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In a letter dated Oct. 13, 1994, Taiwan’s then-representative to the US Benjamin Lu wrote to American Institute in Taiwan chairman Nat Bellocchi: “I take great pleasure in informing you that my government has formally approved that the name of our Washington office will be Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States.”

Two months later, on Dec. 20, Bellocchi responded, acknowledging receipt of the letter “informing me of the change in name of your office from the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA) to Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO).”

Earlier, in a letter dated Oct. 3, 1990, then-US Department of State executive secretary J. Stapleton Roy had written to US national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, CIA acting executive secretary James Pittman and US Department of Defense executive secretary Colonel John Dubia, saying: “Consistent with the unofficial nature of US-Taiwan ties, the US Government [USG] no longer refers to Taiwan as the ‘Republic of China’ — a term reflecting Taipei’s continuing claim to be the government of China… We refer to Taiwan simply as Taiwan.”

The U.S. therefore has an “American Institute in Taiwan” and a “Taiwan Relations Act.”

So why is TECRO called the “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office” today and not the “Taiwan Economic and Cultural Representative Office?”

FAPA understands that in 1994, when Washington asked Taipei for a short list of new names to replace the oddly nondescriptive CCNAA (mis)nomer, Taipei did not submit a possible new name for its representative office with the word “Taiwan” in it — despite Roy stating in 1990 that “we refer to Taiwan simply as Taiwan” in the US guidelines.

The TECRO name is nondescriptive as well of course, as it has the word “Taipei” in it, which creates the impression that the office only represents the capital and its residents.

It would be the equivalent of referring to the American Institute in Taiwan as the Washington Institute in Taiwan.

FAPA believes that the time is now that the US starts adhering to reality by changing TECRO to a name that is consistent with US policy: the Taiwan Representative Office. It would set an inspiring precedent for other countries to emulate.

該是改名的時候了: 台北經濟文化代表處—-> 台灣代表處

一九九四年十月十三日，時任駐美代表魯肇忠向美國在台協會理事主席白樂崎（Nat Bellocchi）致函道：「我很榮幸通知您，我方政府已經正式決議將我駐華府辦公室命名為駐美國台北經濟文化代表處。」

一九九四年十二月二十日，白樂崎回函魯肇忠確認收到「告知駐美辦公室由北美事務協調委員會更名為駐美國台北經濟文化代表處」的訊息。

一九九○年十月三日，在一封寫給美國國家安全顧問史考克羅夫（Brent Scowcroft）、代理中央情報局執行秘書長彼特曼（James R. Pittman），以及國防部執行秘書長杜比亞（John A. Dubia）上校的信函中，美國國務卿芮效儉（Stapleton Roy）寫道：「因美台僅保持非官方關係，美國政府不再稱呼台灣為『中華民國』—一個反映台北持續宣稱其為中國政府的名詞—我方僅稱台灣為台灣。」

我們因此有美國在「台」協會以及「台灣」旅行法。

那為何代表處稱為「台北」經濟文化代表處，而非「台灣」經濟文化代表處？

FAPA了解，當華府於一九九四年向台北要求一份新的頭銜清單，以取代北美事務協調委員會時，台灣政府並沒有提出任何一個包含「台灣」的選項，即使芮效儉早於一九九○年便提出「我們僅稱台灣為台灣」。因為有「台北」，台北經濟文化代表處的名字無法彰顯其性質。它製造了一個該代表處僅代表台灣首都台北的印象。依此邏輯，與台北經濟文化代表處相呼應的「美國在台協會」應為「華盛頓在台協會」。

FAPA認為這是美國尊重事實，改變台北駐美代表處名稱為符合美國政策的「台灣代表處」的時候了！這個鼓舞人心的前例，將使其他國家跟進仿效。

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The Merriam-Webster online dictionary defines “status quo” as “the existing state of affairs.”

US Secretary of Defense James Mattis knows what it means.

The former general said this past June that “we oppose all unilateral efforts to alter the ‘status quo’ [in the Taiwan Strait] and will continue to insist any resolution of differences accord with the wishes of the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.”

