On July 15, 2026, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the $47.32 billion Fiscal Year 2027 (FY27) National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs (NSRP) Appropriations Act (H.R.8595) in a 217-209 vote.
 
House Appropriations Committee Chairman Tom Cole (R-OK) emphasized that the bill maintains strong support for key allies, including Taiwan, while countering threats from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and other adversaries.
 
Key Taiwan-Related Provisions
 
The legislation includes several critical provisions that support Taiwan and bolster stability in the Indo-Pacific.

• Defense Support: Provides at least $500 million under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Program to assist Taiwan in acquiring U.S. defense articles, services, and training. It also directs the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, to prioritize the delivery of defense articles and services to Taiwan.

• Taiwan “Honest Maps”: Prohibits funds made available by the Act from being used to create, procure, or display any map that inaccurately depicts Taiwan’s territory and social and economic system, or the islands administered by Taiwan authorities.

• Countering PRC’s Global Influence: Provides no less than $1.8 billion to advance U.S. national security interests in the Indo-Pacific, including at least $400 million for a dedicated Countering PRC Influence Fund. It also prohibits foreign governments from using funds provided under this Act to repay debts owed to Communist China.

• Leveraging U.S. Bilateral Aid: Directs the Secretary of State to review foreign governments’ UN voting records and their support for Taiwan’s participation as an observer in multilateral agencies, bodies, or commissions when considering U.S. bilateral assistance for a foreign government.

  
Implications

The bill signals a more operational approach to supporting Taiwan. It provides direct military financing and incorporates foreign governments’ support for Taiwan as a factor in U.S. bilateral aid decisions. The dedicated Countering PRC Influence Fund and the Taiwan “Honest Maps” provision further counter Beijing’s global coercion.

Taken together, the legislation reflects continued congressional support for Taiwan’s self-defense and international participation while underscoring Taiwan’s strategic importance to U.S. national security interests in the Indo-Pacific.

Sources:
[1] Taipei Times   [2] H.R.8595 (FY27 NSRP Appropriations Bill)   [3] House Appropriations Committee

TSMC’s US$100 Billion U.S. Expansion Deepens Bilateral Industrial Integration

On July 16, 2026, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC) announced a landmark additional US$100 billion investment in its Arizona operations. According to TSMC Chairman and CEO C.C. Wei (魏哲家), the new commitment will fund four additional leading-edge wafer fabrication plants and advanced packaging facilities. The announcement brings TSMC’s total planned U.S. investment to US$265 billion.
 
U.S. officials, including U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Director Raymond Greene, welcomed TSMC’s investment for strengthening supply chain resilience and creating high-paying American jobs.
 
AI Demand Accelerates Taiwanese Investment in the U.S.
 
Surging AI demand is accelerating TSMC’s U.S. expansion. At TSMC’s second-quarter earnings conference, Wei highlighted “very strong signal and positive outlook” from major cloud service providers, reaffirming TSMC’s confidence in a “multi-year AI megatrend.” He added that agentic AI and rapid data center construction are driving massive demand for advanced silicon, CPUs, and AI accelerators.
 
Beyond TSMC, Taiwan’s broader technology sector is also scaling up U.S. operations. In May, 20 Taiwanese companies — spanning semiconductor suppliers and AI server manufacturers — expressed interest in investing a combined US$35 billion in the United States.
 
Taiwan’s government has also introduced measures to support companies investing in the U.S., including a government-backed financing guarantee mechanism with an initial US$1.375 billion financing pool. Applications for the credit guarantees are expected to open as early as this July.
 
Urgent Double-Tax Relief for Deeper Economic Integration
 
TSMC’s latest U.S. expansion reflects a broader shift in U.S.-Taiwan economic relations toward deeper, long-term integration in investment and advanced manufacturing. Yet, the bilateral policy framework has not kept pace with this rapidly expanding economic relationship.
 
Taiwan remains the only top-ten U.S. trading partner without a bilateral tax agreement. The lack of bilateral double-tax relief poses a severe structural challenge, raising costs for Taiwanese firms operating in the U.S., with some estimated to face effective tax burdens of up to 51% on U.S. profits.
 
FAPA therefore urges the U.S. Senate to swiftly pass the United States-Taiwan Expedited Double-Tax Relief Act (S.199), whose House companion (H.R.33) passed by an overwhelming 423–1 vote in January 2025. Enacting the legislation would provide treaty-like tax relief and remove a major competitive disadvantage facing Taiwan.
 
Sources:
[1] Focus Taiwan   [2] Focus Taiwan   [3] Reuters   [4] Taipei Times   [5] Focus Taiwan   [6] Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA)   [7] S.199 / H.R.33 (United States-Taiwan Expedited Double-Tax Relief Act)

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China’s military test-launched a nuclear-capable, intercontinental-range submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from a nuclear-powered submarine on July 6, drawing sharp and widespread criticism from the U.S., its Indo-Pacific allies, and democratic partners.
 
While China’s official news agency has not specified the missile type, the state-controlled Global Times, citing a military expert, indicated that it was likely a JL-3, China’s most advanced SLBM, which the Pentagon assesses can reach the continental United States directly from Chinese coastal waters. However, Taiwan’s Defense Minister Wellington Koo (顧立雄) later stated that the missile was most likely a JL-2, underscoring that the precise missile type remains disputed.
 
China’s Growing Sea-Based Nuclear Capabilities
 
Regardless of the exact model, the test marks a significant and troubling advance in the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) sea-based nuclear capabilities. While the PLA last test-launched a land-based ICBM in 2024 — its first such test into international waters since 1980 — the July 6 launch demonstrated the growing operational maturity of the sea-based leg of China’s nuclear triad.
 
According to former senior U.S. intelligence official Dennis Wilder, this is a major development, as China has never before fired a ballistic missile from one of its nuclear-powered submarines into the South Pacific.
 
Indo-Pacific Democracies Condemn Beijing’s Missile Test
 
This provocative missile test, conducted after China gave regional governments only a few hours of advance notice, was sharply criticized by the U.S. and many of its Indo-Pacific democratic partners. The test destabilized regional security and raised serious concerns over Beijing’s lack of transparency and failure to provide adequate prior notification in accordance with international norms.

• In its statement, the U.S. State Department condemned “Beijing’s rapid and opaque nuclear weapons buildup.” It further urged China to commit to “a regularized notification arrangement for all intercontinental-range ballistic missile and space launches,” consistent with the commitments made by all other Permanent Five (P5) members of the UN Security Council.

• Taiwan’s Presidential Office condemned the test as a coercive attempt to intimidate the international community and called on Beijing to immediately cease its “irresponsible unilateral actions.”

• Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese called the test destabilizing and “provocative.” The launch notably coincided with the signing of a landmark mutual defense pact between Australia and Fiji.

• Although the missile carried a dummy warhead, New Zealand noted that it was fired directly into the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, a reckless move that blatantly contravenes the spirit and intent of the Treaty of Rarotonga, whose relevant protocols China ratified in 1987.

China’s Military Calculus

John Blaxland, an international security expert and former military intelligence officer, suggested that China was testing both its operational capabilities and the reactions of the U.S. and its regional allies. Similar to its military activities around Taiwan, Blaxland warned that the missile test is a calculated effort by Beijing to gradually normalize its “intrusive, assertive, [and] authoritarian behavior” across the Indo-Pacific.

