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 26 Dec 2022 03:26:00 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>FAPA認為，美國在加強對台軍事承諾與合作的同時，亦應公開挑戰北京的「一中原則」，嚴正重申「台灣並非中國的一部分」；支持台灣人民擁有決定台灣地位與前途之自決權；並推動台美關係正常化，強化承認台灣主權獨立現狀及國格，最終實現台美正式建交。如此，才能有效對抗中國對台的軍事戰、法律戰、與外交戰。</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://fapa.org/the-us-should-recognize-taiwans-independence-and-statehood/">軍事協防之外，美國應重申台灣非中國領土，並承認台灣獨立現狀與國格</a> appeared first on <a href="https://fapa.org">Formosan Association for Public Affairs</a>.</p>
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<h6 class="has-text-align-right wp-block-heading" style="text-align: right;">簡明子（台灣人公共事務會會長）</h6>
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<p>因應中國不斷升高對台軍事威脅，美國總統拜登自上任以來四度公開表態，若中國武力犯台，美國將出兵保衛台灣。日前，美國參眾兩院通過二○二三財政年度《國防授權法》（NDAA），亦致力強化台灣防衛能力，包括授權未來五年共一百億美元的對台無償軍援，引起各界關注。該法案於十二月二十三日經<a class="ooo" href="http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4164026" target="_blank" rel="noopener">拜登總統簽署</a>後，已正式生效成為美國法律。</p>
<p>此法案納入《台灣強化韌性法》（Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act），其核心內容來自參院外交委員會所通過之《台灣政策法》（Taiwan Policy Act），不僅詳列強化台美防衛夥伴關係之具體倡議，亦包括成立「台灣學人計畫」（亦稱《台灣獎學金法》）、支持台灣國際參與、落實《台灣旅行法》等友台條款，展現美國國會對台灣的跨黨派高度支持。</p>
<p>然而，參院與眾院版《台灣政策法》中關於提升台美雙邊政府互動、尊重台灣主權尊嚴、賦予台灣實質外交待遇（例如駐美代表處更名為「台灣代表處」）等重要條文，卻傳出白宮方面有所顧忌，而未能一併納入此次所通過生效之《國防授權法》，令人遺憾。</p>
<p>總部位於華府的<a class="ooo" href="http://fapa.org/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">「台灣人公共事務會」（FAPA）</a>認為，美國在加強對台軍事承諾與合作的同時，亦應公開挑戰北京的「一中原則」，嚴正重申「台灣並非中國的一部分」，並推動台美關係正常化，強化承認台灣獨立國格，最終實現台美正式建交。如此，才能有效對抗中國對台的軍事戰、法律戰、與外交戰。</p>
<p>事實上，自一九四五年二戰終戰以來，美國曾多次否認台澎為中國領土。但在一九七○年代美中關係正常化後，美國卻刻意避談台灣主權歸屬問題，不挑戰中方對台領土主張，進而被中國惡意扭曲美國對台立場，造成「美國已承認台灣屬中」的嚴重與普遍誤解。直到二○二○年十一月，時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧公開表示「台灣依然不是中國的一部分」，美國政府才再度「表態」中國並未擁有台灣主權。</p>
<p>面對中國對台文攻武嚇、企圖併吞台灣，我們呼籲拜登所領導的美國政府應放棄模糊不清的「一中政策」，明確重申「台灣非中國領土」，且支持台灣人民擁有決定台灣地位與前途之自決權，並保障台灣維護主權獨立現狀及國格的決心與堅持。</p>
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<h6 class="wp-block-heading">原文刊載於<span style="text-decoration: underline;"><a href="https://talk.ltn.com.tw/article/paper/1558934">自由時報</a></span>（2022/12/25）</h6>
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		<p>The post <a href="https://fapa.org/the-us-should-recognize-taiwans-independence-and-statehood/">軍事協防之外，美國應重申台灣非中國領土，並承認台灣獨立現狀與國格</a> appeared first on <a href="https://fapa.org">Formosan Association for Public Affairs</a>.</p>
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		<title>Beyond Strategic Clarity: Biden Should Make Clear to Xi That Taiwan Is Not Part of China</title>
		<link>https://fapa.org/biden-should-make-clear-to-xi-that-taiwan-is-not-part-of-china/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Chih-Jung Huang]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 13 Nov 2022 15:35:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Op-Ed]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[One China Policy]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Taiwan&#039;s Status]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>We at FAPA call on the U.S. to abandon its misleading “One China Policy,”  and urge President Biden to restate the U.S. longstanding position on Taiwan’s “undetermined” status when he meets with Xi, making clear that the U.S. regards that “Taiwan is NOT part of China.”</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://fapa.org/biden-should-make-clear-to-xi-that-taiwan-is-not-part-of-china/">Beyond Strategic Clarity: Biden Should Make Clear to Xi That Taiwan Is Not Part of China</a> appeared first on <a href="https://fapa.org">Formosan Association for Public Affairs</a>.</p>
