On August 27, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan passed the opposition-led Act on Strengthening Defense Autonomy and Developing the Unmanned Vehicles Industry, directing the Ministry of National Defense (MND) to prioritize domestically produced “low-cost, high-performance” unmanned systems. The measure comes as Taiwan seeks to strengthen its asymmetric defense capabilities and build a more resilient domestic drone industry and trusted, non-PRC supply chains.
 
The legislation requires the central government to earmark, in principle, NT$40 billion (US$1.26 billion) annually for six consecutive years, totaling up to NT$240 billion (US$7.56 billion), through the regular general budget, while allowing additional funding based on actual needs, subject to legislative approval. This framework replaces the Cabinet’s proposed NT$210 billion (US$6.6 billion) multi-year special-budget approach.
 
Following a rare cross-party compromise, the final version includes three critical defense systems requested by the MND: coastal attack drones, coastal reconnaissance drones, and small suicide unmanned surface vehicles, which had been excluded from earlier proposals by the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP).
 
Concerns Over Funding Constraints
 
The MND expressed “regret” that the Cabinet’s proposed special budget failed to pass, saying the rejected proposal had been designed to acquire urgently needed “asymmetric” combat capabilities “within the shortest possible time.”
 
On August 26, Defense Minister Wellington Koo criticized the opposition’s NT$40 billion annual spending cap as insufficient, noting that the MND is separately seeking an additional NT$31.1 billion for other unmanned systems in its 2027 general budget.
 
In an interview published on August 26, Taiwan’s Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim similarly warned that a fixed annual cap could disrupt procurement schedules, as contract payments can rise sharply during peak delivery periods. She urged lawmakers to respect the MND’s force-building schedule and requirements, while emphasizing that Taiwan must demonstrate a steadfast commitment to self-defense to prevent Beijing from miscalculating Taiwan’s resolve.
 
Dispute Over Oversight
 
Another key dispute centered on oversight. The Cabinet favored MND leadership to ensure alignment with military operational requirements, while the opposition backed the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), citing its role in industrial development and regulation.
 
In the same interview, Vice President Hsiao also argued that the MND should lead because it is best positioned to determine the types, models, specifications, and functions of drones needed for Taiwan’s defense.
 
In the final version, the MOEA will share implementation with the MND, overseeing industry development, standards for “indigenous” unmanned systems and “trustworthy supply chains,” manufacturer accreditation, cybersecurity-related reviews, and the establishment of at least three drone testing sites within one year.
 
Building Deterrence Through Mass and Alliance Integration
 
The bill is a meaningful step toward stronger deterrence by expanding Taiwan’s drone production and procurement. Unmanned systems are increasingly central to modern warfare, particularly as Taiwan faces sustained Chinese gray-zone pressure and prepares for potential military contingencies.
 
Still, annual spending constraints and repeated legislative budget reviews could limit procurement flexibility and slow the buildup. To mitigate near-term funding risks, the Executive Yuan reportedly plans to countersign the act and fund unmanned systems through this year’s supplemental budget. This could help sustain Taiwan’s defense buildup and strengthen trusted supply chains with the United States and other democratic partners.
 
Sources:
[1] Taipei Times    [2] Taipei Times    [3] Focus Taiwan    [4] Focus Taiwan    [5] Focus Taiwan

China Expands “Quasi-Quarantine” Campaign Around Taiwan with Record Maritime Activity

China has sharply increased the scale of its coercive operations by government vessels in waters around Taiwan, including coast guard, oceanographic research, and other official ships. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) reported that a record 244 Chinese government vessels were detected around Taiwan’s main island in July 2026, compared with 55 in June and 30 in May. Another 152 vessels were detected around the main island during the first 21 days of August.
 
The record activity comes as Beijing continues to expand its maritime presence around Taiwan, particularly in waters east of the island nation. Since May, the CGA has recorded 1,247 Chinese vessels around Taiwan and several of its outlying islands. About 60 percent were China Coast Guard vessels, while research and other government vessels made up the rest. The figures do not include Chinese naval warships, which operate around Taiwan on a near-daily basis.
 
A recent Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) poll found that 70.5 percent of respondents in Taiwan viewed recent Chinese coast guard patrols east of Taiwan as an act of “ill intent.” The survey also showed that 81.2 percent opposed Beijing’s “one country, two systems” framework, while 83.9 percent supported the position that Taiwan’s future should be decided by its 23 million people.
 
Escalating the “Quasi-Quarantine” Campaign: The Growing Role of Research Vessels
 
Taiwanese coast guard officials have warned that the situation is becoming “increasingly severe,” while analysts and observers note that Beijing’s expanding maritime presence is fueling concerns over a potential quarantine or blockade that could restrict Taiwan’s access to energy and other critical supplies.
 
A particularly concerning development is the growing role of Chinese research vessels, especially in waters east of Taiwan. China operates more than 120 oceanographic research vessels, with the CGA tracking about 41 that operate in Taiwan’s waters.
 
In May, the Tong Ji conducted suspected oceanographic sampling and seabed surveys along the edge of Taiwan’s restricted waters that could contribute to China’s anti-submarine warfare databases, according to the CGA.
 
More recently, the Xiang Yang Hong 03 operated over deep-sea trenches and undersea telecommunications cables east of Taiwan under China Coast Guard and maritime militia escort, with analysts assessing that it was collecting hydrographic data from the Ryukyu and East Taiwan trenches to support People’s Liberation Army (PLA) anti-submarine warfare.
 
Implications
 
While China has long used gray-zone maritime tactics around Taiwan, the recent surge in these operations reflects Beijing’s calculated effort to create the false impression of legitimate jurisdiction over Taiwan’s surrounding waters.
 
Beijing seeks to establish a “new normal” in which China’s growing maritime presence helps normalize its unlawful claims to authority in the waters around Taiwan, steadily altering the status quo and making those changes harder to reverse.
 
