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On July 15, 2026, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the $47.32 billion Fiscal Year 2027 (FY27) National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs (NSRP) Appropriations Act (H.R.8595) in a 217-209 vote.
 
House Appropriations Committee Chairman Tom Cole (R-OK) emphasized that the bill maintains strong support for key allies, including Taiwan, while countering threats from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and other adversaries.
 
Key Taiwan-Related Provisions
 
The legislation includes several critical provisions that support Taiwan and bolster stability in the Indo-Pacific.

• Defense Support: Provides at least $500 million under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Program to assist Taiwan in acquiring U.S. defense articles, services, and training. It also directs the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, to prioritize the delivery of defense articles and services to Taiwan.

• Taiwan “Honest Maps”: Prohibits funds made available by the Act from being used to create, procure, or display any map that inaccurately depicts Taiwan’s territory and social and economic system, or the islands administered by Taiwan authorities.

• Countering PRC’s Global Influence: Provides no less than $1.8 billion to advance U.S. national security interests in the Indo-Pacific, including at least $400 million for a dedicated Countering PRC Influence Fund. It also prohibits foreign governments from using funds provided under this Act to repay debts owed to Communist China.

• Leveraging U.S. Bilateral Aid: Directs the Secretary of State to review foreign governments’ UN voting records and their support for Taiwan’s participation as an observer in multilateral agencies, bodies, or commissions when considering U.S. bilateral assistance for a foreign government.

  
Implications

The bill signals a more operational approach to supporting Taiwan. It provides direct military financing and incorporates foreign governments’ support for Taiwan as a factor in U.S. bilateral aid decisions. The dedicated Countering PRC Influence Fund and the Taiwan “Honest Maps” provision further counter Beijing’s global coercion.

Taken together, the legislation reflects continued congressional support for Taiwan’s self-defense and international participation while underscoring Taiwan’s strategic importance to U.S. national security interests in the Indo-Pacific.

Sources:
[1] Taipei Times   [2] H.R.8595 (FY27 NSRP Appropriations Bill)   [3] House Appropriations Committee

TSMC’s US$100 Billion U.S. Expansion Deepens Bilateral Industrial Integration

On July 16, 2026, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC) announced a landmark additional US$100 billion investment in its Arizona operations. According to TSMC Chairman and CEO C.C. Wei (魏哲家), the new commitment will fund four additional leading-edge wafer fabrication plants and advanced packaging facilities. The announcement brings TSMC’s total planned U.S. investment to US$265 billion.
 
U.S. officials, including U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Director Raymond Greene, welcomed TSMC’s investment for strengthening supply chain resilience and creating high-paying American jobs.
 
AI Demand Accelerates Taiwanese Investment in the U.S.
 
Surging AI demand is accelerating TSMC’s U.S. expansion. At TSMC’s second-quarter earnings conference, Wei highlighted “very strong signal and positive outlook” from major cloud service providers, reaffirming TSMC’s confidence in a “multi-year AI megatrend.” He added that agentic AI and rapid data center construction are driving massive demand for advanced silicon, CPUs, and AI accelerators.
 
Beyond TSMC, Taiwan’s broader technology sector is also scaling up U.S. operations. In May, 20 Taiwanese companies — spanning semiconductor suppliers and AI server manufacturers — expressed interest in investing a combined US$35 billion in the United States.
 
Taiwan’s government has also introduced measures to support companies investing in the U.S., including a government-backed financing guarantee mechanism with an initial US$1.375 billion financing pool. Applications for the credit guarantees are expected to open as early as this July.
 
Urgent Double-Tax Relief for Deeper Economic Integration
 
TSMC’s latest U.S. expansion reflects a broader shift in U.S.-Taiwan economic relations toward deeper, long-term integration in investment and advanced manufacturing. Yet, the bilateral policy framework has not kept pace with this rapidly expanding economic relationship.
 
Taiwan remains the only top-ten U.S. trading partner without a bilateral tax agreement. The lack of bilateral double-tax relief poses a severe structural challenge, raising costs for Taiwanese firms operating in the U.S., with some estimated to face effective tax burdens of up to 51% on U.S. profits.
 