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<h6 class="has-text-align-right wp-block-heading">By Chih-Jung Huang (黃致榮) | FAPA Policy Fellow</h6>
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<p>U.S. President Joe Biden is scheduled to hold talks with China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Indonesia on November 14, 2022 — their first in-person meeting since Biden took office in January 2021. We at the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA) call on the Biden administration to reassess the One China Policy, which has provided China with a distorted justification for its claims on Taiwan.</p>
<p>On September 18, 2022, President Biden pledged that the U.S. forces would defend Taiwan if China invaded. The comments marked the clearest statement and the fourth time since his taking of office that Biden vowed that the U.S. would defend Taiwan militarily, effectively ending so-called U.S. “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan’s defense.</p>
<p>When asked about what Xi should know about the U.S. commitment to Taiwan, Biden said that “[we] agree with what we signed onto a long time ago [with the People’s Republic of China (PRC)]” and that “there’s One China Policy.”</p>
<p>We believe that when dealing with Taiwan, the U.S. should focus more on the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the 1982 Six Assurances rather than the U.S.-PRC Three Joint Communiques — the basis of the U.S. One China Policy.</p>
<p>The U.S. “One China Policy” — which, though merely “acknowledges” China’s position over Taiwan — is not only misleading but also dangerous. It misleads the general public and international community into thinking that the U.S. “recognizes” the Chinese claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. It also emboldens China to invade and annex Taiwan by force.</p>
<p>As China continues to increase its military aggression and hasten an invasion of Taiwan, it is now time for Biden and his administration to publicly revitalize the U.S.’s longstanding position on Taiwan’s undetermined status, and make clear to Xi, the PRC, and the world that Taiwan is not part of China and use collective deterrence to prevent China’s invasion of Taiwan.</p>
<h4>U.S. Longstanding Position on Taiwan’s “Undetermined” Status</h4>
<p>Since the Japanese surrender to the Allied Powers in 1945, the United States has long maintained the position that China has never acquired sovereignty over Taiwan and that Taiwan’s international status remains “unsettled” or “undetermined.” Statements from various U.S. officials in the early post-war period attest to this point.</p>