Jeffrey Lewis, a scholar of China’s nuclear weapons modernization, characterized the launch as a clear signal of China’s “new era” of more frequent and overt arms testing. “They’re willing to pay the political costs . . . in a way that they weren’t in the past,” Lewis observed.

Implications

China’s latest missile launch demonstrates Beijing’s growing confidence in openly displaying its expanding sea-based nuclear capabilities and imposing a “new normal” of military coercion in the Indo-Pacific.

By projecting power deep into the Pacific while gauging regional and international reactions, China is showing that its challenge to the status quo is not limited to the Taiwan Strait but extends across the broader region.

Sources:
[1] Taipei Times   [2] Reuters   [3] Radio Taiwan International (RTI)   [4] Dennis Wilder’s LinkedIn   [5] U.S. Department of State   [6] Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)   [7] New York Times

Taiwan International Ocean Forum Calls for Collective Maritime Resilience to Counter China’s Gray-Zone Aggression

On July 8, 2026, the Taiwan International Ocean Forum opened in Taipei, bringing together participants from 15 countries, including more than 100 experts from government, industry, academia, and research institutions, as well as international lawmakers. Centered on the theme of “Maritime Resilience,” the forum serves as a crucial platform for high-level dialogue on Indo-Pacific maritime security and regional cooperation.
 
Amid rising regional tensions, the forum focused on Beijing’s expanding gray-zone activities and aggression, including the China Coast Guard’s unilateral “law enforcement patrols” in waters around Taiwan and across the wider Indo-Pacific, as well as the sabotage of undersea communications cables involving China-affiliated vessels.
 
Taiwan’s Ocean Affairs Council Minister Kuan Bi-ling (管碧玲) warned that these incremental tactics risk creating an entirely new “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait, underscoring the need for closer international cooperation to strengthen maritime resilience and safeguard regional stability.
 
International Lawmakers Urge Robust Collective Maritime Deterrence
 
U.S. Senator Tammy Duckworth (D-IL) attended the forum during her visit to Taiwan, where she and British Member of Parliament Tom Tugendhat warned that China is using coast guard enforcement and other coercive tools to establish a “new normal” in waters east of Taiwan and across the South China Sea, in violation of existing maritime law.
 
Highlighting recent Chinese Coast Guard patrols that required commercial vessels transiting waters east of Taiwan to report their destinations, Duckworth stressed that countries must steadfastly exercise their freedom of navigation rights.
 
She argued that like-minded partners should collectively assert their right to transit the Taiwan Strait in accordance with international law and resolutely reject Beijing’s attempts to establish a foothold for a different maritime order through coercive actions.
 
Strategic Implications
 
The forum underscores that diplomatic rhetoric alone is no longer sufficient to preserve peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and the broader Indo-Pacific. Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) Executive Director Luke de Pulford warned that while G7 statements have helped raise awareness, governments have yet to develop meaningful deterrence or reach an international agreement on the “red lines” that would trigger coordinated international action.
 
Taken together, the discussions at the forum further highlighted the growing urgency of closer maritime cooperation and practical policy coordination among Taiwan and like-minded democracies. Such collaboration is vital to uphold freedom of navigation, defend the rules-based maritime order, and prevent Beijing from normalizing coercive changes to the status quo.
 
Sources:
[1] Taiwan International Ocean Forum   [2] Taipei Times   [3] Radio Taiwan International (RTI)   [4] Focus Taiwan   [5] Taipei Times

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The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) highly controversial “Ethnic Unity and Progress Law,” adopted by the Chinese National People’s Congress in March 2026, officially took effect on July 1, 2026. While institutionalizing forced assimilation domestically, the law asserts sweeping jurisdiction over dissidents and global critics both within and beyond China’s borders.
 
The most alarming aspect of the PRC’s new ethnic unity law is its unprecedented extraterritorial reach under Article 63, which provides that individuals and organizations outside China can be held legally liable if they are deemed to “undermine ethnic unity and progress” or “promote ethnic separatism” against China.  
 
The new law has drawn immediate international criticism, including from Taiwan’s government, the U.S. Congress, the European Parliament, Japanese parliamentary groups, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
 
Increasing Threats to Taiwanese Citizens and Taiwan-Related Actors
 
While framed as an ethnic policy measure, the law directly threatens Taiwanese citizens and Taiwan-related actors by leveraging Beijing’s expansive definition of the “Chinese nation.” Taiwanese legal scholar Chen Yu-jie (陳玉潔) warned that the PRC’s new law contains “overly broad” provisions and asserts long-arm jurisdiction, substantially raising legal risks for Taiwanese citizens and businesses.
 
Taiwanese national security officials highlighted specific risks for Taiwan-related actors and global critics:

• Taiwanese officials and ordinary citizens entering or transiting through China or closely aligned non-democratic countries could face severe risks of arbitrary detention or separatism charges.

• Journalists, academics, and researchers focusing on China’s human rights record, military expansion, or cross-Taiwan Strait issues could face heightened border scrutiny, pressure, and publication restrictions.

• Companies promoting non-China supply chains, participating in export controls, or investigating forced-labor risks could face Chinese sanctions and other forms of pressure.

 Bipartisan Condemnation in the U.S. Congress

Bipartisan lawmakers in the U.S. House and Senate have introduced separate resolutions denouncing China’s Ethnic Unity and Progress Law. Introduced by Reps. Chris Smith (R-NJ) and Jim McGovern (D-MA), H.Res.1400 condemns China’s campaign of forced assimilation against ethnic and religious minorities. Separately, S.Res.791, introduced by Senators Jacky Rosen (D-NV), John Curtis (R-UT), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), and Jim Banks (R-IN), calls on the PRC to end its transnational repression campaigns that undermine U.S. sovereignty and threaten the safety and freedoms of people in the United States.

In a bipartisan joint statement, House Select Committee on China Chairman John Moolenaar (R-MI), Ranking Member Ro Khanna (D-CA), and Congresswoman Young Kim (R-CA), alongside multiple U.S. Senators led by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch (R-ID) and Ranking Member Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), condemned the PRC’s newly enacted “ethnic unity” law. They warned that the law provides Beijing with near-limitless authority to target overseas critics and seeks to legitimize its transnational repression.

Implications

By extending Beijing’s ethnic and unilateral national-unification framework beyond China’s borders, the law weaponizes domestic ethnic-policy legislation into a tool for transnational repression and global censorship.

More broadly, it demonstrates how Beijing seeks to convert its authoritarian political narratives into enforceable extraterritorial legal claims. By doing so, it exports its arbitrary red lines on identity, sovereignty, and human rights far beyond China’s territory, actively undermining Taiwanese self-determination and global democratic norms.

Sources:
[1] Taipei Times   [2] Focus Taiwan   [3] Central News Agency (CNA)   [4] H.Res.1400 / S.Res.791 (Resolutions Condemning the PRC’s Ethnic Unity Law)   [5] U.S. House Select Committee on China

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On June 19, 2026, Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) reported that a Chinese oceanographic research vessel had entered the nation’s restricted waters —which extend 12 to 24 nautical miles from the coast — off Yilan County on Taiwan’s east coast. The vessel intruded into the area for nearly five hours, ignoring the CGA’s demands to immediately leave the waters. A Chinese state media account attempted to justify the ship’s intrusion, falsely portraying it as a lawful environmental survey in so-called “China’s jurisdictional waters.”