FAPA therefore urges the U.S. Senate to swiftly pass the United States-Taiwan Expedited Double-Tax Relief Act (S.199), whose House companion (H.R.33) passed by an overwhelming 423–1 vote in January 2025. Enacting the legislation would provide treaty-like tax relief and remove a major competitive disadvantage facing Taiwan.
 
Sources:
[1] Focus Taiwan   [2] Focus Taiwan   [3] Reuters   [4] Taipei Times   [5] Focus Taiwan   [6] Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA)   [7] S.199 / H.R.33 (United States-Taiwan Expedited Double-Tax Relief Act)

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China’s military test-launched a nuclear-capable, intercontinental-range submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from a nuclear-powered submarine on July 6, drawing sharp and widespread criticism from the U.S., its Indo-Pacific allies, and democratic partners.
 
While China’s official news agency has not specified the missile type, the state-controlled Global Times, citing a military expert, indicated that it was likely a JL-3, China’s most advanced SLBM, which the Pentagon assesses can reach the continental United States directly from Chinese coastal waters. However, Taiwan’s Defense Minister Wellington Koo (顧立雄) later stated that the missile was most likely a JL-2, underscoring that the precise missile type remains disputed.
 
China’s Growing Sea-Based Nuclear Capabilities
 
Regardless of the exact model, the test marks a significant and troubling advance in the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) sea-based nuclear capabilities. While the PLA last test-launched a land-based ICBM in 2024 — its first such test into international waters since 1980 — the July 6 launch demonstrated the growing operational maturity of the sea-based leg of China’s nuclear triad.
 
According to former senior U.S. intelligence official Dennis Wilder, this is a major development, as China has never before fired a ballistic missile from one of its nuclear-powered submarines into the South Pacific.
 
Indo-Pacific Democracies Condemn Beijing’s Missile Test
 
This provocative missile test, conducted after China gave regional governments only a few hours of advance notice, was sharply criticized by the U.S. and many of its Indo-Pacific democratic partners. The test destabilized regional security and raised serious concerns over Beijing’s lack of transparency and failure to provide adequate prior notification in accordance with international norms.

• In its statement, the U.S. State Department condemned “Beijing’s rapid and opaque nuclear weapons buildup.” It further urged China to commit to “a regularized notification arrangement for all intercontinental-range ballistic missile and space launches,” consistent with the commitments made by all other Permanent Five (P5) members of the UN Security Council.

• Taiwan’s Presidential Office condemned the test as a coercive attempt to intimidate the international community and called on Beijing to immediately cease its “irresponsible unilateral actions.”

• Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese called the test destabilizing and “provocative.” The launch notably coincided with the signing of a landmark mutual defense pact between Australia and Fiji.

• Although the missile carried a dummy warhead, New Zealand noted that it was fired directly into the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, a reckless move that blatantly contravenes the spirit and intent of the Treaty of Rarotonga, whose relevant protocols China ratified in 1987.

China’s Military Calculus

John Blaxland, an international security expert and former military intelligence officer, suggested that China was testing both its operational capabilities and the reactions of the U.S. and its regional allies. Similar to its military activities around Taiwan, Blaxland warned that the missile test is a calculated effort by Beijing to gradually normalize its “intrusive, assertive, [and] authoritarian behavior” across the Indo-Pacific.

Jeffrey Lewis, a scholar of China’s nuclear weapons modernization, characterized the launch as a clear signal of China’s “new era” of more frequent and overt arms testing. “They’re willing to pay the political costs . . . in a way that they weren’t in the past,” Lewis observed.

Implications

China’s latest missile launch demonstrates Beijing’s growing confidence in openly displaying its expanding sea-based nuclear capabilities and imposing a “new normal” of military coercion in the Indo-Pacific.

By projecting power deep into the Pacific while gauging regional and international reactions, China is showing that its challenge to the status quo is not limited to the Taiwan Strait but extends across the broader region.

Sources:
[1] Taipei Times   [2] Reuters   [3] Radio Taiwan International (RTI)   [4] Dennis Wilder’s LinkedIn   [5] U.S. Department of State   [6] Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)   [7] New York Times

Taiwan International Ocean Forum Calls for Collective Maritime Resilience to Counter China’s Gray-Zone Aggression

On July 8, 2026, the Taiwan International Ocean Forum opened in Taipei, bringing together participants from 15 countries, including more than 100 experts from government, industry, academia, and research institutions, as well as international lawmakers. Centered on the theme of “Maritime Resilience,” the forum serves as a crucial platform for high-level dialogue on Indo-Pacific maritime security and regional cooperation.
 