China has been changing the ‘status quo’ in the Taiwan Strait over the past decades and Taiwan has not.

How did China change the status quo? A handful of examples:

It enacted its “Anti-Secession” Law in 2005.

When Chinese President Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, he promulgated the “Chinese Dream.” Xi identified the annexation of Taiwan as a major component of this, saying that any attempts at “separatism” would face “the punishment of history.” He hinted that China must take control of Taiwan by 2050.

China has conducted numerous long-range military live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait; sent bombers flying over major waterways around Taiwan; dispatched warships that trespassed into Taiwan’s territorial waters; and in January 2018 unilaterally launched a new aviation corridor over the Taiwan Strait.

On the diplomatic front, China this year poached two of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies — the Dominican Republic and Burkina Faso within in month.

On May 30, former American Institute in Taiwan chairman Richard Bush said that he would like to see “a very senior official in the United States […]say to its counterpart in China: ‘We are not trying to change the status quo. Taiwan is not trying to change the status quo. You are trying to change the status quo.’”

Bush is of course right. The time is now for US President Donald Trump, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Mattis and other US officials to read the Chinese the riot act when it comes to the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait.

The time is now for the US to speak out without inhibitions!

中國正在改變台海現狀

韋氏線上詞典將「現狀」 (status quo) 定義為「現正存在的狀態」。

美國國防部長馬提斯（James Mattis）很清楚 「現狀」 的意涵。馬提斯上將在今年6月曾指出：「我們反對任何片面改變（台海）現狀的舉動，並且會持續堅持任何解決分歧的方式必須符合台灣海峽兩岸人民的意願。」

過去數十年來大幅改變海峽兩岸現狀的是中國，不是台灣。

中國如何改變現狀? 以下有數個例子:

中國於2005年通過《反分裂國家法》。

習近平於2012年掌權後發表了「中國夢」。他指出併吞台灣是中國夢的重要環節，並稱「分裂」祖國的行徑將受到「歷史的懲罰」。習近平的種種言論暗示了中共必在2050年之前併吞控制台灣。

近來中國的軍事挑釁也愈來愈明目張膽。不僅在台灣海峽進行多次長程實彈射擊軍事演習，頻以軍機及航艦繞台方式進行遠海長訓；更逕行在今年1月開通涵蓋跨半個台灣海峽的M503航線。這些例子僅是九牛一毛。

AIT前理事主席卜睿哲於5月30日在布魯金斯學會的研討會中表示，他希望川普政府高層的官員，可能是總統、國務卿或是國防部長，能向中國相應官員表示美國並沒有試著改變現狀，台灣也沒有試圖改變現狀，但中方卻一再企圖改變現狀。

卜睿哲言之有理。美國總統川普、國務卿龐皮歐（Mike Pompeo）、國防部長馬提斯應嚴厲斥責，不應再縱容中國顛覆台海現狀的種種挑釁行為。

現在是美國放下任何顧忌，公開譴責中國的時機。

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“The 1992 Consensus” has three meanings:

1) The Chinese Communist Party says the “1992 Consensus” means that both Mainland China and Taiwan accept the “One China Principle” and so long as Taiwan’s “leaders” accept this, then the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can carry out “practical relations.”

2) The Chinese Nationalist Party on Taiwan asserts that the “consensus” was that “There is One China, both sided can interpret it as they wish” without having to commit to either side’s interpretation.

3) The Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan asserts that the “1992 Consensus” never existed. On November 2, 2001, Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian told a former U.S. Defense Secretary, “Nowhere in Taiwan’s official government records is there anything that substantiates Beijing’s claim that the two sides reached a consensus in 1992 on the ‘one China’ principle.” Explaining his position, President Chen added, “Recognizing the ‘one China’ principle means giving up the Republic of China. How can I remain president if the Republic of China disappears from the world?”

What does the United States think of the 1992 Consensus?