The incident follows a recent pattern of Chinese maritime incursions into waters under Taiwan’s jurisdiction. Earlier in June, a Chinese coast guard vessel and a survey ship intruded into waters around Dongsha Island (Pratas Island) and waters east of Taiwan, while two Chinese official vessels entered restricted waters near Taiping Island (Itu Aba) for the first time.

Furthermore, the Chinese Coast Guard harassed international merchant ships in Taiwan’s eastern exclusive economic zone (EEZ), unlawfully demanding navigation data under the false pretext of Chinese jurisdiction.

These coercive activities were internationally condemned by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany in rare, coordinated statements. Taiwan’s CGA and Ocean Affairs Council (OAC) condemned the activities and adopted a “shadowing and monitoring” strategy to track Chinese vessels, deny them access to Taiwan-controlled waters, and avoid giving Beijing a pretext to escalate the conflict.

Tests of a“Quasi-Quarantine” Model

The broader pattern suggests that Beijing is testing a “quasi-quarantine” model in waters under Taiwan’s control. In a recent Jamestown Foundation analysis, Dr. Ying Yu Lin, a Taiwan-based expert on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), argues that China is using its coast guard, maritime patrol, and other government vessels to create the appearance of administrative control without declaring a formal military blockade or launching a high-profile military exercise.

As part of Beijing’s broader gray-zone campaign against Taiwan, this “quasi-quarantine” operation is designed to normalize China’s maritime presence, test Taiwan’s operational response, and shape the maritime lawfare and psychological environment for future coercive actions.

In a recent interview, Bonnie Glaser, managing director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund, also cited the Dongsha and Taiping incidents as part of a “dangerous trend” of pressure tactics China uses to coerce Taiwan and countries that are strengthening ties with Taiwan.

Implications

China’s recent maritime actions around Taiwan-controlled waters, including Dongsha, Taiping, and waters east of Taiwan, are not merely a rehearsal for a possible quarantine or blockade. They should be understood as part of Beijing’s broader gray-zone campaign to erode the First Island Chain’s security environment and legitimize Chinese jurisdiction across these waters. As with its artificial island-building in the South China Sea, Beijing is taking incremental actions to create a “new normal” that could later support expanded claims and coercive actions.

Experts have warned that ignoring these operations could allow China to gradually establish a greater presence and perceived jurisdiction around Taiwan-controlled waters, increasing pressure on Taiwan and regional partners. The United States should not underestimate this trend: Beijing is playing the long game to weaken the U.S.-led regional security architecture and undermine core U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific.

Sources:
[1] Focus Taiwan   [2] South China Morning Post   [3] Taipei Times   [4] Taipei Times   [5] Reuters   [6] Taipei Times   [7] Jamestown Foundation   [8] Central News Agency (CNA)

GCTF Strengthens Multilateral Democratic Cooperation Against China’s Transnational Repression

The Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) hosted a seminar in Taipei, Taiwan, from June 23 to 25, 2026, on strengthening democratic resilience and countering the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) transnational repression.
 
This year’s event brought together delegates from 29 countries, including Taiwan’s formal GCTF partners: the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom (UK).
 
GCTF’s Strategic and Multilateral Value
 
GCTF is a pivotal, Taiwan-U.S.-launched multilateral platform that helps Taiwan expand its international space by leveraging its policy expertise and strengths. Since its establishment in 2015, the framework has enabled Taiwan to build enduring partnerships on issues of shared concern, including law enforcement cooperation, information security, and media literacy. To date, GCTF has organized 105 international workshops, drawing over 10,000 officials, experts, and civil society representatives from around the world.
 
The platform’s continued expansion underscores growing international interest in democratic, multilateral cooperation with Taiwan. This momentum is highlighted by the UK joining GCTF as its sixth official partner in 2025, as well as a cumulative total of 27 overseas events across 18 countries by the end of that year.

2026 Theme: Transnational Repression
 
At the seminar’s opening this year, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te called on democracies to strengthen resilience and solidarity. He noted that the free world faces “unprecedented dangers” from authoritarian regimes that leverage emerging technologies and illicit financial flows to sow division across borders.
 
President Lai emphasized that Beijing’s transnational repression includes overseas surveillance, cyberattacks, and cognitive warfare operations designed to silence critics, undermine trust in democratic institutions, and erode national sovereignty. “No democratic nation can be absent in the fight against this hybridized challenge,” he said.
 
Platforms such as GCTF have become vital assets for democratic security cooperation in recent years, especially as the PRC continues to weaponize transnational repression to undermine democratic interests and silence critics.
 
In a similar vein, the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC), in its recent report titled “Report on the PRC’s Transnational Repression and Malign Influence in 2025,” found that China has escalated its use of transnational lawfare to suppress voices advocating for Taiwan’s sovereignty and independence. This trend is exemplified by the PRC’s extraterritorial criminal investigation of Taiwanese lawmaker Puma Shen as a so-called “diehard Taiwan independence separatist.”
 
Implications
 
GCTF demonstrates that Taiwan is not merely a participant in international cooperation, but an indispensable contributor to the democratic community. Over the past decade, the framework has provided an institutionalized platform for Taiwan to share its policy and governance experience with democratic partners.
 
This year’s focus on transnational repression further highlights Taiwan’s practical contributions. As a frontline democracy facing sustained authoritarian coercion, Taiwan has accumulated unparalleled experience in countering the PRC’s multilayered transnational repression and malign pressure, offering valuable lessons for democracies seeking to develop coordinated responses to authoritarian threats.
 
Sources:
[1] Taipei Times   [2] Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF)   [3] U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC)   [4] Taipei Times

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On June 18, 2026, Taiwan President Lai Ching-te received a U.S. House delegation –– including Representative Lucy McBath (D-GA), second vice chair of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), and Representative Valerie Foushee (D-NC), a member of the caucus –– at the Presidential Office.

During the meeting, Lai called for expanded Taiwan-U.S. cooperation in defense, technology, industry, and artificial intelligence (AI), while also highlighting the need to remove remaining barriers to cross-border investment.

Breaking Down the Double Taxation Barrier

President Lai explicitly called on the U.S. Congress to expedite the passage of U.S.-Taiwan double taxation relief legislation, which he said would reduce cross-border investment barriers and further foster bilateral commercial cooperation.

This push directly aligns with the relevant Senate legislation, the United States-Taiwan Expedited Double-Tax Relief Act (S.199). This bipartisan legislation complements the House version (H.R.33), which overwhelmingly passed the House by a 423–1 vote in January 2025.

Meanwhile, American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan (AmCham Taiwan) President Carl Wegner announced that he would lead a high-level business delegation to Washington for “door-knock” meetings with U.S. officials on boosting bilateral trade.

Wegner expressed optimism that the long-stalled double-tax relief effort could move further forward in the near future, bolstered by the momentum of the U.S.-Taiwan Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) signed in February 2026.

AI and Semiconductor Pipeline

Against the backdrop of the accelerating AI revolution, eliminating double taxation has become increasingly urgent. Driven by the unprecedented AI boom, two-way trade in goods reached US$256 billion in 2025, making Taiwan the United States’ fourth-largest trading partner (surpassing Japan, Germany, and South Korea).

During the meeting with the U.S. House delegation, President Lai highlighted the newly established U.S.-Taiwan Semiconductor Education Alliance –– an initiative designed to promote collaboration among universities, industry, and government stakeholders to strengthen bilateral semiconductor workforce talent pipelines.