The United States and its democratic partners must firmly reject Beijing’s unilateral efforts to erode Taiwan’s sovereignty and sovereign rights through gray-zone coercion, while bolstering multilateral maritime domain awareness and operational coordination to safeguard regional security and uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific.
 
Sources:
[1] Taipei Times    [2] Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC)    [3] Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA)

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On August 10, 2026, the four co-chairs of the U.S. Congressional Taiwan Caucus ––  Representatives Mario Diaz-Balart (R-FL), Ami Bera (D-CA), Andy Barr (R-KY), and Greg Stanton (D-AZ) –– sent a joint letter to Lithuania’s top leaders, urging the country to maintain its substantive relationship with democratic Taiwan amid the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) “bullying and coercion.”
 
The Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded by reaffirming Taiwan as an “important regional partner” and stating that Lithuania would continue to pursue mutually beneficial cooperation with Taiwan. Prime Minister Mindaugas Sinkevičius also thanked the U.S. lawmakers. Speaker of the Seimas (Lithuanian Parliament) Juozas Olekas, however, noted that Lithuania’s support for Taiwan “remains strong,” while stressing that this would not alter Vilnius’s efforts to normalize relations with Beijing.
 
Lithuania’s Experience Facing PRC Coercion
 
The bipartisan appeal from the Congressional Taiwan Caucus co-chairs underscores growing concern over the PRC’s bullying and coercion against countries that seek to deepen ties with Taiwan.
 
Lithuania became a prime target of Beijing’s economic coercion after allowing the “Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania” to open in 2021. In retaliation, Beijing downgraded diplomatic ties and imposed a de facto trade embargo, targeting Lithuanian exports and disrupting European Union supply chains.
 
Lithuania has sought to maintain cooperation with Taiwan while also working to repair relations with China. In February 2026, then-Lithuanian Prime Minister Inga Ruginienė described the 2021 decision to open the representative office in Vilnius under the name “Taiwanese” as a “mistake,” noting that Vilnius had begun taking “small first steps” toward restoring ties with Beijing.
 
Talks on a new economic cooperation action plan with Taiwan were temporarily paused in June 2026 amid Lithuania’s political transition. Nonetheless, Vilnius resumed negotiations in July after the new government under Prime Minister Mindaugas Sinkevičius took office.
 
U.S. Congress Seeks to Counter PRC Coercion Against Taiwan’s Partners
 
Lithuania’s experience illustrates the broader challenge facing countries that deepen official or unofficial ties with Taiwan, as Beijing can impose economic costs to pressure governments into policy reversals.
 
To address this challenge, U.S. lawmakers have pursued bipartisan legislation specifically designed to help Taiwan’s partners withstand PRC pressure. The Taiwan Allies Fund Act was introduced in the Senate in March 2025 (S.1216) and in the House in April 2025 (H.R.2559). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee advanced S.1216 in January 2026, and the bill was reported with an amendment in February.
 
The House version would authorize $120 million over three years from fiscal years 2026 through 2028, while the amended Senate version would authorize $30 million over the same period, under the Countering PRC Influence Fund (CPIF). This assistance would support countries facing PRC coercion for maintaining or strengthening ties with Taiwan.
 
Implications
 
As Lithuania and other European countries such as Czechia remain key U.S. partners on Europe’s strategic frontline, Beijing’s efforts to capitalize on shifting domestic political dynamics to weaken their ties with Taiwan warrant close attention.
 
For Taiwan, sustaining robust ties with democratic partners helps reinforce its sovereignty and expand its international space. Lithuania’s experience also underscores the value of pairing diplomatic support with practical economic security measures to mitigate the economic costs of resisting PRC coercion and strengthen democratic resilience.
 
Sources:
[1] Office of Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart    [2] Taipei Times    [3] Asia Society Policy Institute    [4] Taipei Times    [5] Focus Taiwan    [6] S.1216 / H.R.2559 (Taiwan Allies Fund Act)

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On August 14, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan passed the 2026 central government budget after a record 266-day delay, preserving the full NT$63.4 billion (about US$2 billion) in drone-related funding. The funding includes NT$44.2 billion for a six-year drone industry development program, alongside NT$19.2 billion in procurement funding across government agencies.
 
In a significant reversal, lawmakers from the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) ultimately backed the full funding package after earlier proposing steep cuts and later considering a freeze. A Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) spokesman emphasized that the budget should never have been targeted for cuts in the first place, as it was originally proposed by the Executive Yuan to support national defense capabilities and critical industrial upgrades.
 
Building Taiwan’s Drone Industry and Democratic Supply Chains
 
Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) issued a statement welcoming the vote, saying the funding will provide a stable foundation for R&D, mass production, testing and validation, and global market expansion.
 
According to the MOEA, the program is built around three core policy objectives: industrial development, defense self-reliance, and democratic supply chains. It aims to generate more than NT$40 billion in annual industry output and make Taiwan an Asia-Pacific hub for democratic drone supply chains by 2030.
 
The Legislature also adopted a resolution to stabilize annual funding while strengthening procurement oversight. It calls on the Executive Yuan to instruct the MOEA to:

• Distribute the NT$44.2 billion budget evenly over six years, with annual allocations capped at the six-year average;
• Authorize the use of inter-entity supply contracts for non-military drone purchases; and
• Require new drone-related programs to be incorporated into the broader interagency framework and approved by the Executive Yuan before implementation. 

Strategic Implications

The vote followed months of domestic political deadlock amid sustained calls from Taiwan’s government and industry to advance critical defense and drone-related investments, as well as growing U.S. calls for Taiwan to invest more — and more effectively — in drones and other asymmetric capabilities. These calls have come from senior U.S. officials, bipartisan members of Congress, and the Director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT).

