U.S. Senate Passes Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act to Normalize U.S. Relations with Taiwan
Congress has taken a significant step toward normalizing U.S.-Taiwan engagement by unanimously passing the Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act (H.R. 1512). This bill requires the State Department to review, update, and report on its Taiwan engagement guidance at least every five years, targeting decades-old restrictions that have limited high-level contact and led to inconsistent implementation across administrations.
Why It Matters
For the United States, regular updates to Taiwan engagement guidelines help mitigate policy volatility and strengthen U.S. credibility. As Brookings scholar Ryan Hass noted, “Washington needs to be seen as a principled arbiter that is committed to pushing back against any threats to peace and stability” — a necessity as China’s coercion intensifies. By ensuring consistent and updated guidance, the Act creates a more durable framework for managing cross-Strait tensions.
Institutionalizing these periodic updates also provides Taiwan with clearer, more reliable engagement channels, preventing outdated U.S. self-imposed restrictions from hampering cooperation. It further reinforces the implementation of existing legislation, such as the Taiwan Travel Act and the Taiwan Assurance Act, ensuring steadier and more supportive U.S. engagement with Taiwan amid rising pressure from Beijing.
Congressional Support
The Senate’s unanimous passage of the bill on November 18 underscores strong bipartisan unity on Taiwan policy. Sens. John Cornyn (R-TX) and Chris Coons (D-DE) stressed that U.S. strategy must keep pace with the intensifying threat of a Chinese invasion.
Furthermore, key committees, including the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), are signaling closer scrutiny of the Administration’s implementation of major pro-Taiwan legislation, as evidenced by the November 20 hearing on the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act.
Implications
The Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act signals a U.S. commitment to deepening and normalizing engagement with Taiwan. By institutionalizing five-year reviews of Taiwan guidance, the Act fosters a more forward-leaning U.S. policy across administrations.
As the State Department updates its guidelines, Congress is expected to apply closer oversight to ensure meaningful progress. The required reports could drive new, proactive measures to strengthen Taiwan’s international status and bolster defense cooperation. Together, these changes position the U.S. to play a more consistent and strategic role in supporting Taiwan at a moment of growing global importance.
Sources:
[1] Focus Taiwan
[2] Brookings Institution
[3] Office of Sen. Chris Coons
[4] Senate Foreign Relations Committee
U.S. Approves US$330 Million Sustainment Package to Boost Taiwan’s Aircraft Readiness
On November 13, the second Trump administration approved its first arms sale to Taiwan — a US$330 million sustainment package for F-16, C-130, and IDF aircraft. The package provides spare parts, repair support, and contractor services to stabilize aircraft readiness as Taiwan’s Air Force faces record strain from near-daily PLA incursions.
Taiwan’s government-funded think tank, INDSR, emphasized that sustainment and spare parts are now as vital as acquiring major new equipment, warning that without reliable logistics support, aircraft readiness cannot be maintained under intensifying gray-zone pressure from China.
Why It Matters
The package supports priorities outlined in the FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), including faster sustainment, accelerated Foreign Military Sales, and clearing Taiwan’s arms backlog.
As China expert Rush Doshi testified in a recent SFRC hearing, PLA gray-zone activity has forced Taiwan’s military aircraft to fly at unprecedented rates. Doshi highlighted that Chinese incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) surged from nearly 1,000 in 2021 to over 3,000 last year and are projected to potentially exceed 4,000 this year, rapidly degrading the readiness of Taiwan’s fighter fleet.
This sale helps bridge that readiness gap by delivering the essential spare parts and maintenance support needed to keep Taiwan’s F-16, C-130, and IDF fleets operational, particularly while major systems such as F-16Vs, HIMARS, and Stingers remain delayed.
Congressional Support
Congress has increased bipartisan pressure on the Department of Defense (DoD) and the State Department to accelerate Taiwan’s defense readiness through measures such as the PORCUPINE Act (S. 1744), which directs agencies to address delays in the arms backlog.
Rep. John Moolenaar (R-MI) has warned that “deterrence delayed is deterrence denied,” while Sens. James Risch (R-ID) and Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) emphasized in a recent hearing that readiness and sustainment — not just new platforms — are Taiwan’s most urgent needs. In the same SFRC hearing, witness Bonnie Glaser emphasized that such sustainment gaps undermine deterrence even more rapidly than delays in new platforms.
The proposed Taiwan PLUS Act (S. 1824 & H.R. 3563) also targets these bottlenecks, seeking to streamline logistics and address delays in the delivery of defense articles.
Implications
The DoD’s notification of this package triggers the formal congressional review period, reinforcing Congress’s insistence that U.S. support for Taiwan remain timely and credible. Operationally, the package provides a critical readiness bridge until delayed platforms arrive. Key issues to watch include whether the administration advances additional sustainment packages, accelerates high-priority backlog items, or turns to co-production to mitigate long-term delays.
Sources:
[1] DSCA
[2] Focus Taiwan
[3] Testimony by Dr. Rush Doshi
[4] Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Japan Narrows Ambiguity: Linking a Taiwan Contingency to Collective Self-Defense
On November 7, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi sharpened Japan’s stance on a Taiwan contingency, asserting that a Chinese naval blockade of Taiwan could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” under Japan’s 2015 security laws. This classification is significant as it explicitly authorizes the nation to exercise its right of collective self-defense.
China has responded with severe diplomatic and economic retaliation, ranging from a violent, now-deleted threat by the Chinese Consul General in Osaka to the reinstatement of bans on Japanese seafood and a large-scale tourism boycott.
Takaichi’s position goes further than former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 2021 framing that “a Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency.” While Abe’s statement was politically significant, it did not explicitly cross the legal threshold for collective self-defense.
Why It Matters
For the United States: Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has emphasized that “our alliance is critical to deterring Chinese military aggression, to responding to regional contingencies, and keeping our countries safe.” Japan experts such as Jeffrey Hornung (RAND) and Zack Cooper (AEI) argue that to keep pace with China’s growing military power, the U.S.–Japan alliance must evolve from mere coordination to deeper integration.
For Taiwan: Tokyo’s increasingly explicit linkage of a Chinese attack on Taiwan to Japan’s own national security marks a meaningful shift away from past ambiguity, raising the potential costs of aggression for Beijing. This trend strengthens Taiwan’s strategic environment by expanding the number of actors Beijing must account for, echoing earlier analyses that called for deeper U.S.–Japan cooperation for a Taiwan Conflict.
Congressional Attention
Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL) condemned the PRC diplomat’s threat against Takaichi, while Sen. Bill Hagerty (R-TN), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, has long emphasized the critical importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Additionally, a Senate hearing in March underscored Japan’s essential role in Indo-Pacific burden-sharing and deterrence.
Implications
Japan’s clearer signals on a Taiwan contingency suggest a further shift in how Tokyo interprets the constraints of Article 9 of its constitution and applies the 2015 security legislation to a cross-Strait scenario. This evolving posture is likely to drive future U.S.–Japan–Taiwan coordination. Congress should monitor whether Beijing expands pressure — such as increasing economic coercion or ICAD-style (illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive) gray-zone tactics — against Japan, given the direct impact on U.S. contingency planning.