<p>On November 21, 1946, the U.S. Department of State informed the Republic of China’s Embassy in the U.S. that “from the legal standpoint the transfer of Taiwan’s sovereignty remains to be formalized.” On April 15, 1949, Michael J. McDermott, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations, also stated that “[Taiwan’s] final status will be determined by the peace treaty if and when we get one” with Japan.</p>
<p>As Secretary of State John Foster Dulles explained on December 1, 1954, “technical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores [i.e., Penghu islands] has never been settled. That is because the Japanese Peace Treaty merely involves a renunciation by Japan of its right and title to these islands. But the future title is not determined by the Japanese Peace Treaty nor is it determined by the Peace Treaty which was concluded between the Republic of China and Japan.”</p>
<p>Prior to 1970, the U.S. State Department repeatedly testified to Congress that the legal status of Taiwan remained “unsettled.” The State Department also wrote to the Senate during hearings in 1969 and 1970 that: “In neither [the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 nor the Taipei Peace Treaty of 1952] did Japan cede this area [of Taiwan and the Pescadores] to any particular entity. As Taiwan and the Pescadores are not covered by any existing international disposition, sovereignty over the area is an unsettled question subject to future international resolution.”</p>
<h4>Problems With the One China Policy</h4>
<p>While the U.S. has never accepted China’s claim over Taiwan, its One China Policy is confusing and has led to dangerous misinterpretations. Its origins lie in a series of communications between the U.S. and China prior to their normalization of relations.</p>
<p>In the 1972 Shanghai Communique, the United States declared that it “acknowledges” — rather than “recognizes” — that “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait” maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China, and also that the U.S. Government “does not challenge that position.”</p>
<p>When negotiating the Chinese translation of the U.S. policy statements in the Shanghai Communique, the Nixon administration insisted to the Chinese that the verb “acknowledge” be translated as “renshidao” (takes note of) instead of “chengren” (recognize) to make clear that the U.S. itself did not accept the Chinese position and territorial claim over Taiwan.</p>
<p>In the 1979 Normalization Communique, the U.S. again only “acknowledges” the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. And in the August 17, 1982 Communique, the U.S. just stated that it had already “acknowledged” the Chinese position of one China and Taiwan is part of China.</p>
<p>Although the U.S. did not “recognize” or “accept” the PRC’s territorial claim over Taiwan in the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques, the communiques’ statements gave the PRC an unnecessary opportunity to distort the U.S. position by equating a position of acknowledgment with one of recognition.</p>
<p>As such, the U.S. should abolish the One China Policy, as it provides the PRC with a legal “justification” to invade and annex Taiwan. Through a distortion of this confusing policy, the PRC has accused the U.S. of violating China’s territorial integrity and its sovereignty over Taiwan. Indeed, they often point to the joint communiques as evidence that the U.S. has “recognized” its claims over Taiwan.</p>