Preserving the full drone funding signals Taiwan’s unwavering resolve to enhance its self-defense capabilities, while bolstering its defense-industrial resilience and wartime sustainment capacity. It will also position Taiwan as a vital partner in trusted non-PRC drone supply chains and co-development efforts with the United States and other democratic partners.

Sources:
[1] Focus Taiwan    [2] Taipei Times    [3] Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs    [4] Central News Agency (CNA)

China Exploits Claimed “Joint Drills” to Normalize its Naval Presence Near Taiwan and Challenge U.S. Regional Influence

On August 12, China’s military claimed that its naval vessel Honghe and the Indonesian Navy frigate KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai-332 carried out joint drills in the waters east of Taiwan, including maritime communications, formation maneuvering, and replenishment at sea.
 
While Beijing framed the encounter as demonstrating the two sides’ willingness to cooperate pragmatically and jointly safeguard regional peace, the Indonesian Navy clarified that the interaction was a routine, non-combat “passing exercise” (PASSEX) unrelated to “war fighting.”
 
Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) strongly condemned the move as Beijing’s “political manipulation” and a “military provocation” aimed at creating a false impression that China has jurisdiction over the waters east of Taiwan.
 
Beijing’s Strategic Calculus
 
John Dotson, director of the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI), noted that while limited in scale, the claimed joint drills carry symbolic significance by advancing China’s objectives to cultivate regional partners and expand its naval presence in waters east of Taiwan. He also said Beijing was pushing back against the growing Japan-Philippines “quasi-alliance,” driven by concerns over China’s increasingly assertive behavior and the potential for a Taiwan Strait military crisis.
 
China announced the claimed joint naval exercise while the U.S. Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby and Indonesian Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin met in Jakarta on August 11. The officials discussed strengthening bilateral defense cooperation, including the implementation of the two countries’ Major Defense Cooperation Partnership (MDCP).
 
When asked about the claimed drill, a U.S. State Department spokesperson urged Beijing to “cease its continuous military pressure” against Taiwan, while calling on other countries not to amplify China’s “destabilizing narratives.”
 
Implications
 
By falsely framing a PASSEX as a joint naval exercise, China is attempting to exploit an interaction with a foreign navy to lend spurious legitimacy to its expanding naval presence in waters near Taiwan. This tactic also reflects Beijing’s broader effort to cultivate regional security partners and normalize its military activities around Taiwan.
 
Even as Indonesia clarified the non-combat nature of the interaction, the episode points to Beijing’s broader effort to expand its regional security influence and challenge U.S. strategic leadership in the Indo-Pacific.

Sources:
[1] Focus Taiwan   [2] Taipei Times   [3] Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI)

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The live-fire portion of Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang military exercises is running from August 5 to 14. For the first time, the drills feature deliberate mobile internet slowdowns to simulate enemy attacks on communications networks. They are also examining how Taiwan would respond to mounting Chinese military pressure, amid concerns that Beijing is rehearsing blockade tactics aimed at severing Taiwan’s Pacific supply lines from its allies and partners.
 
The Han Kuang exercises have served as Taiwan’s primary war games since 1984 and are intended to test the nation’s combat readiness in the event of a possible Chinese invasion. This year’s drills are designed to be more realistic, unscripted, and decentralized, in response to past criticisms that earlier exercises were too highly staged.
 
2026 Han Kuang Priorities

• Decentralized Command and U.S.-Style Training: According to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, this year’s exercises focus on decentralization and a transition toward unscripted, live-fire training. Following U.S. advice, the military has not shared the full exercise plans with its field officers to better gauge their real-time reactions to unexpected battlefield scenarios. Taiwan’s military is also incorporating key U.S.-style rehearsal methods, including backbriefs,to empower front-line troops to become active decision-makers during combat.

• Expanded Reserve and Civilian Mobilization: Taiwan’s military has called up more than 20,000 reservists, who are conducting a variety of training missions, including coastal defense. Separate exercises are also testing civilian vehicle requisitions to support wartime operations.

• Advanced Combat and Coastal Defense Capabilities: Taiwan’s newly deployed U.S.-made M1A2T Abrams tanks are participating in the Han Kuang exercises for the first time. The tanks are assigned to defend strategic locations in northern Taiwan, including beaches, critical infrastructure, and command centers, following the arrival in April of the final shipment of an order for 108 tanks. The exercises also feature the newly inaugurated Littoral Combat Command, established on July 1 to integrate the Taiwan Navy’s anti-ship missiles, coastal defense forces, mobile radar, and unmanned systems into a single unified command.

• Critical Infrastructure Resilience: Blockage drills are being staged at the recently opened Danjiang Bridge to simulate slowing an enemy advance toward Taipei’s central government district. Located in New Taipei, the bridge provides a key route into the capital, home to the Presidential Office and other major political and economic infrastructure sites. In another first for Taiwan, mobile network bandwidth is being deliberately reduced to simulate enemy attacks on communications infrastructure.

Implications

The 2026 Han Kuang exercises reflect a broader shift in Taiwan’s defense training toward more realistic and decentralized preparations for a potential Chinese invasion. By introducing U.S.-style command practices and putting both military and civilian systems through unscripted wartime scenarios, the exercises demonstrate Taiwan’s serious commitment to defense preparedness. They also reinforce a whole-of-society approach to resilience and deterrence.

The drills further underscore the important role that U.S. security assistance and defense cooperation continue to play in strengthening Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities and maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Sources:
[1] Focus Taiwan   [2] Reuters   [3] Taipei Times   [4] Focus Taiwan

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On July 28, 2026, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) publicly released, for the first time, a photograph showing U.S. and Taiwanese coast guard vessels operating side by side. The image depicts Taiwan’s 4,000-tonne Chiayi-class offshore patrol vessel Taipei (CG5005) sailing alongside the U.S. Coast Guard’s 4,500-tonne Legend-class cutter USCGC Midgett (WMSL-757).
 