On August 28, 2001, then-director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), Raymond Burghardt, in a “completely personal analysis of what happened,” explained that in 1992, before talks began between the two unofficial offices of Taiwan and China, “each side exchanged faxes, which had common language in some areas and differing views in others. Then they agreed they would take this exchange of faxes and it would constitute an agreement to hold talks.” Burghardt said. “That’s what happened. Nothing more, nothing less. To me, I’m not sure why you could call that a consensus. I call it an agreement.”

Ambassador Burghardt did not say what he thought the substance of the fax exchange was. (Taipei Times, August 29, Associated Press August 28, 2001) On March 20, 2017, Ambassador Burghardt repeated this view in an interview at the East-West Center in Hawaii. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j9yWlqhI1GM)

To us at FAPA, the “1992 Consensus” sounds more like a “1992 Nonsensus.”

什麼是九二共識？

「九二共識」有以下三種詮釋：

1)中國共產黨所宣稱「九二共識」，意味著中國大陸與台灣都承認「一中原則」，並且只要台灣的「領導人」接受九二共識，海峽兩岸便可以發展「務實的關係」。

2)在台灣的中國國民黨所聲稱的「九二共識」，其所謂的「共識」指的是「一個中國，各自表述」，但雙方不必遵循對方的立場。

3)而民主進步黨主張「九二共識」是根本不存在的。在 2001年11月2日，台灣總統陳水扁告訴一位美國前任國防部長：「在台灣政府的官方紀錄中，並沒有任何東西能夠證實北京對於兩岸已在1992年達成『一中』共識的宣稱。」為了解釋這樣的狀況，陳總統補充道：「承認『一中原則』意味著放棄中華民國。如果中華民國不存在，我怎麼可能繼續當中華民國總統？」

美國怎麼看待九二共識？

在 2001年8月28日，時任美國在台協會台北辦事處處長薄瑞光根據他的「個人分析」指出，在台灣與中國之間的兩個非官方會對話之前，「兩岸就有以傳真方式做溝通。在某些觀點有找到共同的語言，在某些地方抱持著不同的看法。然後雙方同意在此基礎之上，兩岸達成對話的協議。」薄瑞光如此說道。「這就是當時發生的事。沒有更多，也沒有更少。對我而言，我不知道為何那可以被稱之為『共識』，我認為那僅指是一個雙方的協議。」

根據2001年8月29日台北時報與同年8月28日美聯社兩則報導，薄瑞光大使並沒有對於上述兩岸交換傳真的實質意義多加闡述；在2017年3月20日，薄瑞光大使在夏威夷的東西中心（East-West Center）受訪時，再次重述了上面的觀點。(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j9yWlqhI1GM)

對此，台灣人公共事務會直言表示，「九二共識」更像是「九二沒有共識」。

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The December 1943 Cairo Declaration that wrapped up a meeting held in Cairo between Winston Churchill, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-shek is often cited as the primary legal foundation for the PRC’s and the ROC’s claims to territorial sovereignty over Taiwan.

At various public occasions, Beijing’s leaders have invoked the Cairo Declaration to establish that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. The KMT has also long cited the Cairo Declaration as the legal basis for Taiwan’s return to the Republic of China.

On December 2013, for instance, former Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou affirmed the validity of the Cairo Declaration as an “international treaty,” stating that it is the legal basis upon which Taiwan was restored to the ROC post-World War II.

After all, under international law, ONLY a treaty can settle the status of territories, right?

Ma stated: “In fact, the declaration is a treaty because there is no prescribed formality in terms of such agreements…From the perspective of international law, any concrete promise made by an official of a country in their capacity as head of state, prime minister or minister of foreign affairs is legally binding.”

But is it?

The US National Archives do not consider the Cairo Declaration a treaty. Several years ago, FAPA received a letter from the assistant archivist for records services at the Archives just outside Washington DC, who wrote: “The National Archives and Records Administration has not filed this [Cairo] declaration under treaties. […] The declaration was a communique and it does not have [a] treaty series (TS) or executive agreement series (EAS) number.”

The National Archives flatly contradict the KMT claims that the Declaration is a treaty, and with one fell swoop also voids the basis for Beijing’s “One China Principle” claims.