Amid rising regional tensions, the forum focused on Beijing’s expanding gray-zone activities and aggression, including the China Coast Guard’s unilateral “law enforcement patrols” in waters around Taiwan and across the wider Indo-Pacific, as well as the sabotage of undersea communications cables involving China-affiliated vessels.
 
Taiwan’s Ocean Affairs Council Minister Kuan Bi-ling (管碧玲) warned that these incremental tactics risk creating an entirely new “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait, underscoring the need for closer international cooperation to strengthen maritime resilience and safeguard regional stability.
 
International Lawmakers Urge Robust Collective Maritime Deterrence
 
U.S. Senator Tammy Duckworth (D-IL) attended the forum during her visit to Taiwan, where she and British Member of Parliament Tom Tugendhat warned that China is using coast guard enforcement and other coercive tools to establish a “new normal” in waters east of Taiwan and across the South China Sea, in violation of existing maritime law.
 
Highlighting recent Chinese Coast Guard patrols that required commercial vessels transiting waters east of Taiwan to report their destinations, Duckworth stressed that countries must steadfastly exercise their freedom of navigation rights.
 
She argued that like-minded partners should collectively assert their right to transit the Taiwan Strait in accordance with international law and resolutely reject Beijing’s attempts to establish a foothold for a different maritime order through coercive actions.
 
Strategic Implications
 
The forum underscores that diplomatic rhetoric alone is no longer sufficient to preserve peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and the broader Indo-Pacific. Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) Executive Director Luke de Pulford warned that while G7 statements have helped raise awareness, governments have yet to develop meaningful deterrence or reach an international agreement on the “red lines” that would trigger coordinated international action.
 
Taken together, the discussions at the forum further highlighted the growing urgency of closer maritime cooperation and practical policy coordination among Taiwan and like-minded democracies. Such collaboration is vital to uphold freedom of navigation, defend the rules-based maritime order, and prevent Beijing from normalizing coercive changes to the status quo.
 
Sources:
[1] Taiwan International Ocean Forum   [2] Taipei Times   [3] Radio Taiwan International (RTI)   [4] Focus Taiwan   [5] Taipei Times

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The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) highly controversial “Ethnic Unity and Progress Law,” adopted by the Chinese National People’s Congress in March 2026, officially took effect on July 1, 2026. While institutionalizing forced assimilation domestically, the law asserts sweeping jurisdiction over dissidents and global critics both within and beyond China’s borders.
 
The most alarming aspect of the PRC’s new ethnic unity law is its unprecedented extraterritorial reach under Article 63, which provides that individuals and organizations outside China can be held legally liable if they are deemed to “undermine ethnic unity and progress” or “promote ethnic separatism” against China.  
 
The new law has drawn immediate international criticism, including from Taiwan’s government, the U.S. Congress, the European Parliament, Japanese parliamentary groups, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
 
Increasing Threats to Taiwanese Citizens and Taiwan-Related Actors
 
While framed as an ethnic policy measure, the law directly threatens Taiwanese citizens and Taiwan-related actors by leveraging Beijing’s expansive definition of the “Chinese nation.” Taiwanese legal scholar Chen Yu-jie (陳玉潔) warned that the PRC’s new law contains “overly broad” provisions and asserts long-arm jurisdiction, substantially raising legal risks for Taiwanese citizens and businesses.
 
Taiwanese national security officials highlighted specific risks for Taiwan-related actors and global critics:

• Taiwanese officials and ordinary citizens entering or transiting through China or closely aligned non-democratic countries could face severe risks of arbitrary detention or separatism charges.

• Journalists, academics, and researchers focusing on China’s human rights record, military expansion, or cross-Taiwan Strait issues could face heightened border scrutiny, pressure, and publication restrictions.

• Companies promoting non-China supply chains, participating in export controls, or investigating forced-labor risks could face Chinese sanctions and other forms of pressure.