AIT’s post stated that “the United States Coast Guard and the Taiwan Coast Guard are busy coordinating on shared maritime objectives, such as search and rescue, preparing for tropical storms, disaster relief, preserving maritime resources, countering illegal fishing, and interdicting illegal drug shipments at sea.”
 
International Pushback Against China’s Destabilizing Maritime Operations
 
The release came amid growing international concern over China’s recent “special maritime law enforcement operations” east of Taiwan. On June 24, 2026, the representative offices of the U.K., France, and Germany in Taipei issued a joint statement expressing concern over “novel Chinese activity in the waters east of Taiwan” and reiterating their opposition to “any unilateral change to the status quo,” particularly “by threat or use of force or coercion.”
 
On August 1, a U.S. Department of State spokesperson criticized Chinese Coast Guard activity east of Taiwan as “deeply destabilizing.” “By asserting authority over maritime areas that Taiwan has peacefully administered for over 70 years, China only exacerbates tensions,” the spokesperson said, adding, “We urge Beijing to cease its pressure against Taiwan and instead engage in meaningful dialogue with Taiwan’s democratically elected authorities.”
 
Why It Matters
 
Taiwan’s Ocean Affairs Council Minister Kuan Bi-ling (管碧玲) said AIT’s proactive release of the photo demonstrates that the U.S. fully recognizes that the Taiwan Coast Guard is the sole legitimate law enforcement agency in Taiwan’s waters and the exclusive partner for U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement cooperation in those waters.
 
Bonnie Glaser, managing director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund, said AIT’s post conveyed a message from Washington that “Taiwan is an important partner” and that “the United States is committed to working alongside Taiwan to promote shared objectives.” She added that the message reassured Taiwan and its people that they are not alone while warning Beijing that its attempts to isolate and bully Taiwan will not succeed.
 
Chen Wen-chia (陳文甲), a Taiwanese national defense strategy expert, noted that AIT’s post also reflected growing “paramilitary cooperation” between the U.S. and Taiwan. While the two sides lack formal military ties, such cooperation provides greater operational flexibility and facilitates intelligence sharing.
 
Implications
 
Deterring the escalation of China’s gray-zone coercion requires the U.S. to work closely with allies and partners to counter Beijing’s activities at sea and in the air, said Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and an expert on Indo-Pacific security.
 
Taiwan’s frontline experience and growing maritime law enforcement capabilities make it an indispensable partner in addressing these challenges. Continued U.S.-Taiwan cooperation will remain critical to strengthening regional resilience, preserving peace and stability across the Indo-Pacific, and safeguarding Taiwan’s democratic sovereignty against China’s coercion.
 
Sources:
[1] American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Official Facebook Page   [2] Focus Taiwan   [3] Focus Taiwan   [4] Taipei Times   [5] Taipei Times   [6] Central News Agency (CNA)

U.S. Senators Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Counter PRC’s Growing Gray-Zone Aggression

On July 29, 2026, U.S. Senators Tammy Duckworth (D-IL) and Marsha Blackburn (R-TN) introduced the bipartisan “Countering Gray-Zone Aggression by the People’s Republic of China Act” (S.5160). The legislation aims to bolster U.S. monitoring and deterrence capabilities to counter the PRC’s intensifying use of “gray-zone tactics” against Taiwan and other Indo-Pacific partners.
 
The bill defines “gray-zone tactics” as activities short of open warfare that advance a state’s interests while avoiding kinetic military responses through a mix of diplomatic, economic, informational, and paramilitary tools.
 
Taiwan at the Center of PRC’s Aggression
 
The bill identifies Taiwan as a primary target of the PRC’s gray-zone tactics, citing the increased frequency of Chinese vessel incursions into national waters, airspace incursions, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and economic coercion.
 
Crucially, the legislation highlights that Beijing employs these tactics with the specific purpose of coercing Taiwan into so-called “reunification” by gradually eroding Taiwan’s political cohesion, economic independence, and societal confidence without triggering kinetic escalation.
 
In their official press release, Senator Duckworth underscored, “Increasing PRC aggression in the Indo-Pacific doesn’t just impact our partners in the region—it threatens America’s economic and national security.”
 
“This legislation would strengthen our ability to counter the CCP’s malign geopolitical interests and its increasingly aggressive tactics in the Indo-Pacific,” Senator Blackburn added.
 
Key Measures to Counter PRC Gray-Zone Activities
 
The legislation contains key provisions to monitor, expose, deter, and counter PRC gray-zone activities. Specifically, the bill:

• Directs the Secretary of State to submit a strategy to better monitor and publicly expose PRC gray-zone tactics, while explicitly permitting the strategy to prioritize efforts to counter PRC activities in the Taiwan Strait and the broader Indo-Pacific.

• Mandates the establishment of an interagency task force to track, formulate, and strengthen tools to counter and mitigate gray-zone operations, evaluate progress toward the strategy’s objectives and performance indicators, and submit annual public reports to Congress.

• Instructs the Department of State to identify additional key areas for collaboration with U.S. Indo-Pacific allies and partners, the private sector, and academia to enhance collective capabilities to deter PRC gray-zone activities.

Implications
 
The bill reflects a more concrete and institutionalized U.S. response to the PRC’s growing gray-zone pressure and operations in the Indo-Pacific. It closely aligns with Senator Duckworth’s advocacy during the 2026 Taiwan International Ocean Forum in Taipei earlier in July, where she urged like-minded democracies to actively exercise their freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait and resolutely reject Beijing’s coercive attempts to establish a “new normal” in the waters surrounding Taiwan.

If enacted, the legislation would require the U.S. government to formulate a more cohesive strategy and action plan to counter Beijing’s gray-zone tactics in close coordination with U.S. allies and partners. Furthermore, it would also strengthen the U.S. response through a dedicated interagency task force, along with annual assessments and public reports to Congress, aimed at exposing PRC coercion and holding Beijing accountable.