Indeed, the Cairo Declaration was merely intended as a “declaration of intent” about the world’s affairs among the three leaders – a mere statement of war aims, the territorial reassignments of which had to be solemnized in a formal peace treaty after Japan’s surrender. It has negligible status in international law as a treaty or convention.

Although important at the time, the Cairo Declaration does not have any legal binding power 65 plus years later, allowing neither the KMT nor the PRC to derive territorial claims from it.

開羅宣言

1943年12月1日發佈的「開羅宣言」，是一份總結邱吉爾、羅斯福和蔣介石在開羅舉行的一個會議的新聞公報，時常被中華民國與中華人民共和國引用作為其領土主權的法定基礎。

北京的領導人們時常在不同的公開場合引述開羅宣言，強調台灣是中國領土不可分割的一部分；中國國民黨長久以來也以開羅宣言作為台灣回歸中華民國的主張。

舉例來說，在2013年的12月，台灣前總統馬英九便曾斷言開羅宣言的效力等同是「國際條約」，強調其為中華民國在二戰後收復台灣的法定基礎。　

畢竟，在國際法的範疇中，只有「條約」能夠決定領土歸屬，不是嗎？

馬英九如此說明：「事實上，這個宣言實為合約，因為這種協議是沒有預設格式的···由國際法的角度來看，一個國家元首、總理或外交部長就他職權範圍內所做的具體承諾，是具有法效力的。」

但事實真的事這樣嗎？

美國國家檔案館（US National Archives ）並不將開羅宣言視為條約。數年前，台灣人公共事務會收到一封來自華盛頓國家檔案館記錄部門的助理檔案管理員的信件，其中這麼寫道：「國家檔案管和紀錄管理局並沒有將（開羅）宣言列為條約，﹝···﹞該宣言性質為公報，它並沒有歸屬於任何的條約或行政協定編號。」

美國國家檔案管的判斷，顯然和國民黨對於「開羅宣言是國際條約」的認知天差地別，也一舉推翻了北京所宣稱的「一個中國原則」。

很顯然的，開羅宣言僅僅只是一份三個領袖對於國際事務的「意向宣言」—對於戰爭的政策聲明，日本投降後領土的重分配，應該在正式的和平條約中處理。開羅宣言的法律效力與地位不足以作為條約或公約。

雖然開羅宣言在當下的時空背景具有重要地位，但在65年後的今天，它並不具有任何法律約束力，遑論作為中國國民黨或中國共產黨對台灣的領主主張依據。

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In May 2017, the New York City based National Association of Scholars stated: “We recommend that all universities close their Confucius Institutes.”

Confucius Institutes are teaching and research centers located at colleges and universities, underwritten by the Chinese government. The Confucius Institute website says the Institutes are intended for “the promotion and dissemination of Chinese language and culture.”

However, critics have accused them of being the propaganda arm of the ruling Communist Party of China.

Since 2005, more than 100 Confucius Institutes have opened in the United States. These Institutes are largely staffed and funded by an agency of the Chinese government’s Ministry of Education—the Hanban. The Hanban also operates similarly organized Confucius Classrooms at 501 primary and secondary schools in the United States. These 600+ educational outposts comprise some 40% of China’s 1,579 Confucius Institutes and Classrooms worldwide.

The Institutes are designed to project a favorable image of China’s ruling Communist Party around the world through language and cultural programs, but restrict discussions of topics unpalatable to China’s ruling Communist Party such as the occupation of Tibet, Taiwan independence, Falun Gong, the Uyghur minority in East Turkestan, the Tiananmen Square massacre, the enormous wealth of China’s top leaders etc…

Therefore, in June 2014, the American Association of University Professors (a 47,000-member association that was founded in 1915 to guard academic freedom) called upon nearly 100 universities to “cease their involvement” with the Confucius Institutes unless major reforms are instituted.

Earlier, in 2010, Canadian intelligence stated said that Confucius Institutes are managed by China’s embassies and organize protests against Taiwan, Falun Gong and other supposed “poisons.” China’s Politburo propaganda czar Li Changchun himself boasted in 2009 that Confucius Institutes “are an important part of China’s overseas propaganda setup.”

