China Sets the Tone for 2026 with a Large Drill Near Taiwan, Testing U.S. Deterrence and Congressional Action

A significant escalation preceded the start of 2026, as China closed out the previous year with a large-scale, coercive military drill near Taiwan. On December 29 and 30, 2025, the People’s Liberation Army conducted the so-called “Justice Mission 2025” exercise to simulate blockade operations and amphibious port seizures targeting Taiwan. Gray-zone tactics were also on display, as China Coast Guard vessels breached Taiwan’s 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone and approached within 1.6 nautical miles of Wuqiu and 1.3 nautical miles of the Matsu islands.
 
In their respective New Year addresses, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping declared that “the reunification of our motherland…is unstoppable,” while Taiwan President Lai Ching-te countered by pledging to “comprehensively establish robust deterrence and democratic defense mechanisms” to safeguard Taiwan’s sovereignty.
 
The U.S. Department of State responded by urging Beijing to “cease its military pressure against Taiwan” and reiterated that the U.S. “opposes unilateral changes to the status quo, including by force or coercion.” Jack Burnham of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) observed that the drills are part of Beijing’s effort to isolate Taiwan by targeting its closest regional partners, particularly Japan and the United States.
 
Why It Matters
 
For Taiwan: The drill follows the Trump administration’s December 17 announcement of an $11.1 billion arms sales package to Taiwan, the largest single authorization in recent history. The package prioritizes asymmetric capabilities, notably High-Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), lightweight launchers designed for rapid deployment; and M57 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) rounds, short-range ballistic missiles capable of striking strategic targets up to 300 kilometers away.
 
Beijing has cited this arms sales package as a primary catalyst for the drills, with state-media posters depicting HIMARS-carrying cargo ships being intercepted before reaching Taiwan. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has further assessed that this exercise may also serve as a warning to Japan following the diplomatic fallout from Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s November 7 comments, in which she suggested a Taiwan contingency could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan and potentially trigger a Self-Defense Force deployment.
 
For the United States: However, there are ample reasons to be skeptical about Beijing’s stated justification for the drill. John Dotson, Director at the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI), stated that “an exercise of such scale would be planned far in advance.” Grant Newsham of the Center for Security Policy (CSP) also argues that Beijing’s attempt to link the drills to the U.S. arms sales is pretextual. Crucially, the exercise included maneuvers designed to contest forces beyond the First Island Chain, signaling a direct challenge and threat to the United States’ ability to operate freely in the Western Pacific.
 
Congressional Attention
 
Leadership within the House Select Committee on the CCP acted quickly to denounce the PLA maneuvers. Chairman John Moolenaar (R-MI) and Ranking Member Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL) characterized the drills as a “deliberate escalation by Beijing.” The committee also released its bipartisan “Ten More for Taiwan” report in December 2025, which highlights the urgent need to expedite and streamline U.S. security assistance to Taiwan.
 
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan currently require a 30-day Congressional review period, which is double the time for arms sales to NATO and other treaty allies. The PORCUPINE Act (S. 1744), spearheaded by Senators Pete Ricketts (R-NE) and Chris Coons (D-DE) and unanimously passed by the Senate in December 2025, will designate Taiwan for “NATO Plus” treatment. This legislation would reduce the Congressional review time from 30 to 15 days, and expedite licensing procedures for allies seeking to transfer military equipment to Taiwan. The recent escalation from Beijing adds to the urgency of passing this bill in the House and providing a structural fix to the arms delivery bottleneck in the coming year.
 
Implications
 
Taiwan is prioritizing deterrence, but domestic politics are slowing implementation. The government announced a proposed NT$1.25 trillion (US$40 billion) special defense budget that includes plans for a multi-layered domestic air-defense network, dubbed the “T-Dome.” This supplements the general defense budget, which is projected to exceed 3 percent of GDP in 2026 and hit 5 percent by 2030. Yet, legislative infighting threatens the timeline for acquiring these asymmetric capabilities. Opposition parties — the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) — have repeatedly blocked the authorization bill for these funds from reaching Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan’s plenary agenda.
 
Washington faces a different problem: high authorization volume but slow delivery. The Trump administration’s $11.1 billion notification shows strong political support but adds to a logjam of unfulfilled orders. As of November 2025, the U.S. arms sale backlog to Taiwan stands at $21.54 billion, according to the GMU Taiwan Security Monitor (TSM). This lag creates a risky scenario in which, amid intensifying Chinese coercion, credible deterrence is challenged by both political and administrative constraints.
 
Beijing is likely factoring these constraints into its calculations. The CCP probably views the current period as a strategic window. Grant Newsham also describes the recent drills as a “dress rehearsal” for an attack, suggesting the PLA is sticking to its own timeline regardless of external diplomacy. The immediate problem is whether credible deterrence can hold while these political and logistical bottlenecks persist, while the long-term problem is whether the U.S. and allies can work together to counter sustained Chinese maritime pressure on critical shipping and air routes around the First Island Chain.

Sources:
[1] USNI News   [2] Focus Taiwan   [3] ISW   [4] Bloomberg   [5] Taiwan’s Presidential Office   [6] U.S. Department of State   [7] FDD   [8] CNN   [9] Global Times   [10] GTI   [11] CSP   [12] Select Committee on CCP   [13] Select Committee on CCP   [14] PORCUPINE Act (S. 1744)   [15] Focus Taiwan   [16] AP   [17] Focus Taiwan   [18] TSM   [19] NTD