Sources:
[1] Sen. Tammy Duckworth’s Office   [2] S.5160 (Countering Gray Zone Aggression by the PRC Act; See the Full Text)   [3] Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA)

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Between June and July 2026, Taiwan publicly showcased two separate quadruped robotics initiatives advancing both national defense and civilian resilience applications. The National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) demonstrated military-specific quadruped prototypes, while the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) and the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) presented a domestically developed quadruped robot platform designed for industrial inspection, navigation, and emergency response.
 
NCSIST Unveils Military Quadruped Prototypes
 
On June 2, 2026, NCSIST unveiled three military-specific robot dog prototypes designed for surveillance, reconnaissance, and combat support missions. Based on the Vision 60 quadruped robot developed by U.S.-based Ghost Robotics, the prototypes integrate NCSIST-developed systems that provide intelligence-gathering, patrol, and monitoring capabilities. The robot dog systems are being produced in Taiwan under U.S. technology licensing, reflecting Taiwan’s efforts to localize production and system integration.
 
The three prototypes include a LiDAR (light detection and ranging) and thermal-imaging model, an electro-optical reconnaissance model, and an armed model equipped with an NCSIST-developed remote-controlled weapon station. Their potential missions include security patrols, facility surveillance, nighttime monitoring, coastal defense, airfield security, riot control, and urban warfare. These robot dogs can also network with one another to share information and coordinate operations.
 
Building Taiwan’s Robotics Supply Chain
 
On July 8, 2026, MOEA announced a domestically developed quadruped robot platform created by ITRI in collaboration with key Taiwanese industry partners. Designed for industrial inspection, autonomous navigation, firefighting, and disaster response, the platform integrates technologies spanning core components, key modules, full-machine control, and AI software, thereby enabling Taiwanese companies to develop domestic modules and prototypes.
 
The initiative is designed to accelerate quadruped robot development and commercialization. It also aims to strengthen Taiwan’s presence in the global industrial quadruped robot market, which is projected to exceed US$4 billion by 2035. It leverages Taiwan’s strengths in information and communications technology (ICT), semiconductors, and precision machinery to develop indigenous technologies and build a non-China supply chain for critical components.
 
Implications
 
The parallel development of military and civilian quadruped robotic systems demonstrates how Taiwan is leveraging its technological and manufacturing strengths to advance autonomous technologies for both defense and civilian applications.
 
As Taiwan faces growing military pressure from China, expanding the deployment of unmanned systems will strengthen its self-defense capabilities by reducing personnel exposure to high-risk environments, improving operational flexibility, and enhancing overall societal resilience in a potential conflict.
 
At the same time, developing a trusted, non-China robotics supply chain can position Taiwan as a reliable partner in next-generation autonomous technologies while reinforcing its long-term defense and industrial resilience.
 
Sources:
[1] Focus Taiwan   [2] Taipei Times

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On July 15, 2026, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the $47.32 billion Fiscal Year 2027 (FY27) National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs (NSRP) Appropriations Act (H.R.8595) in a 217-209 vote.
 
House Appropriations Committee Chairman Tom Cole (R-OK) emphasized that the bill maintains strong support for key allies, including Taiwan, while countering threats from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and other adversaries.
 
Key Taiwan-Related Provisions
 
The legislation includes several critical provisions that support Taiwan and bolster stability in the Indo-Pacific.

• Defense Support: Provides at least $500 million under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Program to assist Taiwan in acquiring U.S. defense articles, services, and training. It also directs the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, to prioritize the delivery of defense articles and services to Taiwan.

• Taiwan “Honest Maps”: Prohibits funds made available by the Act from being used to create, procure, or display any map that inaccurately depicts Taiwan’s territory and social and economic system, or the islands administered by Taiwan authorities.

• Countering PRC’s Global Influence: Provides no less than $1.8 billion to advance U.S. national security interests in the Indo-Pacific, including at least $400 million for a dedicated Countering PRC Influence Fund. It also prohibits foreign governments from using funds provided under this Act to repay debts owed to Communist China.

• Leveraging U.S. Bilateral Aid: Directs the Secretary of State to review foreign governments’ UN voting records and their support for Taiwan’s participation as an observer in multilateral agencies, bodies, or commissions when considering U.S. bilateral assistance for a foreign government.

  
Implications

The bill signals a more operational approach to supporting Taiwan. It provides direct military financing and incorporates foreign governments’ support for Taiwan as a factor in U.S. bilateral aid decisions. The dedicated Countering PRC Influence Fund and the Taiwan “Honest Maps” provision further counter Beijing’s global coercion.

Taken together, the legislation reflects continued congressional support for Taiwan’s self-defense and international participation while underscoring Taiwan’s strategic importance to U.S. national security interests in the Indo-Pacific.

Sources:
[1] Taipei Times   [2] H.R.8595 (FY27 NSRP Appropriations Bill)   [3] House Appropriations Committee

TSMC’s US$100 Billion U.S. Expansion Deepens Bilateral Industrial Integration

On July 16, 2026, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC) announced a landmark additional US$100 billion investment in its Arizona operations. According to TSMC Chairman and CEO C.C. Wei (魏哲家), the new commitment will fund four additional leading-edge wafer fabrication plants and advanced packaging facilities. The announcement brings TSMC’s total planned U.S. investment to US$265 billion.
 
U.S. officials, including U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Director Raymond Greene, welcomed TSMC’s investment for strengthening supply chain resilience and creating high-paying American jobs.
 
AI Demand Accelerates Taiwanese Investment in the U.S.
 
Surging AI demand is accelerating TSMC’s U.S. expansion. At TSMC’s second-quarter earnings conference, Wei highlighted “very strong signal and positive outlook” from major cloud service providers, reaffirming TSMC’s confidence in a “multi-year AI megatrend.” He added that agentic AI and rapid data center construction are driving massive demand for advanced silicon, CPUs, and AI accelerators.
 