<p>Instead, the U.S. should rely on the Taiwan Relations Act and Six Assurances to define its relationship with Taiwan. The TRA has guided U.S. policy toward Taiwan in the absence of a diplomatic relationship since 1979. In passing the TRA, Congress mandated that Taiwan be treated like an independent sovereign country for the purposes of U.S. law: “Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with such respect to Taiwan.” When emphasizing the One China Policy, however, this reality is often neglected.</p>
<p>The 1982 Six Assurances, too, has been adhered to by all subsequent U.S. administrations, assuring that the U.S. “[has] not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan.” Since 2016, Congress has passed several pieces of legislation reaffirming that the Six Assurances, together with the TRA, form the “cornerstone” of U.S. relations with Taiwan. Both the Trump and Biden administrations have explicitly recognized the Six Assurances as a cornerstone of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Going forward, the U.S. should emphasize the TRA and Six Assurances, which are formal documents, rather than the One China Policy, which has provided the PRC with a pretext for annexing Taiwan.</p>
<h4>The Biden Administration Should Challenge China’s Claim over Taiwan</h4>
<p>The world has undergone dramatic changes since the 1970s, and the One China Policy no longer reflects current realities. Taiwan is now a vibrant democratic country, while China has become openly aggressive and belligerent. Polls consistently show that most Taiwanese identify themselves as “Taiwanese” rather than Chinese. The “One China Policy” is outdated.</p>
<p>The U.S.’s entire “One China” concept and its decision to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC (and cut off official ties with Taiwan) were predicated on Beijing’s commitment to resolve its differences with Taiwan peacefully. However, in the past five decades, Beijing has torn up its promises and routinely threatened to annex Taiwan by force.</p>
<p>The Taiwan Relations Act specifies that it is the U.S. policy to consider any non-peaceful means to determine the future of Taiwan “a threat” to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of “grave concern” to the United States. It has also made clear that the U.S.’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan “will be determined” by peaceful means.</p>
<p>Since China has significantly increased its military capability and seeks to accelerate its annexation of Taiwan, it has been long overdue for the U.S. to abandon its confusing and dangerous One China Policy, as the policy — as laid down in the three communiques — is supposed to be conditional on China’s peaceful approach to Taiwan.</p>
<p>Even if the U.S. is not prepared to formally recognize Taiwan’s independent statehood, President Biden should restate the U.S. longstanding position on Taiwan’s “undetermined” status when he meets with Xi, making clear that the U.S. regards that Taiwan is not part of China and that Taiwan’s status and future should be determined peacefully in accordance with the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan.</p>