Implications

AmCham’s 2026 Business Climate Survey highlights Taiwan’s vital role in global technology supply chains, with 92% of members planning to maintain or increase investments in Taiwan. The survey also found that 76% of respondents consider a double taxation avoidance agreement important to their business, underscoring the private-sector demand for congressional action.

Separately, AmCham’s 2026 Taiwan White Paper frames Taiwan as a critical partner for U.S. technology supply chains and Indo-Pacific stability, highlighting significant opportunities for U.S.-Taiwan R&D and co-production in drones, robotics, and other asymmetric capabilities.

Given these growing economic bonds, it is essential that the U.S. Senate swiftly pass the United States-Taiwan Expedited Double-Tax Relief Act (S.199) to remove remaining barriers to deeper bilateral investment and cooperation.

Sources:
[1] Focus Taiwan   [2] Taipei Times   [3] S.199 / H.R.33 (United States-Taiwan Expedited Double-Tax Relief Act)   [4] Taipei Times   [5] Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)   [6] AmCham Taiwan (2026 Taiwan White Paper)   [7] American Institute in Taiwan (AIT)   [8] AmCham Taiwan (2026 Business Climate Survey)

“Blue Skies for Taiwan Act” Advances Out of Senate Committee as Taiwan Expands Drone Development and Procurement

On June 17, 2026, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee advanced the bipartisan Blue Skies for Taiwan Act (S.4259). The move brought the bill one step closer to creating a fast-track certification pathway for trusted Taiwanese drone and drone-component manufacturers to integrate into the U.S. Department of Defense’s “Blue UAS” program.

Strengthening Trusted Drone Supply Chains

The legislation would establish a “Blue UAS Working Group” to identify and address regulatory, export-control, and certification barriers that impede Taiwan’s participation in Blue UAS programs. This initiative aims to systematically strengthen trusted, PRC-free drone supply chains while bolstering Taiwan’s indigenous drone production and regional resilience.

This legislation marks a shift toward a reciprocal defense-industrial partnership. By accelerating Taiwanese manufacturers’ integration into Pentagon-vetted networks, the bill would reduce cybersecurity risks and expand the supply of trusted, democratic UAS systems and components available to the United States and its allies.

Taiwan Accelerates Military Drone Expansion

The legislative progress in Washington coincides with the Taiwanese government’s moves to expand investment in its domestic uncrewed systems. On June 18, 2026, Taiwan’s Executive Yuan approved a draft special budget to fund the development and procurement of domestic drones and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), with a budget ceiling of NT$210 billion (approximately US$6.65 billion) to be allocated through December 2031.

The proposed procurement consists of 1,446 coastal reconnaissance drones, 208,200 coastal attack drones, and 1,320 uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs). This robust procurement, alongside the scheduled launch of a dedicated army drone squadron, reflects Taiwan’s proactive stance and firm commitment to sustaining its buildup of uncrewed systems and enhancing its asymmetric deterrence.

Sources:
[1] Office of Sen. Jeff Merkley   [2] S.4259 (Blue Skies for Taiwan Act)   [3] Taipei Times  [4] Taipei Times

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Key U.S. House and Senate committees recently advanced important Taiwan defense measures in two major defense bills. After the House Armed Services Committee approved its version of the FY2027 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) on June 4, the House Appropriations Committee released its FY2027 Defense Appropriations Bill on June 10, proposing US$2 billion in funding to bolster Taiwan’s defense.

The Senate Armed Services Committee subsequently advanced its own version of the FY2027 NDAA on June 11, further underscoring strong congressional support for strengthening Taiwan’s defense and deterrence.

Key Taiwan Provisions

The House FY2027 NDAA includes up to US$1 billion for the Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative (TSCI) to help Taiwan strengthen its self-defense capabilities, including funding for medical support, training, and the joint development of unmanned systems with the United States.

The House FY2027 Defense Appropriations Bill allocates US$1 billion for TSCI, available through September 30, 2028. It provides an additional US$1 billion for the replacement of defense articles and reimbursement of defense services supplied to Taiwan.

The Senate FY2027 NDAA authorizes the Department of Defense to establish a War Reserve Stockpile (WRS) program for Taiwan to strengthen wartime logistics, pre-positioned supplies, and long-term sustainment. The bill also redesignates TSCI as the First Island Chain Security Cooperation Initiative (FICSCI), extends it through 2032, and makes the Philippines eligible for assistance. Additionally, it requires a review of delays in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.

Implications

These measures suggest that U.S. congressional defense policy and funding proposals are increasingly treating Taiwan’s defense as part of a regional First Island Chain denial defense framework, rather than solely as a bilateral U.S.-Taiwan security issue.

By linking Taiwan security assistance, wartime stockpiles, reviews of arms-sales delays, and regional defense cooperation, these bills reinforce the 2026 National Defense Strategy’s emphasis on building and sustaining a strong denial defense along the First Island Chain.

For Taiwan, this underscores its strategic importance to Indo-Pacific deterrence and to broader U.S. interests in preserving a favorable regional balance of power.

Sources:

[1] Focus Taiwan   [2] Taipei Times   [3] Focus Taiwan   [4] Taipei Times   [5] Focus Taiwan   [6] Taipei Times   [7] U.S. Department of War (2026 National Defense Strategy)

Taiwan Becomes Home to the First Overseas Evaluation Partner for U.S. “Green UAS” Drone Certification

On June 4, 2026, Taiwan’s Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI; 工研院) announced that it had become an authorized evaluation body under the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) “Green UAS” certification program. This critical framework assesses cybersecurity and supply-chain integrity in commercial and non-defense drone systems.
 
This designation makes Taiwan the first country outside the U.S. with a recognized Green UAS evaluation body, allowing Taiwanese companies to complete key testing and evaluation steps locally. Partnering with the Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (漢翔航空), Taiwan is positioned to develop into a regional testing and validation hub aligned with U.S. trusted-drone standards, helping Taiwanese drone companies expand into the U.S. and other markets.
 
Taiwan Enters the U.S. Trusted Drone Pipeline
 
This milestone establishes a domestic fast track for Taiwanese drone firms to enter the American commercial and defense ecosystems by allowing key Green UAS evaluations to be completed in Taiwan.
 
AUVSI Chief Executive Officer Michael Robbins noted that “Green UAS” serves as the commercial standard managed by AUVSI, while “Blue UAS” is the government standard adopted by the U.S. Department of War. Drones that meet Green UAS standards can advance through a review process toward Blue UAS compliance.
 
Robbins further noted that once Taiwanese companies secure Green UAS certification, their products may qualify for relevant exemptions from the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Covered List restrictions and potentially become eligible for sales to the U.S. Department of War.
 
This partnership aligns closely with Washington’s push for trusted, non-PRC (or “non-Red”) supply chains. The exclusion of PRC-manufactured components is increasingly becoming a core requirement for U.S. defense contracts. The Pentagon’s $1 billion Drone Dominance Program aims to expand demand for large-scale, low-cost allied production, which could further strengthen Taiwan’s role as a trusted defense-technology partner.
 
Implications
 
This development advances Taiwan’s vision of becoming a leading Asian drone supply chain center by leveraging its world-class semiconductor, systems integration, and trusted technology strengths.
 