Beyond TSMC, Taiwan’s broader technology sector is also scaling up U.S. operations. In May, 20 Taiwanese companies — spanning semiconductor suppliers and AI server manufacturers — expressed interest in investing a combined US$35 billion in the United States.
 
Taiwan’s government has also introduced measures to support companies investing in the U.S., including a government-backed financing guarantee mechanism with an initial US$1.375 billion financing pool. Applications for the credit guarantees are expected to open as early as this July.
 
Urgent Double-Tax Relief for Deeper Economic Integration
 
TSMC’s latest U.S. expansion reflects a broader shift in U.S.-Taiwan economic relations toward deeper, long-term integration in investment and advanced manufacturing. Yet, the bilateral policy framework has not kept pace with this rapidly expanding economic relationship.
 
Taiwan remains the only top-ten U.S. trading partner without a bilateral tax agreement. The lack of bilateral double-tax relief poses a severe structural challenge, raising costs for Taiwanese firms operating in the U.S., with some estimated to face effective tax burdens of up to 51% on U.S. profits.
 
FAPA therefore urges the U.S. Senate to swiftly pass the United States-Taiwan Expedited Double-Tax Relief Act (S.199), whose House companion (H.R.33) passed by an overwhelming 423–1 vote in January 2025. Enacting the legislation would provide treaty-like tax relief and remove a major competitive disadvantage facing Taiwan.
 
Sources:
[1] Focus Taiwan   [2] Focus Taiwan   [3] Reuters   [4] Taipei Times   [5] Focus Taiwan   [6] Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA)   [7] S.199 / H.R.33 (United States-Taiwan Expedited Double-Tax Relief Act)

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China’s military test-launched a nuclear-capable, intercontinental-range submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from a nuclear-powered submarine on July 6, drawing sharp and widespread criticism from the U.S., its Indo-Pacific allies, and democratic partners.
 
While China’s official news agency has not specified the missile type, the state-controlled Global Times, citing a military expert, indicated that it was likely a JL-3, China’s most advanced SLBM, which the Pentagon assesses can reach the continental United States directly from Chinese coastal waters. However, Taiwan’s Defense Minister Wellington Koo (顧立雄) later stated that the missile was most likely a JL-2, underscoring that the precise missile type remains disputed.
 
China’s Growing Sea-Based Nuclear Capabilities
 
Regardless of the exact model, the test marks a significant and troubling advance in the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) sea-based nuclear capabilities. While the PLA last test-launched a land-based ICBM in 2024 — its first such test into international waters since 1980 — the July 6 launch demonstrated the growing operational maturity of the sea-based leg of China’s nuclear triad.
 
According to former senior U.S. intelligence official Dennis Wilder, this is a major development, as China has never before fired a ballistic missile from one of its nuclear-powered submarines into the South Pacific.
 
Indo-Pacific Democracies Condemn Beijing’s Missile Test
 
This provocative missile test, conducted after China gave regional governments only a few hours of advance notice, was sharply criticized by the U.S. and many of its Indo-Pacific democratic partners. The test destabilized regional security and raised serious concerns over Beijing’s lack of transparency and failure to provide adequate prior notification in accordance with international norms.

• In its statement, the U.S. State Department condemned “Beijing’s rapid and opaque nuclear weapons buildup.” It further urged China to commit to “a regularized notification arrangement for all intercontinental-range ballistic missile and space launches,” consistent with the commitments made by all other Permanent Five (P5) members of the UN Security Council.

• Taiwan’s Presidential Office condemned the test as a coercive attempt to intimidate the international community and called on Beijing to immediately cease its “irresponsible unilateral actions.”

• Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese called the test destabilizing and “provocative.” The launch notably coincided with the signing of a landmark mutual defense pact between Australia and Fiji.

• Although the missile carried a dummy warhead, New Zealand noted that it was fired directly into the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, a reckless move that blatantly contravenes the spirit and intent of the Treaty of Rarotonga, whose relevant protocols China ratified in 1987.

China’s Military Calculus

John Blaxland, an international security expert and former military intelligence officer, suggested that China was testing both its operational capabilities and the reactions of the U.S. and its regional allies. Similar to its military activities around Taiwan, Blaxland warned that the missile test is a calculated effort by Beijing to gradually normalize its “intrusive, assertive, [and] authoritarian behavior” across the Indo-Pacific.

Jeffrey Lewis, a scholar of China’s nuclear weapons modernization, characterized the launch as a clear signal of China’s “new era” of more frequent and overt arms testing. “They’re willing to pay the political costs . . . in a way that they weren’t in the past,” Lewis observed.

Implications

China’s latest missile launch demonstrates Beijing’s growing confidence in openly displaying its expanding sea-based nuclear capabilities and imposing a “new normal” of military coercion in the Indo-Pacific.

By projecting power deep into the Pacific while gauging regional and international reactions, China is showing that its challenge to the status quo is not limited to the Taiwan Strait but extends across the broader region.

Sources:
[1] Taipei Times   [2] Reuters   [3] Radio Taiwan International (RTI)   [4] Dennis Wilder’s LinkedIn   [5] U.S. Department of State   [6] Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)   [7] New York Times

Taiwan International Ocean Forum Calls for Collective Maritime Resilience to Counter China’s Gray-Zone Aggression

On July 8, 2026, the Taiwan International Ocean Forum opened in Taipei, bringing together participants from 15 countries, including more than 100 experts from government, industry, academia, and research institutions, as well as international lawmakers. Centered on the theme of “Maritime Resilience,” the forum serves as a crucial platform for high-level dialogue on Indo-Pacific maritime security and regional cooperation.
 