 Bipartisan Condemnation in the U.S. Congress

Bipartisan lawmakers in the U.S. House and Senate have introduced separate resolutions denouncing China’s Ethnic Unity and Progress Law. Introduced by Reps. Chris Smith (R-NJ) and Jim McGovern (D-MA), H.Res.1400 condemns China’s campaign of forced assimilation against ethnic and religious minorities. Separately, S.Res.791, introduced by Senators Jacky Rosen (D-NV), John Curtis (R-UT), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), and Jim Banks (R-IN), calls on the PRC to end its transnational repression campaigns that undermine U.S. sovereignty and threaten the safety and freedoms of people in the United States.

In a bipartisan joint statement, House Select Committee on China Chairman John Moolenaar (R-MI), Ranking Member Ro Khanna (D-CA), and Congresswoman Young Kim (R-CA), alongside multiple U.S. Senators led by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch (R-ID) and Ranking Member Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), condemned the PRC’s newly enacted “ethnic unity” law. They warned that the law provides Beijing with near-limitless authority to target overseas critics and seeks to legitimize its transnational repression.

Implications

By extending Beijing’s ethnic and unilateral national-unification framework beyond China’s borders, the law weaponizes domestic ethnic-policy legislation into a tool for transnational repression and global censorship.

More broadly, it demonstrates how Beijing seeks to convert its authoritarian political narratives into enforceable extraterritorial legal claims. By doing so, it exports its arbitrary red lines on identity, sovereignty, and human rights far beyond China’s territory, actively undermining Taiwanese self-determination and global democratic norms.

Sources:
[1] Taipei Times   [2] Focus Taiwan   [3] Central News Agency (CNA)   [4] H.Res.1400 / S.Res.791 (Resolutions Condemning the PRC’s Ethnic Unity Law)   [5] U.S. House Select Committee on China

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On June 19, 2026, Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) reported that a Chinese oceanographic research vessel had entered the nation’s restricted waters —which extend 12 to 24 nautical miles from the coast — off Yilan County on Taiwan’s east coast. The vessel intruded into the area for nearly five hours, ignoring the CGA’s demands to immediately leave the waters. A Chinese state media account attempted to justify the ship’s intrusion, falsely portraying it as a lawful environmental survey in so-called “China’s jurisdictional waters.”

The incident follows a recent pattern of Chinese maritime incursions into waters under Taiwan’s jurisdiction. Earlier in June, a Chinese coast guard vessel and a survey ship intruded into waters around Dongsha Island (Pratas Island) and waters east of Taiwan, while two Chinese official vessels entered restricted waters near Taiping Island (Itu Aba) for the first time.

Furthermore, the Chinese Coast Guard harassed international merchant ships in Taiwan’s eastern exclusive economic zone (EEZ), unlawfully demanding navigation data under the false pretext of Chinese jurisdiction.

These coercive activities were internationally condemned by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany in rare, coordinated statements. Taiwan’s CGA and Ocean Affairs Council (OAC) condemned the activities and adopted a “shadowing and monitoring” strategy to track Chinese vessels, deny them access to Taiwan-controlled waters, and avoid giving Beijing a pretext to escalate the conflict.

Tests of a“Quasi-Quarantine” Model

The broader pattern suggests that Beijing is testing a “quasi-quarantine” model in waters under Taiwan’s control. In a recent Jamestown Foundation analysis, Dr. Ying Yu Lin, a Taiwan-based expert on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), argues that China is using its coast guard, maritime patrol, and other government vessels to create the appearance of administrative control without declaring a formal military blockade or launching a high-profile military exercise.

As part of Beijing’s broader gray-zone campaign against Taiwan, this “quasi-quarantine” operation is designed to normalize China’s maritime presence, test Taiwan’s operational response, and shape the maritime lawfare and psychological environment for future coercive actions.

In a recent interview, Bonnie Glaser, managing director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund, also cited the Dongsha and Taiping incidents as part of a “dangerous trend” of pressure tactics China uses to coerce Taiwan and countries that are strengthening ties with Taiwan.

Implications

China’s recent maritime actions around Taiwan-controlled waters, including Dongsha, Taiping, and waters east of Taiwan, are not merely a rehearsal for a possible quarantine or blockade. They should be understood as part of Beijing’s broader gray-zone campaign to erode the First Island Chain’s security environment and legitimize Chinese jurisdiction across these waters. As with its artificial island-building in the South China Sea, Beijing is taking incremental actions to create a “new normal” that could later support expanded claims and coercive actions.