Alignment with U.S. cybersecurity and procurement standards would further strengthen Taiwan’s defense resilience and position the country as a key Indo-Pacific hub for trusted, non-PRC drone supply chains.
 
Sources:
[1] Taipei Times   [2] Focus Taiwan   [3] Liberty Times   [4] Global Taiwan Institute   [5] Drone Dominance

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On June 2 and 3, 2026, during congressional budget hearings on the State Department’s FY 2027 budget request, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reaffirmed that U.S. policy and commitments toward Taiwan remain unchanged and that Washington does not consult Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan. He also clarified that a proposed US$14 billion arms sale to Taiwan has not been halted, but rather remains under review.

U.S. President Donald Trump later confirmed that his administration is still considering the proposed arms package, while indicating that he still plans to discuss the issue with Taiwan President Lai Ching-te.

U.S. Taiwan Policy and Six Assurances Unchanged

During the June 2 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Rubio stated that there had been “no change” in U.S. policy toward Taiwan and that Washington wants to see the cross-strait status quo preserved.

On June 3, Rubio again faced questions from lawmakers about Taiwan during additional congressional budget hearings, including the House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing and the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee hearing on the State Department’s FY 2027 budget request.

Throughout the hearings, Rubio reaffirmed that U.S. arms-sales decisions regarding Taiwan are not negotiated with or subject to consultation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) — a core principle of the Six Assurances to Taiwan. He emphasized that the PRC’s objections to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are nothing new and do not give Beijing any role in Washington’s decisions.

Taiwan Arms Package Still Under Review

During the hearings, Rubio clarified that the proposed US$14 billion arms sale to Taiwan has not been “paused,” stating instead that the package remains under review as it moves through the administration’s internal process.

He explained that the package is significant in scale and carries implications for the U.S. defense industrial base and future production capacity, requiring the administration to balance those factors with other considerations.

Rubio also pointed to the administration’s December 2025 approval of an approximately US$11 billion arms package for Taiwan, describing it as the largest U.S. arms package for Taiwan by dollar value in the history of U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation.

Trump’s Latest Response

Following Rubio’s testimony, President Trump said on June 5 that Washington is still considering the proposed US$14 billion arms sale to Taiwan. Asked by reporters aboard Air Force One whether he had made a decision on the package, Trump replied, “We’re looking at that.” Trump also indicated that he still planned to speak with Taiwan President Lai Ching-te, saying, “I’ll always talk to him.”

President Lai has previously said that, if given the opportunity to speak with Trump, he would stress that improving Taiwan’s defense capabilities and purchasing U.S. weapons are necessary measures to safeguard Taiwan’s security and maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

Sources:
[1] Taipei Times   [2] Focus Taiwan   [3] Taipei Times   [4] Reuters   [5] Central News Agency (CNA)   [6] Focus Taiwan

Taiwan Bolsters Anti-Ship Missile Arsenal to Strengthen “Kill Zone” Strategy

Taiwan is sharply increasing its anti-ship missile (ASM) arsenal, with its total stockpile projected to exceed 1,800 ASMs by early 2029, according to a Reuters report. The buildup includes missiles launched from aircraft, ships, and ground-based launchers, reflecting Taiwan’s broader shift toward an asymmetric defense posture against the growing Chinese military threat.
 
This expanding ASM force is central to Taiwan’s “kill zone” strategy in the Taiwan Strait, where defenders seek to use large numbers of affordable but lethal precision weapons to offset China’s overwhelming firepower advantage. Alongside shorter-range missiles and swarms of surface and aerial drones, these capabilities are intended to make any Chinese invasion or blockade far more costly and difficult to execute.
 
Asymmetric Firepower and Reliable Deterrence
 
According to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, existing anti-ship missiles are currently deployed around the nation “in a mobile and dispersed manner to preserve combat effectiveness.” ASMs “can establish a powerful maritime strike capability and degrade the enemy’s combat effectiveness,” the defense ministry said.
 
Retired U.S. Marine Corps Colonel Grant Newsham noted that anti-ship missiles are a “sensible” investment for Taiwan, emphasizing that long-range precision weapons could threaten or destroy Chinese vessels before they even set out across the Taiwan Strait, or at any point between the Chinese coast and Taiwan’s shores. “Employed properly and with adequate numbers, these missiles are a huge problem for a Chinese invasion force,” Newsham added.
 
Taiwan is also expected to field more than 1,000 domestically produced Hsiung Feng II and III anti-ship cruise missiles by early 2029, complementing its U.S.-supplied Harpoon missiles. This robust domestic production pipeline underscores Taiwan’s growing defense self-reliance, ensuring a sustainable, independent supply of high-impact deterrence capabilities to safeguard its sovereignty.
 
U.S. Support and Arms Deliveries
 
Taiwan’s ASM supply is tightly linked to its strategic partnership with the United States and U.S. defense contractors, including Boeing, which manufactures the Harpoon missile. Senior Taiwanese officials reported that Taiwan’s military currently possesses 450 Boeing-made Harpoon missiles and is in the process of receiving 400 more land-based variants. Data collected by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute also indicate that the Trump administration approved the sale of an additional 195 air-launched ASMs. However, the deal terms are still being negotiated.
 
At a March 2026 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing titled “Reforming America’s Defense Sales,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Director Michael F. Miller testified that under standing policy guidance, Taiwan remains the United States’ top priority for Harpoon ASM deliveries.
 
Implications
 
Taiwan’s missile buildup reflects critical lessons drawn from conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, where asymmetric deployments of missiles and drones have demonstrated how weaker actors can retain the capacity to fight back and impose significant costs on more powerful adversaries.
 
By setting up a concentrated “kill zone” in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan’s objective is to decisively disrupt a Chinese invasion fleet before it reaches Taiwan’s beaches, thereby securing critical time for the United States and other democratic allies to respond and mobilize.
 
To coordinate this expanded firepower, Taiwan’s military will formally establish the Littoral Combat Command on July 1, 2026. This new command will integrate the nation’s coastal radars, anti-ship missiles, and drones into a single, unified combat force to strengthen its overall defense readiness.
 
Sources:
[1] Reuters   [2] Taipei Times   [3] Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA)   [4] Focus Taiwan

COMPUTEX TAIPEI 2026 Solidifies Taiwan’s Role in Global AI Integration

Held from June 2 to 5, 2026, this year’s COMPUTEX TAIPEI reached record highs in both scale and international participation, bringing together 1,500 technology companies from 33 countries and occupying 6,000 exhibition booths under the theme “AI Together.”
 
The unprecedented scale of the event firmly establishes Taiwan’s position as a global center of artificial intelligence (AI) hardware, advanced manufacturing, and technology integration, showcasing its profound economic resilience and undisputed role at the frontline of global technology development.
 
The Geopolitical Anchor of Global AI Integration
 
The global AI revolution is heavily dependent on Taiwan’s advanced manufacturing ecosystem. Addressing the opening ceremony, Taiwan President Lai Ching-te directly linked peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait with the security of the global AI supply chain. He emphasized that maintaining the political “status quo” is Taiwan’s most responsible pledge to global supply chains.
 
As international technology giants gather to transition AI from cloud computing into real-world deployment –– such as autonomous robotics, automotive platforms, and smart manufacturing –– Taiwan’s cohesive and highly flexible information and communication technology (ICT) supply chain serves as the indispensable foundation for global AI integration.
 