Amid rising regional tensions, the forum focused on Beijing’s expanding gray-zone activities and aggression, including the China Coast Guard’s unilateral “law enforcement patrols” in waters around Taiwan and across the wider Indo-Pacific, as well as the sabotage of undersea communications cables involving China-affiliated vessels.
 
Taiwan’s Ocean Affairs Council Minister Kuan Bi-ling (管碧玲) warned that these incremental tactics risk creating an entirely new “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait, underscoring the need for closer international cooperation to strengthen maritime resilience and safeguard regional stability.
 
International Lawmakers Urge Robust Collective Maritime Deterrence
 
U.S. Senator Tammy Duckworth (D-IL) attended the forum during her visit to Taiwan, where she and British Member of Parliament Tom Tugendhat warned that China is using coast guard enforcement and other coercive tools to establish a “new normal” in waters east of Taiwan and across the South China Sea, in violation of existing maritime law.
 
Highlighting recent Chinese Coast Guard patrols that required commercial vessels transiting waters east of Taiwan to report their destinations, Duckworth stressed that countries must steadfastly exercise their freedom of navigation rights.
 
She argued that like-minded partners should collectively assert their right to transit the Taiwan Strait in accordance with international law and resolutely reject Beijing’s attempts to establish a foothold for a different maritime order through coercive actions.
 
Strategic Implications
 
The forum underscores that diplomatic rhetoric alone is no longer sufficient to preserve peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and the broader Indo-Pacific. Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) Executive Director Luke de Pulford warned that while G7 statements have helped raise awareness, governments have yet to develop meaningful deterrence or reach an international agreement on the “red lines” that would trigger coordinated international action.
 
Taken together, the discussions at the forum further highlighted the growing urgency of closer maritime cooperation and practical policy coordination among Taiwan and like-minded democracies. Such collaboration is vital to uphold freedom of navigation, defend the rules-based maritime order, and prevent Beijing from normalizing coercive changes to the status quo.
 
Sources:
[1] Taiwan International Ocean Forum   [2] Taipei Times   [3] Radio Taiwan International (RTI)   [4] Focus Taiwan   [5] Taipei Times

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The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) highly controversial “Ethnic Unity and Progress Law,” adopted by the Chinese National People’s Congress in March 2026, officially took effect on July 1, 2026. While institutionalizing forced assimilation domestically, the law asserts sweeping jurisdiction over dissidents and global critics both within and beyond China’s borders.
 
The most alarming aspect of the PRC’s new ethnic unity law is its unprecedented extraterritorial reach under Article 63, which provides that individuals and organizations outside China can be held legally liable if they are deemed to “undermine ethnic unity and progress” or “promote ethnic separatism” against China.  
 
The new law has drawn immediate international criticism, including from Taiwan’s government, the U.S. Congress, the European Parliament, Japanese parliamentary groups, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
 
Increasing Threats to Taiwanese Citizens and Taiwan-Related Actors
 
While framed as an ethnic policy measure, the law directly threatens Taiwanese citizens and Taiwan-related actors by leveraging Beijing’s expansive definition of the “Chinese nation.” Taiwanese legal scholar Chen Yu-jie (陳玉潔) warned that the PRC’s new law contains “overly broad” provisions and asserts long-arm jurisdiction, substantially raising legal risks for Taiwanese citizens and businesses.
 
Taiwanese national security officials highlighted specific risks for Taiwan-related actors and global critics:

• Taiwanese officials and ordinary citizens entering or transiting through China or closely aligned non-democratic countries could face severe risks of arbitrary detention or separatism charges.

• Journalists, academics, and researchers focusing on China’s human rights record, military expansion, or cross-Taiwan Strait issues could face heightened border scrutiny, pressure, and publication restrictions.

• Companies promoting non-China supply chains, participating in export controls, or investigating forced-labor risks could face Chinese sanctions and other forms of pressure.

 Bipartisan Condemnation in the U.S. Congress

Bipartisan lawmakers in the U.S. House and Senate have introduced separate resolutions denouncing China’s Ethnic Unity and Progress Law. Introduced by Reps. Chris Smith (R-NJ) and Jim McGovern (D-MA), H.Res.1400 condemns China’s campaign of forced assimilation against ethnic and religious minorities. Separately, S.Res.791, introduced by Senators Jacky Rosen (D-NV), John Curtis (R-UT), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), and Jim Banks (R-IN), calls on the PRC to end its transnational repression campaigns that undermine U.S. sovereignty and threaten the safety and freedoms of people in the United States.

In a bipartisan joint statement, House Select Committee on China Chairman John Moolenaar (R-MI), Ranking Member Ro Khanna (D-CA), and Congresswoman Young Kim (R-CA), alongside multiple U.S. Senators led by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch (R-ID) and Ranking Member Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), condemned the PRC’s newly enacted “ethnic unity” law. They warned that the law provides Beijing with near-limitless authority to target overseas critics and seeks to legitimize its transnational repression.

Implications

By extending Beijing’s ethnic and unilateral national-unification framework beyond China’s borders, the law weaponizes domestic ethnic-policy legislation into a tool for transnational repression and global censorship.

More broadly, it demonstrates how Beijing seeks to convert its authoritarian political narratives into enforceable extraterritorial legal claims. By doing so, it exports its arbitrary red lines on identity, sovereignty, and human rights far beyond China’s territory, actively undermining Taiwanese self-determination and global democratic norms.

Sources:
[1] Taipei Times   [2] Focus Taiwan   [3] Central News Agency (CNA)   [4] H.Res.1400 / S.Res.791 (Resolutions Condemning the PRC’s Ethnic Unity Law)   [5] U.S. House Select Committee on China

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On June 19, 2026, Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) reported that a Chinese oceanographic research vessel had entered the nation’s restricted waters —which extend 12 to 24 nautical miles from the coast — off Yilan County on Taiwan’s east coast. The vessel intruded into the area for nearly five hours, ignoring the CGA’s demands to immediately leave the waters. A Chinese state media account attempted to justify the ship’s intrusion, falsely portraying it as a lawful environmental survey in so-called “China’s jurisdictional waters.”