Experts have warned that ignoring these operations could allow China to gradually establish a greater presence and perceived jurisdiction around Taiwan-controlled waters, increasing pressure on Taiwan and regional partners. The United States should not underestimate this trend: Beijing is playing the long game to weaken the U.S.-led regional security architecture and undermine core U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific.

Sources:
[1] Focus Taiwan   [2] South China Morning Post   [3] Taipei Times   [4] Taipei Times   [5] Reuters   [6] Taipei Times   [7] Jamestown Foundation   [8] Central News Agency (CNA)

GCTF Strengthens Multilateral Democratic Cooperation Against China’s Transnational Repression

The Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) hosted a seminar in Taipei, Taiwan, from June 23 to 25, 2026, on strengthening democratic resilience and countering the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) transnational repression.
 
This year’s event brought together delegates from 29 countries, including Taiwan’s formal GCTF partners: the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom (UK).
 
GCTF’s Strategic and Multilateral Value
 
GCTF is a pivotal, Taiwan-U.S.-launched multilateral platform that helps Taiwan expand its international space by leveraging its policy expertise and strengths. Since its establishment in 2015, the framework has enabled Taiwan to build enduring partnerships on issues of shared concern, including law enforcement cooperation, information security, and media literacy. To date, GCTF has organized 105 international workshops, drawing over 10,000 officials, experts, and civil society representatives from around the world.
 
The platform’s continued expansion underscores growing international interest in democratic, multilateral cooperation with Taiwan. This momentum is highlighted by the UK joining GCTF as its sixth official partner in 2025, as well as a cumulative total of 27 overseas events across 18 countries by the end of that year.

2026 Theme: Transnational Repression
 
At the seminar’s opening this year, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te called on democracies to strengthen resilience and solidarity. He noted that the free world faces “unprecedented dangers” from authoritarian regimes that leverage emerging technologies and illicit financial flows to sow division across borders.
 
President Lai emphasized that Beijing’s transnational repression includes overseas surveillance, cyberattacks, and cognitive warfare operations designed to silence critics, undermine trust in democratic institutions, and erode national sovereignty. “No democratic nation can be absent in the fight against this hybridized challenge,” he said.
 
Platforms such as GCTF have become vital assets for democratic security cooperation in recent years, especially as the PRC continues to weaponize transnational repression to undermine democratic interests and silence critics.
 
In a similar vein, the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC), in its recent report titled “Report on the PRC’s Transnational Repression and Malign Influence in 2025,” found that China has escalated its use of transnational lawfare to suppress voices advocating for Taiwan’s sovereignty and independence. This trend is exemplified by the PRC’s extraterritorial criminal investigation of Taiwanese lawmaker Puma Shen as a so-called “diehard Taiwan independence separatist.”
 
Implications
 
GCTF demonstrates that Taiwan is not merely a participant in international cooperation, but an indispensable contributor to the democratic community. Over the past decade, the framework has provided an institutionalized platform for Taiwan to share its policy and governance experience with democratic partners.
 
This year’s focus on transnational repression further highlights Taiwan’s practical contributions. As a frontline democracy facing sustained authoritarian coercion, Taiwan has accumulated unparalleled experience in countering the PRC’s multilayered transnational repression and malign pressure, offering valuable lessons for democracies seeking to develop coordinated responses to authoritarian threats.
 
Sources:
[1] Taipei Times   [2] Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF)   [3] U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC)   [4] Taipei Times

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On June 18, 2026, Taiwan President Lai Ching-te received a U.S. House delegation –– including Representative Lucy McBath (D-GA), second vice chair of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), and Representative Valerie Foushee (D-NC), a member of the caucus –– at the Presidential Office.

During the meeting, Lai called for expanded Taiwan-U.S. cooperation in defense, technology, industry, and artificial intelligence (AI), while also highlighting the need to remove remaining barriers to cross-border investment.

Breaking Down the Double Taxation Barrier

President Lai explicitly called on the U.S. Congress to expedite the passage of U.S.-Taiwan double taxation relief legislation, which he said would reduce cross-border investment barriers and further foster bilateral commercial cooperation.

This push directly aligns with the relevant Senate legislation, the United States-Taiwan Expedited Double-Tax Relief Act (S.199). This bipartisan legislation complements the House version (H.R.33), which overwhelmingly passed the House by a 423–1 vote in January 2025.