Highlights of U.S. Tech Giants
 
The event featured high-profile keynote addresses and forum presentations by leaders of major U.S. technology companies, including Jensen Huang, Cristiano Amon, Matt Murphy, and Lip-Bu Tan, the CEOs of NVIDIA, Qualcomm, Marvell, and Intel, respectively.
 
A major highlight came from NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang, who enthusiastically praised the local ecosystem, describing Taiwan as the “epicenter of the AI revolution.” His remarks highlighted NVIDIA’s massive expansion in Taiwan, noting that the company’s procurement tied to Taiwan’s local ecosystem has grown to roughly US$150 billion annually, and that NVIDIA plans to build its new Taiwan headquarters in Taipei, which is set to be operational by 2030 and employ up to 4,000 people.
 
Implications
 
COMPUTEX 2026 further underscored that Taiwan is not merely a tech manufacturing hub, but the strategic backbone of the global AI supply chain. Despite growing cross-Strait tensions and China’s continued pressure, major U.S. technology firms are aggressively expanding their investments and deepening their partnerships in Taiwan, demonstrating that a stable, sovereign, and democratic Taiwan remains vital to the next stage of AI development.
 
Sources:
[1] Taipei Times   [2] Reuters   [3] COMPUTEX Daily   [4] Focus Taiwan   [5] Focus Taiwan   [6] Reuters

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On May 28, 2026, the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) published a Federal Register notice amending the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) to implement selected Section 232 tariff relief for certain Taiwan-origin imports entering the United States.
 
Effective retroactively to May 1, 2026, these adjustments fulfill key tariff-related elements of the Memorandum of Understanding Relating to Taiwan-U.S. Investment (MOU) signed on January 15, 2026, between the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO). Under this historic framework, Taiwan has become the first country to secure preferential treatment under the current U.S. administration’s Section 232 tariff regime.
 
The immediate HTSUS changes include:

• Capping Section 232 tariffs on designated Taiwan-origin automobile parts, timber, lumber, and wood derivative products at a maximum rate of 15% (down from prior rates as high as nearly 27%).

• Eliminating derivative Section 232 steel, aluminum, and copper tariffs on certain civil aircraft components that are products of Taiwan, restoring them to ordinary customs duty treatment. According to Taiwanese officials, these products would revert to an average MFN duty rate of approximately 1.12%.

Why It Matters
 
The tariff action places Taiwan on par with key U.S. economic partners such as Japan and South Korea in the affected Section 232 categories, reinforcing Taiwan’s role as a trusted and strategically aligned partner in critical supply chains.
 
In exchange for these tariff reductions and to solidify the broader U.S.-Taiwan Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) signed on February 12, 2026, Taiwan has committed to unprecedented market-opening measures once the agreement enters into force:

• Eliminating or reducing tariffs on 99% of U.S. industrial and agricultural exports –– including beef, dairy products, and automobiles, while addressing non-tariff barriers by accepting U.S. FDA marketing authorizations and U.S. vehicle safety standards; and

• Facilitating long-term increases in purchases of key U.S. commodities from 2025 through 2029. These include $44.4 billion in liquefied natural gas (LNG) and crude oil to diversify Taiwan’s energy security, $15.2 billion in civil aircraft and engines, and $25.2 billion in power equipment, power grids, storage facilities, and other equipment, to help reduce the bilateral trade deficit.

Beyond trade balancing, the MOU establishes a strategic economic partnership that strengthens U.S. domestic semiconductor supply chains and secures America’s technological and industrial leadership against authoritarian coercion.

Taiwan is providing at least $250 billion in credit guarantees to support its enterprises in making at least $250 billion in new direct investments in the U.S. These investments by Taiwanese semiconductor and technology enterprises will significantly expand U.S. domestic advanced chip, energy, and AI manufacturing capacity.

Next Step

As the U.S.-Taiwan strategic economic partnership continues to deepen, this large-scale capital and technological investment highlights the urgent need for the U.S. Senate to swiftly pass the United States-Taiwan Expedited Double-Tax Relief Act (S.199). Introduced by Senators Mike Crapo (R-ID), Ron Wyden (D-OR), Jim Risch (R-ID), and Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), this bipartisan legislation complements the House version (H.R.33), which overwhelmingly passed the House by a 423–1 vote in January 2025.

Addressing double taxation burdens is the vital next step to complement these tariff reductions. By reducing key withholding taxes and providing targeted wage relief for qualified residents of Taiwan, this legislation will provide the legal and financial certainty necessary to sustain long-term U.S.-Taiwan strategic economic cooperation and investment.

Sources:
[1] Federal Register   [2] Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA)   [3] Taipei Times   [4] Taipei Times   [5] Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)   [6] FAPA   [7] S.199 / H.R.33 (U.S.-Taiwan Expedited Double-Tax Relief Act)   [8] Office of Sen. Mike Crapo

Bipartisan “Blue Skies for Taiwan Act” Introduced in U.S. House to Bolster Secure U.S.-Taiwan Drone Cooperation

On May 26, 2026, Representative Eugene Vindman (D-VA) introduced the Blue Skies for Taiwan Act (H.R.9042) in the U.S. House, with Representatives Michael Lawler (R-NY) and Madeleine Dean (D-PA) joining as original cosponsors.
 
The Senate companion (S.4259) was previously introduced on March 26, 2026, by Senators Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Ted Cruz (R-TX), and John Curtis (R-UT), with Senator Andy Kim (D-NJ) joining as a cosponsor.
 
Why It Matters
 
This crucial bipartisan legislation aims to expand U.S.-Taiwan technical, industrial, and supply-chain cooperation on unmanned aerial systems (UAS) as Taiwan faces intensifying pressure from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Beijing’s continued dominance of the global UAS supply chain.
 
By creating a fast-track certification process for trusted Taiwanese drone and component manufacturers, the bill helps build a robust “Blue UAS” ecosystem that is secure, resilient, and independent of China-linked technology and components. This initiative directly enhances American national security while bolstering Taiwan’s defense readiness and resilience.
 
Strategic Implications
 
This legislation marks a significant evolution in U.S.-Taiwan relations by moving beyond traditional, one-way arms sales toward a more reciprocal defense-industrial partnership. By integrating Taiwan into the Pentagon’s Blue UAS framework, the United States is recognizing Taiwan’s technological and manufacturing strengths as indispensable assets for addressing critical gaps in allied drone production.

At a time when Taiwan’s domestic drone industry is rapidly expanding yet faces complex uncertainties in its own domestic defense funding, this legislation sends a powerful strategic signal. It establishes that the United States has a clear, vested interest in helping Taiwan scale secure, PRC-free drone production as part of a broader Indo-Pacific deterrence architecture.
 
Sources:
[1] H.R.9042 / S.4259 (Blue Skies for Taiwan Act)   [2] Office of Sen. Jeff Merkley   [3] Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA)   [4] FAPA

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On May 18, 2026, the 79th World Health Assembly (WHA) opened in Geneva, Switzerland, marking the 10th consecutive year that Taiwan has been excluded from the World Health Organization (WHO) decision-making body due to aggressive diplomatic pressure from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
 
Beijing falsely claims that Taiwan’s participation requires its approval, and continues to weaponize and distort United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 2758 (1971) and WHA Resolution 25.1 (1972) to justify blocking Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. In fact, the two resolutions do not mention Taiwan, nor do they determine Taiwan’s sovereignty or authorize the PRC to represent Taiwan and its people.
 