The incident follows a recent pattern of Chinese maritime incursions into waters under Taiwan’s jurisdiction. Earlier in June, a Chinese coast guard vessel and a survey ship intruded into waters around Dongsha Island (Pratas Island) and waters east of Taiwan, while two Chinese official vessels entered restricted waters near Taiping Island (Itu Aba) for the first time.

Furthermore, the Chinese Coast Guard harassed international merchant ships in Taiwan’s eastern exclusive economic zone (EEZ), unlawfully demanding navigation data under the false pretext of Chinese jurisdiction.

These coercive activities were internationally condemned by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany in rare, coordinated statements. Taiwan’s CGA and Ocean Affairs Council (OAC) condemned the activities and adopted a “shadowing and monitoring” strategy to track Chinese vessels, deny them access to Taiwan-controlled waters, and avoid giving Beijing a pretext to escalate the conflict.

Tests of a“Quasi-Quarantine” Model

The broader pattern suggests that Beijing is testing a “quasi-quarantine” model in waters under Taiwan’s control. In a recent Jamestown Foundation analysis, Dr. Ying Yu Lin, a Taiwan-based expert on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), argues that China is using its coast guard, maritime patrol, and other government vessels to create the appearance of administrative control without declaring a formal military blockade or launching a high-profile military exercise.

As part of Beijing’s broader gray-zone campaign against Taiwan, this “quasi-quarantine” operation is designed to normalize China’s maritime presence, test Taiwan’s operational response, and shape the maritime lawfare and psychological environment for future coercive actions.

In a recent interview, Bonnie Glaser, managing director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund, also cited the Dongsha and Taiping incidents as part of a “dangerous trend” of pressure tactics China uses to coerce Taiwan and countries that are strengthening ties with Taiwan.

Implications

China’s recent maritime actions around Taiwan-controlled waters, including Dongsha, Taiping, and waters east of Taiwan, are not merely a rehearsal for a possible quarantine or blockade. They should be understood as part of Beijing’s broader gray-zone campaign to erode the First Island Chain’s security environment and legitimize Chinese jurisdiction across these waters. As with its artificial island-building in the South China Sea, Beijing is taking incremental actions to create a “new normal” that could later support expanded claims and coercive actions.

Experts have warned that ignoring these operations could allow China to gradually establish a greater presence and perceived jurisdiction around Taiwan-controlled waters, increasing pressure on Taiwan and regional partners. The United States should not underestimate this trend: Beijing is playing the long game to weaken the U.S.-led regional security architecture and undermine core U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific.

Sources:
[1] Focus Taiwan   [2] South China Morning Post   [3] Taipei Times   [4] Taipei Times   [5] Reuters   [6] Taipei Times   [7] Jamestown Foundation   [8] Central News Agency (CNA)

GCTF Strengthens Multilateral Democratic Cooperation Against China’s Transnational Repression

The Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) hosted a seminar in Taipei, Taiwan, from June 23 to 25, 2026, on strengthening democratic resilience and countering the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) transnational repression.
 
This year’s event brought together delegates from 29 countries, including Taiwan’s formal GCTF partners: the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom (UK).
 
GCTF’s Strategic and Multilateral Value
 
GCTF is a pivotal, Taiwan-U.S.-launched multilateral platform that helps Taiwan expand its international space by leveraging its policy expertise and strengths. Since its establishment in 2015, the framework has enabled Taiwan to build enduring partnerships on issues of shared concern, including law enforcement cooperation, information security, and media literacy. To date, GCTF has organized 105 international workshops, drawing over 10,000 officials, experts, and civil society representatives from around the world.
 
The platform’s continued expansion underscores growing international interest in democratic, multilateral cooperation with Taiwan. This momentum is highlighted by the UK joining GCTF as its sixth official partner in 2025, as well as a cumulative total of 27 overseas events across 18 countries by the end of that year.

2026 Theme: Transnational Repression
 
At the seminar’s opening this year, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te called on democracies to strengthen resilience and solidarity. He noted that the free world faces “unprecedented dangers” from authoritarian regimes that leverage emerging technologies and illicit financial flows to sow division across borders.
 
President Lai emphasized that Beijing’s transnational repression includes overseas surveillance, cyberattacks, and cognitive warfare operations designed to silence critics, undermine trust in democratic institutions, and erode national sovereignty. “No democratic nation can be absent in the fight against this hybridized challenge,” he said.
 
Platforms such as GCTF have become vital assets for democratic security cooperation in recent years, especially as the PRC continues to weaponize transnational repression to undermine democratic interests and silence critics.
 
In a similar vein, the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC), in its recent report titled “Report on the PRC’s Transnational Repression and Malign Influence in 2025,” found that China has escalated its use of transnational lawfare to suppress voices advocating for Taiwan’s sovereignty and independence. This trend is exemplified by the PRC’s extraterritorial criminal investigation of Taiwanese lawmaker Puma Shen as a so-called “diehard Taiwan independence separatist.”
 
Implications
 
GCTF demonstrates that Taiwan is not merely a participant in international cooperation, but an indispensable contributor to the democratic community. Over the past decade, the framework has provided an institutionalized platform for Taiwan to share its policy and governance experience with democratic partners.
 
This year’s focus on transnational repression further highlights Taiwan’s practical contributions. As a frontline democracy facing sustained authoritarian coercion, Taiwan has accumulated unparalleled experience in countering the PRC’s multilayered transnational repression and malign pressure, offering valuable lessons for democracies seeking to develop coordinated responses to authoritarian threats.
 
Sources:
[1] Taipei Times   [2] Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF)   [3] U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC)   [4] Taipei Times

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