Meanwhile, American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan (AmCham Taiwan) President Carl Wegner announced that he would lead a high-level business delegation to Washington for “door-knock” meetings with U.S. officials on boosting bilateral trade.

Wegner expressed optimism that the long-stalled double-tax relief effort could move further forward in the near future, bolstered by the momentum of the U.S.-Taiwan Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) signed in February 2026.

AI and Semiconductor Pipeline

Against the backdrop of the accelerating AI revolution, eliminating double taxation has become increasingly urgent. Driven by the unprecedented AI boom, two-way trade in goods reached US$256 billion in 2025, making Taiwan the United States’ fourth-largest trading partner (surpassing Japan, Germany, and South Korea).

During the meeting with the U.S. House delegation, President Lai highlighted the newly established U.S.-Taiwan Semiconductor Education Alliance –– an initiative designed to promote collaboration among universities, industry, and government stakeholders to strengthen bilateral semiconductor workforce talent pipelines.

Implications

AmCham’s 2026 Business Climate Survey highlights Taiwan’s vital role in global technology supply chains, with 92% of members planning to maintain or increase investments in Taiwan. The survey also found that 76% of respondents consider a double taxation avoidance agreement important to their business, underscoring the private-sector demand for congressional action.

Separately, AmCham’s 2026 Taiwan White Paper frames Taiwan as a critical partner for U.S. technology supply chains and Indo-Pacific stability, highlighting significant opportunities for U.S.-Taiwan R&D and co-production in drones, robotics, and other asymmetric capabilities.

Given these growing economic bonds, it is essential that the U.S. Senate swiftly pass the United States-Taiwan Expedited Double-Tax Relief Act (S.199) to remove remaining barriers to deeper bilateral investment and cooperation.

Sources:
[1] Focus Taiwan   [2] Taipei Times   [3] S.199 / H.R.33 (United States-Taiwan Expedited Double-Tax Relief Act)   [4] Taipei Times   [5] Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)   [6] AmCham Taiwan (2026 Taiwan White Paper)   [7] American Institute in Taiwan (AIT)   [8] AmCham Taiwan (2026 Business Climate Survey)

“Blue Skies for Taiwan Act” Advances Out of Senate Committee as Taiwan Expands Drone Development and Procurement

On June 17, 2026, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee advanced the bipartisan Blue Skies for Taiwan Act (S.4259). The move brought the bill one step closer to creating a fast-track certification pathway for trusted Taiwanese drone and drone-component manufacturers to integrate into the U.S. Department of Defense’s “Blue UAS” program.

Strengthening Trusted Drone Supply Chains

The legislation would establish a “Blue UAS Working Group” to identify and address regulatory, export-control, and certification barriers that impede Taiwan’s participation in Blue UAS programs. This initiative aims to systematically strengthen trusted, PRC-free drone supply chains while bolstering Taiwan’s indigenous drone production and regional resilience.

This legislation marks a shift toward a reciprocal defense-industrial partnership. By accelerating Taiwanese manufacturers’ integration into Pentagon-vetted networks, the bill would reduce cybersecurity risks and expand the supply of trusted, democratic UAS systems and components available to the United States and its allies.

Taiwan Accelerates Military Drone Expansion

The legislative progress in Washington coincides with the Taiwanese government’s moves to expand investment in its domestic uncrewed systems. On June 18, 2026, Taiwan’s Executive Yuan approved a draft special budget to fund the development and procurement of domestic drones and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), with a budget ceiling of NT$210 billion (approximately US$6.65 billion) to be allocated through December 2031.

The proposed procurement consists of 1,446 coastal reconnaissance drones, 208,200 coastal attack drones, and 1,320 uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs). This robust procurement, alongside the scheduled launch of a dedicated army drone squadron, reflects Taiwan’s proactive stance and firm commitment to sustaining its buildup of uncrewed systems and enhancing its asymmetric deterrence.

Sources:
[1] Office of Sen. Jeff Merkley   [2] S.4259 (Blue Skies for Taiwan Act)   [3] Taipei Times  [4] Taipei Times

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Key U.S. House and Senate committees recently advanced important Taiwan defense measures in two major defense bills. After the House Armed Services Committee approved its version of the FY2027 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) on June 4, the House Appropriations Committee released its FY2027 Defense Appropriations Bill on June 10, proposing US$2 billion in funding to bolster Taiwan’s defense.