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<h5 class="wp-block-heading">This article is first published in <span style="text-decoration: underline;"><a href="https://international.thenewslens.com/article/176435" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">News Lens</a></span> (2022/11/13)</h5>
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		<p>The post <a href="https://fapa.org/biden-should-make-clear-to-xi-that-taiwan-is-not-part-of-china/">Beyond Strategic Clarity: Biden Should Make Clear to Xi That Taiwan Is Not Part of China</a> appeared first on <a href="https://fapa.org">Formosan Association for Public Affairs</a>.</p>
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		<title>美國應明確將台灣納入共同防禦體系</title>
		<link>https://fapa.org/us-taiwan-mutual-defense/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Chih-Jung Huang]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 10 Dec 2021 17:49:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Op-Ed]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>如今，華府已無法獨自因應中國對台灣及其他印太民主國家所造成的武力威脅。美國應明確將台灣納入以其為首的共同防禦體系，這不僅讓美國與盟國能適時提供台灣軍事合作與協助，亦完全符合美國的核心共享價值與印太地區的最佳共同利益。</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://fapa.org/us-taiwan-mutual-defense/">美國應明確將台灣納入共同防禦體系</a> appeared first on <a href="https://fapa.org">Formosan Association for Public Affairs</a>.</p>
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<h6 class="has-text-align-right wp-block-heading" style="text-align: right;">簡明子（台灣人公共事務會會長）</h6>
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<p>身為台裔美國人，我們非常感謝美國對普世人權及台灣民主的長期守護與支持。然而，中國崛起為侵略性強權的明顯態勢，令我們警覺亦備感不安。北京當局對香港基本政治自由的無情鎮壓，以及對圖博與維吾爾民族認同的系統性滅絕，再再警示著中國霸權若在亞洲持續擴張，將對全體人類帶來悲慘後果。基於複雜的歷史因素，台灣身為印太地區最有活力的民主國家而存在本身，即對威權中國的正當性構成明顯挑戰。也因此，中共政權處心積慮要迫使台灣臣服並納入中國版圖。</p>
<p>今日，台灣的獨立國格與民主自由正遭逢前所未有的生存危機。近年來，中國不僅積極擴充軍力以完備征台作戰能力，並以實際軍事行動來升高對台武力恫嚇。自今年年初以來，中國幾乎每天派軍機侵入台灣的「防空識別區」（Air Defense Identification Zone，ADIZ）；10月1日至4日，更於短短4天內大肆派出149架次軍機騷擾台灣空域，10月4日當天則創下56架次的歷年單日新高紀錄。</p>
<p>趁著美國過去幾十年來對印太地區的忽略，中國打造了龐大與先進的現代化艦隊，使得中美兩國的海軍實力差距大幅縮小。不僅中國海軍軍力大規模擴張，從中國人民解放軍「反介入／區域拒止」（Anti-Access/Area Denial，A2/AD）能力的快速提升、以及彈道飛彈與防空飛彈數量的壓倒性優勢，皆可看出區域軍事平衡正逐漸偏向中國，而台灣更是壟罩在被中國武力併吞的巨大威脅之中。</p>
<p>美中在區域的軍力失衡正不斷加劇，而這也意味著美國對防衛台灣所長期採取的「戰略模糊」（Strategic Ambiguity）策略，已無法有效保障台灣安全與維持台海穩定。即使台灣從不具備軍事挑戰中國的能力，美國在過去仍長年自我限制對台軍售的類型與質量，實質上造成台灣防禦能力的相對弱化；相反地，美國曾長期對中國的軍力大幅提升視而不見，促使北京當局更加恣意妄為，積極對外擴張。</p>
<p>由此可見，化解台海軍力失衡與台灣安全危機，早已刻不容緩。然而，即便拜登政府已意識到此一失衡與危機，但單靠美國本身並無法徹底挽回頹勢。美國海軍目前仍須仰賴北約與日本海軍在印太持續展現能見度，才能勉強重建區域平衡。有鑒於此，美國與其盟國應將台灣軍隊更緊密地納入此軍事同盟，並積極透過軍售及技術授權，加速提升台灣海軍的防禦系統與高科技作戰能力。</p>
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<p>針對美國如何加強與台灣的安全合作、協助提升台灣國防能力、並遏止台海爆發戰爭，本文擬提出下列四項簡單而有效的策略：</p>
<p>一、在軍事保衛台灣的議題上，華府應明確採取「戰略清晰」（Strategic Clarity）的策略。所謂戰略清晰意味著美國必須認清「民主台灣並未挑起戰端，而威權中國係武力侵略者」的事實。中國若對台灣侵略佔領，這不僅體現其稱霸印太的野心，亦將嚴重危及美國的核心利益與亞洲的民主和平。</p>
<p>二、拜登政府應邀請台灣參加兩年一度的「環太平洋軍事演習」（Rim of the Pacific Exercise， RIMPAC）。環太平洋多國聯合軍演每兩年在夏威夷群島周邊舉行，由美國印太司令部主辦，是世界上規模最大的國際海上演習。中國曾三度以觀察員身分參與該軍演，但美國自2018年起已停止邀請中國，以因應中方軍事化南海人造島礁的擴張行徑。身處第一島鏈的台灣為印太戰略中極重要的一環；邀請台灣參與環太平洋軍演，對於增進多國海軍合作與太平洋區域穩定的目標而言，實屬不可或缺。</p>