Some schools have already closed their Confucius Institutes. The University of Chicago closed its Confucius Institutes in 2014 and Ontario’s McMaster University closed its Confucius Institute in 2013.

Because any third-party control of academic matters is inconsistent with principles of academic freedom, FAPA believes that the US Secretary of Education should direct her department to launch an official investigation into the goings on at the Confucius Institutes in the United States and into their relationships with other colleges and universities.”

孔子學院

在今年的五月，位於紐約的全美學者協會發出聲明：「我們建議所有美國大學關閉其孔子學院。」

隸屬中國政府之下的孔子學院，是設在美國大專院校內的教學與研究機構，他們的網站宣稱其使命為「促進、傳播中國語言與文化」。

然而，許多批評者指出，孔子學院已淪為目前執政的中國共產黨的宣傳部門。

自2005年以來，超過一百間孔子學院在美國開張。這些學院的人員與經費大都來自中國政府的教育部門—漢辦。漢辦也在美國五百多間中、小學中設立了類似的孔子教室；在全世界1,579 間孔子學院中，美國的這六百多個「教育前哨站」所占的比重高達 40%。

孔子學院意圖透過語言與文化教育計劃，為中國執政的中國共產黨在全世界樹立良好的形象；但是卻禁止對於中國共產黨不利的任何討論，包含：被中國占領的圖博、台灣獨立、迫害法輪功、東突厥斯坦的維吾爾人、天安門屠殺、中國高官的貪腐······等。

因此在2014年的6月，美國教授協會—一個在1915年成立、致力於維護學術自由、擁有47,000個會員的機構，呼籲近100間的美國大學，除非漢辦同意重新協議、進行機構內部改革，否則要求他們「停止參與」孔子學院的相關事務，以確實反映西方的言論自由價值。

甚至在更早的2010年，加拿大國安情報單位便曾指出孔子學院其實由中國使館所管理，組織了許多針對台灣、法輪功與其他「毒瘤」的抗議。中共的政治局常委、同時也是宣傳思想工作的重要人物李長春，便曾在2009年吹噓孔子學院是「中國境外宣傳思想工作最重要的設置之一。」

近年許多學校已經關閉其孔子學院，包含2013年的加拿大安大略省的麥克馬斯特大學，與2014年的芝加哥大學。

因此，台灣人公共事務會鑑於任何第三方對於學術的控制都與學術自由的原則相互悖離，認為美國教育部長應指示其部門，啟動對於孔子學院與美國高等教育機構關係的正式調查。

The post Confucius Institute appeared first on Formosan Association for Public Affairs.

Among the explanatory definitions of the Taiwan Relations Act, is: “Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan” at 22 USC §3303(a), (b)(1).

As recently as 2015, under instructions from the Legal Advisor of the Department of State, the Solicitor General asserted that the President of the United States had the constitutional authority to withhold recognition of Israel’s claim to sovereignty over Jerusalem. The Solicitor General pointed to precedent for this exclusive presidential prerogative in the case of Taiwan.

The Supreme Court ultimately concurred that the Constitution grants the President such exclusive authority. In its 2015 Zivotofsky v. Kerry decision (https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/576/13-628/), the Court quoted the Solicitor General’s explanation that the TRA “treated Taiwan as if it were a legally distinct entity from China— an entity with which the United States intended to maintain strong ties.” In Zivotofsky, the Court’s decision recorded:

“The Solicitor General explains that the [Normalization Communiqué] designation ‘China’ involves ‘a geographic description, not an assertion that Taiwan is . . . part of sovereign China’,” an explanation that the late Justice Antonin Scalia wryly endorsed with an approving “Quite so”. The court in Zivotofsky continued: “According to the solicitor general, the United States ‘acknowledges the Chinese position’ that Taiwan is a part of China, but ‘does not take a position’ of its own on that issue.”

President Carter had expressed that position on January 1,1979, when he expressly “acknowledge[d] the Chinese position” that “Taiwan is part of China,” but he did not accept that claim….