The Senate Armed Services Committee subsequently advanced its own version of the FY2027 NDAA on June 11, further underscoring strong congressional support for strengthening Taiwan’s defense and deterrence.

Key Taiwan Provisions

The House FY2027 NDAA includes up to US$1 billion for the Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative (TSCI) to help Taiwan strengthen its self-defense capabilities, including funding for medical support, training, and the joint development of unmanned systems with the United States.

The House FY2027 Defense Appropriations Bill allocates US$1 billion for TSCI, available through September 30, 2028. It provides an additional US$1 billion for the replacement of defense articles and reimbursement of defense services supplied to Taiwan.

The Senate FY2027 NDAA authorizes the Department of Defense to establish a War Reserve Stockpile (WRS) program for Taiwan to strengthen wartime logistics, pre-positioned supplies, and long-term sustainment. The bill also redesignates TSCI as the First Island Chain Security Cooperation Initiative (FICSCI), extends it through 2032, and makes the Philippines eligible for assistance. Additionally, it requires a review of delays in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.

Implications

These measures suggest that U.S. congressional defense policy and funding proposals are increasingly treating Taiwan’s defense as part of a regional First Island Chain denial defense framework, rather than solely as a bilateral U.S.-Taiwan security issue.

By linking Taiwan security assistance, wartime stockpiles, reviews of arms-sales delays, and regional defense cooperation, these bills reinforce the 2026 National Defense Strategy’s emphasis on building and sustaining a strong denial defense along the First Island Chain.

For Taiwan, this underscores its strategic importance to Indo-Pacific deterrence and to broader U.S. interests in preserving a favorable regional balance of power.

Sources:

[1] Focus Taiwan   [2] Taipei Times   [3] Focus Taiwan   [4] Taipei Times   [5] Focus Taiwan   [6] Taipei Times   [7] U.S. Department of War (2026 National Defense Strategy)

Taiwan Becomes Home to the First Overseas Evaluation Partner for U.S. “Green UAS” Drone Certification

On June 4, 2026, Taiwan’s Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI; 工研院) announced that it had become an authorized evaluation body under the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) “Green UAS” certification program. This critical framework assesses cybersecurity and supply-chain integrity in commercial and non-defense drone systems.
 
This designation makes Taiwan the first country outside the U.S. with a recognized Green UAS evaluation body, allowing Taiwanese companies to complete key testing and evaluation steps locally. Partnering with the Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (漢翔航空), Taiwan is positioned to develop into a regional testing and validation hub aligned with U.S. trusted-drone standards, helping Taiwanese drone companies expand into the U.S. and other markets.
 
Taiwan Enters the U.S. Trusted Drone Pipeline
 
This milestone establishes a domestic fast track for Taiwanese drone firms to enter the American commercial and defense ecosystems by allowing key Green UAS evaluations to be completed in Taiwan.
 
AUVSI Chief Executive Officer Michael Robbins noted that “Green UAS” serves as the commercial standard managed by AUVSI, while “Blue UAS” is the government standard adopted by the U.S. Department of War. Drones that meet Green UAS standards can advance through a review process toward Blue UAS compliance.
 
Robbins further noted that once Taiwanese companies secure Green UAS certification, their products may qualify for relevant exemptions from the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Covered List restrictions and potentially become eligible for sales to the U.S. Department of War.
 
This partnership aligns closely with Washington’s push for trusted, non-PRC (or “non-Red”) supply chains. The exclusion of PRC-manufactured components is increasingly becoming a core requirement for U.S. defense contracts. The Pentagon’s $1 billion Drone Dominance Program aims to expand demand for large-scale, low-cost allied production, which could further strengthen Taiwan’s role as a trusted defense-technology partner.
 
Implications
 
This development advances Taiwan’s vision of becoming a leading Asian drone supply chain center by leveraging its world-class semiconductor, systems integration, and trusted technology strengths.
 
Alignment with U.S. cybersecurity and procurement standards would further strengthen Taiwan’s defense resilience and position the country as a key Indo-Pacific hub for trusted, non-PRC drone supply chains.
 
Sources:
[1] Taipei Times   [2] Focus Taiwan   [3] Liberty Times   [4] Global Taiwan Institute   [5] Drone Dominance

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