Taiwan’s WHA Bid and Growing International Support
 
Taiwan remained visible in Geneva despite its exclusion from the WHA, as Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung and Health Minister Shih Chung-liang led high-profile side events to showcase Taiwan’s smart healthcare capabilities, medical innovation, and contributions to global health resilience. Minister Shih emphasized that health is a fundamental human right that must never be subject to political conditions, warning that Taiwan’s exclusion creates unnecessary gaps in global health preparedness and response.
 
Meanwhile, Taiwan’s WHA bid has garnered broad and growing international support despite continued PRC obstruction. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the executive and legislative bodies of more than 50 nations have expressed support for Taiwan’s participation in the WHA and other international organizations.
 
Eleven of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies submitted a formal proposal to the WHO Secretariat calling for Taiwan to be invited as a WHA observer. Separately, on May 21, the representative offices of nine like-minded countries in Taiwan — the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, Canada, Germany, France, New Zealand, Lithuania, and Poland — issued a joint statement firmly supporting Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the WHO and its inclusion as a WHA observer.

Taiwan International Solidarity Act

As the PRC continues to misuse and mischaracterize UNGA Resolution 2758 to isolate Taiwan, U.S. lawmakers have pushed forward the bipartisan Taiwan International Solidarity Act (H.R.2416 / S.2224), which seeks to strengthen Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. The House version passed with overwhelming bipartisan support in May 2025, while the Senate companion bill was reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee without amendment in October 2025.
 
The bill clarifies that UNGA Resolution 2758, adopted in 1971, established the PRC government’s representatives as the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations, but “did not address the issue of representation of Taiwan and its people in the United Nations system or any related organizations.” Moreover, it did not take a position on the relationship between the PRC and Taiwan, nor did it contain any statement on Taiwan’s sovereignty.
 
Furthermore, the legislation directs the United States to work with global allies and partners to resist Beijing’s efforts to undermine Taiwan’s diplomatic relationships and international partnerships. It also states that the “United States opposes any initiative that seeks to change Taiwan’s status without the consent of the people of Taiwan.”
 
FAPA’s Call to Action
 
It is deeply disappointing that UNGA Resolution 2758 remains widely exploited by the PRC to “justify” its fictitious “One China principle,” which aims to suffocate Taiwan’s sovereign status and international space in order to eventually annex Taiwan, even by force.
 
To push back against Beijing’s deliberate distortion of UNGA Resolution 2758 and its broader campaign to erase Taiwan’s international identity, the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA) urges the U.S. Senate to swiftly pass the Taiwan International Solidarity Act (S.2224).
 
FAPA calls on U.S. lawmakers to stand firmly with democratic Taiwan, defend Taiwan’s sovereign right to international participation, and support Taiwan’s full membership in the UN, WHO, and other international organizations where Taiwan’s expertise and contributions are urgently needed.
 
Sources:
[1] Taipei Times   [2] Focus Taiwan   [3] Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)   [4] Taipei Times   [5] MOFA   [6] Taipei Times   [7] British Office Taipei   [8] H.R.2416 / S.2224 (Taiwan International Solidarity Act)

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On May 14, 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump met Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing for a high-stakes summit. While Xi aggressively warned that “mishandling” Taiwan could push China and the U.S. into “clashes and even conflicts,” the White House’s subsequent decision to omit Taiwan entirely from its official readout of the talks strongly signals that Washington does not view Taiwan’s security as open to negotiation.
 
During an interview after the summit, Secretary of State Marco Rubio reiterated that “U.S. policy on the issue of Taiwan is unchanged” and warned that “anything that would compel or force a change in what we have now [across the Taiwan Strait] would be problematic.” He added that it would be a terrible mistake for China to pursue annexation by force or through any coercive means, reaffirming steadfast U.S. opposition to any unilateral attempt by China to alter the cross-Strait status quo by force.
 
The summit took place as a $14 billion Taiwan arms package remained stalled by the executive branch, with President Donald Trump saying he had not yet made a final decision and indicating that he would decide after further consultations, including with Taiwan’s leadership. The package includes counter-drone assets, an integrated battle command system, and medium-range munitions, which are essential for bolstering Taiwan’s defense capabilities.
 
Taiwan’s Security Is Not a Bargaining Chip
 
The Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA) strongly emphasized that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan should never be tied to negotiations with Beijing. In a May 14 statement, FAPA National President Dr. Su-Mei Kao said such arms sales should solely reflect Taiwan’s self-defense needs and the long-standing U.S. commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the Six Assurances to Taiwan.
 
She added that Taiwan’s defense requirements “must never be treated as a bargaining chip” in broader U.S.-China negotiations. Under the Six Assurances, the U.S. is pledged not to consult Beijing prior to arms sales to Taiwan. First articulated under the Reagan administration in 1982, the Six Assurances have remained a cornerstone of U.S. policy for over four decades, alongside the TRA, ensuring that Taiwan’s security remains independent of Beijing’s influence or pressure.
 
Strong Congressional Support for Arms Sales to Taiwan
 
Bipartisan lawmakers in both chambers have actively pressed the administration to move forward with the stalled release of the $14 billion arms package for Taiwan.
 
In a bipartisan letter sent on May 8 ahead of the Trump-Xi summit in Beijing, U.S. Senators Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Thom Tillis (R-NC), and their colleagues urged President Trump to “formally notify the $14 billion in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan that Congress pre-approved” and stressed that “American support for Taiwan is not up for negotiation.”
 
This momentum was further reinforced by Representative Jill Tokuda’s (D-HI) May 12 introduction of H.Res.1278 alongside a bipartisan coalition of 22 original cosponsors. The resolution reaffirms the TRA and the Six Assurances as cornerstones of U.S. policy regarding Taiwan, while reiterating unwavering support for Taiwan’s self-defense and resolute opposition to any unilateral efforts to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means.
 
FAPA’s Call to Action
 
“Those commitments must now be backed by concrete action,” FAPA National President Dr. Kao emphasized. FAPA is calling on the Trump administration to approve the pending $14 billion arms package to bolster Taiwan’s defense capabilities and strengthen deterrence against Beijing’s growing aggression.
 
FAPA also urges Congress to swiftly pass the Six Assurances to Taiwan Act (H.R.3452 / S.3208) and the PORCUPINE Act (H.R.7146 / S.1744) to institutionalize U.S. commitments to Taiwan and ensure they remain clear, strong, and credible, regardless of shifting diplomatic dynamics.
 
Sources:
[1] Taipei Times   [2] Focus Taiwan   [3] NBC News (Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s Interview)   [4] Taipei Times   [5] Taipei Times   [6] Focus Taiwan   [7] Senate Foreign Relations Committee   [8] FAPA   [9] H.Res.1278 (Resolution Reaffirming Congressional Support for Taiwan)   [10] H.R.3452 & S.3208 (Six Assurances to Taiwan Act)   [11] H.R.7146 & S.1744 (PORCUPINE Act)

PORCUPINE Act Advanced by House Foreign Affairs Committee

On May 13, 2026, the House Foreign Affairs Committee advanced the PORCUPINE Act (H.R.7146) through a unanimous 45-0 vote, signaling robust bipartisan support to expedite U.S. weapons deliveries to Taiwan. The House version was originally introduced by Rep. Rob Wittman (R-VA) and co-led by Reps. Don Davis (D-NC), Ami Bera (D-CA), and Ryan Mackenzie (R-PA).
 