<p>三、拜登政府應將台灣納入美國的「盟邦戰爭儲備庫存」（War Reserve Stocks for Allies，WRSA）計畫。以台灣目前的防禦計畫來看，台灣軍隊需要大量的消耗性物資與彈藥來對抗中國的軍事攻擊，但美國的對台軍售政策並不允許台灣擁有如此龐大的戰備庫存。倘中國武力犯台，在中國高度的「反介入／區域拒止」能力下，距離遙遠的美軍將無法及時軍事馳援台灣，即便抵台亦不可能毫髮無傷。因此，美國外交關係協會（The Council on Foreign Relations）於近期呼籲美國政府，應將台灣納入「盟邦戰爭儲備庫存」計畫。此計畫將類似美國目前與以色列及北約組織間的相關做法，預先把美國軍事裝備與彈藥儲備於台灣，以供美軍與（或）台灣軍隊在戰事爆發時能在美國國防部同意後及時使用。該 WRSA 計畫將以在台儲備美軍「防禦性」裝備為主，這亦與美國長期的對台政策相一致。</p>
<p>四、強化台美高層軍事交流。軍事交流是強化台美國防安全合作最有效且務實的方法，有助於增進雙邊軍事溝通的透明、清晰、及效率，並大幅降低危機爆發時的溝通混亂情況。</p>
<p>維持台海軍事平衡是確保印太地區和平穩定的必要條件。美國於1979年通過生效的《台灣關係法》（Taiwan Relations Act）雖承諾提供防禦性武器給台灣，但美國在過去幾十年來卻強烈認為台灣並不需要太過於先進的防禦系統，以至於在中國近年極力擴充提升軍備後，造成台海兩邊的軍力失衡與台灣的安全危機。</p>
<p>台裔美國人對於我們的故鄉台灣有著深厚的情感，對台灣成為民主楷模與經濟強國更是感到無比驕傲。如今，華府已無法獨自因應中國對台灣及其他印太民主國家所造成的武力威脅。美國應明確將台灣納入以其為首的共同防禦體系，這不僅讓美國與盟國能適時提供台灣軍事合作與協助，亦完全符合美國的核心共享價值與印太地區的最佳共同利益。</p>
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<h6 class="wp-block-heading">原文刊載於<a href="https://www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?Type=2&amp;SerialNo=131911"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">上報</span></a>（2021/12/10）</h6>
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		<p>The post <a href="https://fapa.org/us-taiwan-mutual-defense/">美國應明確將台灣納入共同防禦體系</a> appeared first on <a href="https://fapa.org">Formosan Association for Public Affairs</a>.</p>
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		<title>政府應以台灣名義申請入聯　向國際重申台灣國格</title>
		<link>https://fapa.org/applying-for-un-membership-in-the-name-of-taiwan/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Chih-Jung Huang]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Sep 2021 14:43:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Op-Ed]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://fapa.org/?p=14165</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>台灣政府向聯合國祕書處提出以「台灣名義」入聯成為會員國的「申請」本身，在國際法及國際政治上即具有「自我重申台灣國格」與「反駁台灣屬於中國」的重大意義。這不僅能彰顯台灣國家的主權獨立性、以及台灣政府的國際代表性，且有助於台灣爭取國際承認與擴展外交空間。</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://fapa.org/applying-for-un-membership-in-the-name-of-taiwan/">政府應以台灣名義申請入聯　向國際重申台灣國格</a> appeared first on <a href="https://fapa.org">Formosan Association for Public Affairs</a>.</p>
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<h6 class="has-text-align-right wp-block-heading" style="text-align: right;"><strong>黃致榮（FAPA政策研究員）</strong></h6>
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<p>第76屆聯合國大會於9月21日至27日舉行總辯論。今年，蔡政府仍延續其執政以來的入聯政策，由外交部長在各大國際媒體發表專文，並洽請友邦於聯大總辯論仗義執言，呼籲讓台灣加入或參與聯合國體系。然而，更為重要的是，台灣政府本身應更加主動積極以「台灣名義」申請入聯、成為正式會員國，藉以向國際重申「台灣主權獨立」的立場，並反駁「台灣屬於中國」的謬論。</p>
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<h4 class="wp-block-heading">聯大第2758號決議被曲解、誤引，以致「台灣」首度入聯申請遭逕行退回</h4>
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<p>自1971年10月25日聯合國大會通過第2758號決議以來，中華人民共和國即惡意扭曲該決議，宣稱聯合國已確認「台灣是中國的一部分」，並承認中華人民共和國政府為包括「台灣同胞」在內之「全體中國人民」的唯一合法代表，不公不義地將台灣排除在聯合國體系之外已近半世紀。</p>
<p>2007年，扁政府首度以「台灣之名」申請入聯，卻遭當時聯合國秘書長潘基文及秘書處「錯誤引用」聯大第2758號決議，藉口「台灣為中華人民共和國的一部分」，逕自退回台灣的申請書，而未依《聯合國憲章》及相關議事規則將台灣的「入會申請案」提交安全理事會決定。</p>
<p>聯合國祕書處曲解聯大決議、誤認台灣屬中，隨即被美、日、加等國表達關切，要求予以改正。此外，美國政府亦於《美國對台灣地位的立場說帖》（U.S. Non-Paper on the Status of Taiwan）中表明：「聯合國大會……第2758號決議，事實上並未確立台灣為中華人民共和國的一省。該決議僅承認中華人民共和國政府的代表是中國在聯合國組織的唯一合法代表，並把蔣介石的代表從其在聯合國及所有相關組織所佔據之席位上驅逐出去……並未提及中國對台灣擁有主權」。</p>