美國法律視台灣為一個主權獨立的國家

「台灣關係法」的解釋性定義之一是:「美國所有涉及國家、民族國家、主權國家、政府與類似實體的法律，其效力都應囊括並適用於台灣」22 USC §3303(a), (b)(1).

2015年，根據國務院法律顧問的指示，聯邦總大事務律師( Solicitor General)宣稱美國總統擁有憲法權力，可以拒絕承認以色列對耶路撒冷主權的主張。總大事務律師指出，這項總統職權應用的先例便是台灣。

最高法院最後同意憲法賦予總統這項獨特的職權。在2015年Zivotofsky 對 Kerry 的訴訟中，法院引用了美國司法部聯邦總大事務律師的解釋，強調台灣關係法(Taiwan Relations Act)「把台灣看成一個於法理上與中國有所區別的實體 – 一個美國意圖與之保持緊密關係的實體。」在Zivotofsky案中，法院的判決如此記載:「總大事務律師解釋說，[美中公報] 指定的「中國」，涉及地理描述，而非斷言台灣屬於中國主權的一部分」，「前任最高法院法官安東寧·斯卡利亞也以『一定是這漾的！』來回應這樣的解釋。」

卡特總統在1979年一月一日首次表達美國的立場：「認知到中國對於『台灣屬於中國的一部分』的主張」，但並不接受這個主張。

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The One China Principle (adhered to by Beijing) provides that: “There is only One China and Taiwan is part of China.” Conversely, the One China Policy (adhered to by -for instance- the US) provides that: “the U.S. acknowledges that China has made certain claims over Taiwan, but that the U.S. does not recognize Chinese claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. The U.S. only ACKNOWLEDGES China’s claims.”

On February 9, 2017, President Donald J. Trump pledged to uphold “our One China policy.”

It means that the United States only recognizes one legitimate government of China at a time. Prior to January 1, 1979, the United States recognized the “Republic of China” as the government of China. After 1979, the U.S. recognized the “People’s Republic of China” as the government of China.

Perhaps the most imaginative articulation of “our One China” is in formal testimony to the U.S. Congress by then-Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly on April 21, 2004.

One member of Congress asked: “Can the evolution of full-fledged democracy on Taiwan and the clear emergence of a sense of Taiwanese identity meld with the principle of One China, or are they in stark contrast with each other?”

Secretary Kelly responded:

“… In my testimony, I made the point “our One China,” and I didn’t really define it, and I’m not sure I very easily could define it.”

“But I can tell you what it is not.”

“It is not the One China policy or the One China principle that Beijing suggests, and it may not be the definition that some would have in Taiwan…”

一個中國政策v.s.一個中國原則

北京堅守的「一個中國原則」內容如下：「世界上只有一個中國，而且台灣是中國的一部分。」相反的，其他國家–如美國–採用的「一個中國政策」則強調：「美國認知到中國對於台灣有所主張，但是美國並不承認中國對台灣主權的宣稱，僅僅『認知』到中國有該宣稱。」

在二零一七年的二月九日，美國總統川普聲明他會信守「我們（美國）的一中政策」。

這代表的意義是，美國承認世界上只有一個中國。在一九七九年一月一日前，美國承認中華民國為中國政府；但一九七九年之後，美國承認中國人民共和國才是中國政府。

目前為止，美國對於「我們的一中政策」最具想像力的發言，應是二零零四年四月二十一日時任亞太助卿凱利在國會的證詞。

當時一名國會議員問道：「台灣民主發展至今羽翼逐漸豐厚，清晰的台灣國族認同也開始浮現；這些現象是否能與『一個中國』的概念共存，或是兩者互相悖離？」

亞太助卿凱利如此回答：

「在我的證詞中，我提到『我們的一個中國』，但我沒有明確的定義它，況且我也不確定我能夠輕易的定義它。」

「但我能告訴你它不是什麼。」

「它並不是北京所宣稱的『一中原則』，或『一中政策』，並且它也可能不合於某些來自台灣的定義。」

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