Earlier in the markup, the committee voted 31-14 to replace the similar Taiwan PLUS Act with the PORCUPINE Act as the main legislative vehicle. The bill’s Senate companion (S.1744) had previously passed the Senate by unanimous consent in December 2025.
 
Why the Bill Matters

This critical legislation streamlines U.S. arms sales to Taiwan by reducing the congressional notification and review periods to as short as 15 days and effectively granting Taiwan “NATO Plus” treatment under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), thereby accelerating the delivery of vital defense transfers.

Significantly, the bill amends the AECA to place Taiwan on par with the closest U.S. security allies, such as Israel, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, for specified arms-transfer procedures. Additionally, it seeks to establish an expedited decision-making process for third-party transfers of U.S.-origin defense articles and services from NATO and other NATO-Plus allies to Taiwan.
 
By cutting through bureaucratic red tape and directly addressing Taiwan’s critical arms sales backlog, the bill strengthens Taiwan’s asymmetric “porcupine strategy” to bolster its self-defense and maintain robust cross-Strait deterrence.
 
FAPA’s Petition

The Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA) has long advocated for elevating Taiwan to “NATO Plus” status to strengthen the U.S.–Taiwan security partnership. Since FAPA launched its petition on January 29, 2026, in support of the House version of the PORCUPINE Act, this grassroots advocacy has successfully mobilized broader congressional backing, securing at least 20 additional bipartisan cosponsors and propelling the legislation forward.
 
Sources:
[1] H.R.7146 & S.1744 (PORCUPINE Act)   [2] Breaking Defense   [3] FAPA   [4] Taiwan Security Monitor (TSM)   [5] FAPA

Bipartisan House Resolution Introduced to Celebrate Taiwanese American Heritage Week

On May 13, 2026, U.S. Representative Ami Bera (D-CA), Co-Chair of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus, introduced a bipartisan resolution (H.Res.1280) supporting the designation of May 10–16, 2026, as Taiwanese American Heritage Week (TAHW).
 
The resolution is co-led by Representatives Michael McCaul (R-TX), Young Kim (R-CA), and Greg Stanton (D-AZ). Its additional cosponsors include Del. Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC) and Representatives Ro Khanna (D-CA), Brad Sherman (D-CA), James Walkinshaw (D-VA), and Dave Min (D-CA).
 
The resolution celebrates Taiwanese American heritage by:

• recognizing the contributions of more than 700,000 Taiwanese Americans;
• highlighting their leadership in business, science, public service, the Armed Forces, and human rights advocacy;
• affirming strong U.S.–Taiwan people-to-people ties and shared democratic values;
• recognizing Taiwan’s role as a key U.S. economic and technological partner; and
• marking the 47th anniversary of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act as a cornerstone of U.S.–Taiwan relations.

What is Taiwanese American Heritage Week?

First observed in 1999, TAHW is celebrated annually in May during the week beginning on Mother’s Day to honor the history, culture, and contributions of Taiwanese Americans.

From the beginning, the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA) and its 44 chapters nationwide have worked alongside elected officials at every level of government to secure proclamations and letters of recognition, building one of the most prolific and sustained civic advocacy campaigns in the Taiwanese American community.

FAPA’s Longstanding Advocacy

Congressman Bera’s resolution is the first House resolution recognizing Taiwanese American Heritage Week since 2010. FAPA was honored to provide draft language for the resolution and to work with Rep. Bera’s office to advance this important recognition.

In an earlier May 10 statement, FAPA National President Dr. Su-Mei Kao (林素梅) stated: “By sharing our heritage, honoring our stories, and recognizing these contributions, Taiwanese Americans continue to serve as a vital bridge that strengthens the enduring bond between the United States and Taiwan.”

FAPA’s 2026 TAHW campaign has reached a record-breaking milestone. According to FAPA’s latest internal tally, at least 100 elected officials at various levels of government have issued proclamations or recognitions of TAHW, including 28 governors — the highest number in the campaign’s 27-year history.

Sources:

[1] Office of Rep. Ami Bera   [2] H.Res.1280 (A Resolution Recognizing TAHW)   [3] FAPA

Taiwanese Drone Firms Champion “Non-Red” Supply Chains at Premier International Exhibition

More than 20 Taiwanese companies and institutions, including the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) and leading drone producer Thunder Tiger, showcased Taiwan’s growing unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) industries at XPONENTIAL 2026, the world’s largest unmanned systems exhibition held in Detroit from May 11 to 14, 2026.
 
At the same event, Taiwan’s Drone Diplomacy Task Force signed a letter of intent (LOI) with the U.S.-based Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) to promote talent exchanges and international certification. AUVSI CEO Michael Robbins noted that Taiwan is AUVSI’s first choice for expanding its Green UAS certification due to its resilient “non-Red” supply chain and technical strengths in the UAV sector.
 
Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) reported that exports of complete drones reached a record US$115.85 million in the first quarter of 2026, already surpassing the 2025 full-year total of US$93.42 million. The United States was Taiwan’s third-largest drone export destination by value, while its top two export destinations — the Czech Republic and Poland — are close U.S. partners and NATO allies in Central and Eastern Europe.
 
Why it Matters
 
The Taiwanese drone industry delegation highlighted Taiwan’s pivotal role in building “non-Red” drone supply chains that can provide the United States and its allies with resilient, PRC-free UAV systems and components.
 
As Russia’s war against Ukraine has demonstrated the transformative importance of drones in modern warfare, the administration of President Lai Ching-te has prioritized the development of Taiwan’s domestic drone industry to bolster the nation’s asymmetric defense capabilities and deter a potential invasion by the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
 
Related Bill
 
In the U.S. Congress, lawmakers have consistently advanced legislation to reinforce the U.S.-Taiwan strategic partnership and bolster Taiwan’s indigenous drone production. On March 26, 2026, U.S. Senators Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Ted Cruz (R-TX), and John Curtis (R-UT) introduced the bipartisan “Blue Skies for Taiwan Act” (S.4259), with Sen. Andy Kim (D-NJ) joining as a cosponsor of the legislation.
 
The bill promotes the development of resilient unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in Taiwan that are free from PRC influence and China-linked supply-chain risks. It also directly seeks to establish “public-private partnerships between the United States and Taiwan for co-development and co-production of UAS systems and components,” strengthening both Taiwan’s defense and U.S. national security.
 
Implications
 
Taiwan’s growing UAS/UAV industry positions the nation as a reliable partner in both global defense production and democratic supply-chain resilience, offering secure, PRC-free drone systems and components to the United States and its allies.
 
However, the opposition-controlled Legislative Yuan’s exclusion of key funding for domestic drone manufacturing and defense autonomy from Taiwan’s recently passed NT$780 billion (US$24.8 billion) special defense budget highlights a concerning gap between Taiwan’s sovereign ambitions and the resources needed to scale production. This domestic funding shortfall makes continued U.S. congressional support for U.S.-Taiwan drone cooperation and resilient, “non-Red” supply chains even more critical to ensuring robust, long-term deterrence.

Sources:
[1] Focus Taiwan   [2] Taipei Times   [3] Taipei Times   [4] Focus Taiwan   [5] S.4259 (Blue Skies for Taiwan Act)   [6] FAPA

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