<p>不久，聯合國秘書長潘基文向當時美國駐聯合國大使哈里札德（Zalmay Khalilzad）承諾，以後在提及台灣時，將會更為謹慎用詞，且「聯合國將不再使用『台灣是中國一部分』的說法」（the UN would no longer use the phrase ‘Taiwan is a part of China’）。</p>
<p></p>
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<h4 class="wp-block-heading">美方近期對台灣參與國際組織與聯合國體系的支持</h4>
<p></p>
<p></p>
<p>然而，隨著中國逐年擴大國際影響力，不僅聯合國至今仍將台灣拒於門外，甚至其體系下的國際組織（例如世界衛生組織）依然錯誤引用聯大第2758號決議，將其曲解為已確立「台灣是中國的一部分」、並已授權中華人民共和國政府在聯合國體系中代表台灣，藉以拒絕台灣的入會與參與。此外，自2016年5月蔡政府上任至2019年9月之間，中國已先後威脅利誘台灣的七個邦交國與之斷交，使得台灣至今僅剩十五個邦交國。</p>
<p>有鑒於此，美國在2020年所通過生效的《台灣友邦法》（TAIPEI Act，亦簡稱《台北法》）以及《台灣保證法》（Taiwan Assurance Act）之中，則表達美國政府對台灣維持拓展邦交、參與國際組織的支持。美國國會於今年4月更提出《台灣國際團結法》（Taiwan International Solidarity Act），力圖澄清聯大第2758號決議僅決定聯合國體系內的「中國代表權問題」，而未處理關乎台灣及台灣人民的「台灣代表權問題」，亦未在「中華人民共和國與台灣之關係」以及「台灣主權爭議」上採取任何立場。</p>
<p>此外，目前仍在美國國會審理中的《美國創新暨競爭法》（U.S. Innovation and Competition Act）、《確保美國全球領導地位與參與法案》（EAGLE Act）、《台灣關係強化法》（Taiwan Relations Reinforcement Act）等友台法案，亦同樣要求美國政府積極支持與推動台灣有意義的參與國際組織。</p>
<p>9月9日，美國聯邦眾議員裴利（Scott Perry）與帝芬尼（Tom Tiffany）聯名致函美國駐聯合國大使湯瑪斯-葛林斐德（Linda Thomas-Greenfield），表示毫無道理將台灣排除在聯合國之外長達五十年之久，並呼籲美國政府利用其影響力，確保台灣取得「聯合國正式會員國資格」（full membership in the United Nations）。</p>
<p></p>
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<h4 class="wp-block-heading">台灣當然具備申請入聯之資格，惟國際社會對「台灣是否主張國格」仍有所存疑</h4>
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<p>顯而易見地，台灣不僅具備國際法上所有「國家構成要件」（一定人口、特定領土、有效統治的中央政府、與他國交往的能力），是一個「愛好和平」（peace-loving）的主權國家，亦「確能並願意履行」（able and willing to carry out）《聯合國憲章》所載之義務，當然有資格依《聯合國憲章》第4條第 1 項之規定，申請成為聯合國會員國。</p>
<p>然而在中國的外交打壓與霸凌下，台灣被排除在聯合國體系外已近半世紀，這不僅貶抑台灣的國家地位與尊嚴，剝奪台灣二千三百萬人平等參與國際社會的集體人權，亦違反聯合國自身的「會籍普遍化原則」（the principle of universality）。</p>
<p>雖然1949年後位於台北的中央政府「在客觀上」僅是個穩定有效統治「台澎金馬等地」的「台灣政府」，但在兩蔣威權時代卻「在主觀上」長期自認並宣稱係代表「包含台灣在內的全中國」的唯一合法「中國政府」，以致在國際間造成「台灣自我否認國家地位」以及「台灣是中國一部分」的錯誤認知與印象。</p>
<p>即便李登輝執政後期已提出「兩岸為特殊的國與國關係」的「特殊兩國論」，且扁政府上台後明確採取「台灣是主權獨立國家」的「一邊一國論」主張、甚至首度以「台灣之名」申請入聯，但其後的馬政府卻刻意捏造「九二共識就是一個中國各自表述」的「一中各表論」，造成國際社會對「台灣是否自我宣稱國格」依然有所質疑與不解，而有待台灣政府積極闡明與澄清。</p>
<p></p>
<p></p>
<h4 class="wp-block-heading">以台灣名義申請入聯具有「重申台灣國格」與「反駁台灣屬中」的重大意義</h4>
<p></p>
<p></p>
<p>蔡政府上任以來，拒不接受「九二共識就是一中各表」以及「兩岸同屬一個中國」等有損台灣主體性的說法，亦不時向台灣內部及國際媒體傳達「台灣是主權獨立國家」的明確立場。然而，若要確實扭轉國際社會對「台灣國家定位」的長期誤解與模糊不清，以台灣名義爭取入聯才是最為積極有效的做法。此舉不僅能伸張台灣的獨立主權與國家尊嚴，亦能引起各國政府注意而達到國際宣傳的效果。</p>
<p>《聯合國憲章》第4條規定唯有主權「國家」（states）才有資格加入聯合國成為會員，也因此，台灣政府以「台灣名義」向聯合國祕書處申請成為聯合國會員國的同時，亦在國際法上產生「台灣自我主張或重申『國家地位』或『國格』（statehood）」的法律效果。即便未必能因此順利入聯，但以台灣之名申請入聯的做法本身，即能有效反駁部分國際法學者錯認「台灣從未自我主張國格，因此不是國家」的誤解與質疑。</p>
<p>此外，以台灣名義爭取入聯，亦是向國際社會明確宣示「台灣是一個主權獨立的國家」，與中華人民共和國互不隸屬，並可釐清「台灣不是中國的一部分」以及中國政府不能代表台灣及台灣人民的根本事實，藉以積極抗衡中國「扭曲台灣法律地位」、「宣傳台灣屬於中國」的國際法律戰與文宣戰。</p>
<p>綜上所述，即便台灣入聯之路必然遭受中國的打壓與反對而困難重重，但台灣政府向聯合國祕書處提出以「台灣名義」入聯成為會員國的「申請」本身，在國際法及國際政治上即具有「自我重申台灣國格」與「反駁台灣屬於中國」的重大意義。這不僅能彰顯台灣國家的主權獨立性、以及台灣政府的國際代表性，且有助於台灣爭取國際承認與擴展外交空間。台灣政府應每年主動以「台灣之名」申請入聯，終有一日能順利使台灣成為聯合國的會員國，實現全體台灣人的共同心願與期待。</p>
<p> </p>
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<h6 class="wp-block-heading">原文刊載於<a href="https://www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?Type=2&amp;SerialNo=125341"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">上報</span></a>（2021/9/27）</h6>
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		<p>The post <a href="https://fapa.org/applying-for-un-membership-in-the-name-of-taiwan/">政府應以台灣名義申請入聯　向國際重申台灣國格</a> appeared first on <a href="https://fapa.org">Formosan Association for Public Affairs</a>.</p>
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		<title>坎貝爾的弦外之音：尊重台灣人自決權　實質維護台獨現狀</title>
		<link>https://fapa.org/campbell-taiwan-0706/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Chih-Jung Huang]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 14 Jul 2021 18:53:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Op-Ed]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://fapa.org/?p=8077</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>美國承認台灣人民擁有決定台灣前途的自決權，且尊重台灣人的自由意志與維持台獨現狀的長期意願與堅持。對美國來說，其實早無「是否支持台灣獨立」的問題，只剩做出「何時正式承認台灣國家地位」、「何時與台灣建立邦交」等國際政治上之決斷。</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://fapa.org/campbell-taiwan-0706/">坎貝爾的弦外之音：尊重台灣人自決權　實質維護台獨現狀</a> appeared first on <a href="https://fapa.org">Formosan Association for Public Affairs</a>.</p>
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<h6 class="wp-block-heading has-text-align-right">簡明子（台灣人公共事務會會長）</h6>
<p> </p>

<p>7月6日，美國白宮印太事務協調官坎貝爾（Kurt Campbell）在智庫活動上回答提問時表示：「我們（美國）不支持台灣獨立（we do not support Taiwan independence）」。這番話在台灣引發熱烈討論，甚至被扭曲成是美國在警告「台獨之路走不通」且批評蔡政府操弄兩岸對立。其實，坎貝爾當天的整段談話，不僅符合美國支持兩岸「維持現狀」的既定政策，致力維護台海和平穩定，他甚至表達多項挺台言論，間接呼應美國尊重台灣人自決權的長期立場。</p>

<p>首先，坎貝爾該段發言的主要目的，在於對中國傳遞清晰的「威懾」（deterrence）訊息，警告中方若武力犯台將面對「災難性」（catastrophic）的後果。他強調美國在處理對台事務上必須保持「非常微妙及危險的平衡」，並且美方在維持台海和平穩定上擁有「極端重要的利益」；而日本、英國等其他國家也已逐漸意識到並承認，維護台海和平攸關國際局勢穩定的深切利益。</p>

<p>其次，坎貝爾當時絕無警告「台獨走不通」之意，亦非針對台灣地位提出任何重大宣示；他反倒是要指責中國近期無端升高對台威脅，且表明美國並未改變對台政策。早在1998年，美國總統柯林頓於上海提及對台「三不」政策時，即已公開說過「我們（美國）不支持台灣獨立」。然而，該政策從不等於美國「反對」台獨，遑論美國「承認」台海兩岸同屬一個中國。事實上，自二戰終戰以來，美國即維持「台灣法律地位未定」的官方立場，亦不時表態「台灣不是中國的一部分」。</p>

<p>所謂「美國不支持台灣獨立」，頂多只是美方重申對台灣主權爭議之最終解決「不採取特定立場」。雖然就台獨支持者來說，美方的那句話不僅聽來刺耳，也絕無重述之必要；但從另一方面來說，「美國不支持台獨」其實也同時反映了美國尊重「台灣人民的自決權」，並認同「台灣前途應由台灣人自行決定」的看法。換言之，是否要追求並堅持「台灣獨立」，其實是屬於台灣人自己的事情。美國無權也無意代為決定台灣前途與最終地位，僅一貫堅持台海紛爭必須以和平方式解決。</p>

<p>這也是為何柯林頓總統在提出「三不」而造成政策困惑後，要刻意於2000年澄清對台政策時強調，美國將持續「反對」（reject）以武力解決台灣問題，且重申美國明確主張兩岸紛爭「必須和平解決，並得到台灣人民的同意（must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the people of Taiwan）」。其實，自拜登政府今年初上台以來，美國國務院亦多次（包括在坎貝爾談話之次日）公開表明，美國將持續在「符合台灣人民的意願與最大利益」（consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people on Taiwan）之前提下，支持和平解決台海爭議。</p>

<p>探其表裡，美國雖在「口頭上」主張台灣地位未定、支持兩岸維持現狀，但「實際上」卻深知台灣與中國係互不隸屬的兩個主權國家。也就是說，「台灣獨立」早已是數十年來的客觀既成事實，而美方的所謂「維持現狀」實質上無非就是「維持台灣獨立存在的現狀」，在為「台灣繼續作為一個主權國家而生存」創造積極有利的條件。</p>

<p>其實，坎貝爾在當天智庫活動上亦提及，「我們（美國）的確相信台灣擁有和平生存的權利」（We do believe Taiwan has a right to live in peace），而且「我們的確支持台灣尊嚴」（we do support Taiwan’s dignity）。其弦外之音即是，美國承認台灣人民擁有決定台灣前途的自決權，且尊重台灣人的自由意志與維持台獨現狀的長期意願與堅持。對美國來說，其實早無「是否支持台灣獨立」的問題，只剩做出「何時正式承認台灣國家地位」、「何時與台灣建立邦交」等國際政治上之決斷。</p>

<p>而總部位於華府的「台灣人公共事務會」（FAPA），也將持續為台灣和平穩定發展以及台美共同利益來發聲，盼能早日完成「台美關係正常化」，並促使台灣的國格與尊嚴能儘早獲得應有的國際承認與對待。</p>

<p> </p>

<p>原文刊載於<span style="text-decoration: underline;"><a href="https://www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?SerialNo=118627" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">上報</a></span>（2021/7/15）</p>
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		<p>The post <a href="https://fapa.org/campbell-taiwan-0706/">坎貝爾的弦外之音：尊重台灣人自決權　實質維護台獨現狀</a> appeared first on <a href="https://fapa.org">Formosan Association for Public Affairs</a>.</p>
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