Pass the PORCUPINE Act Now: China’s Taiwan Drills Blur Grey-Zone Coercion and Invasion Preparations
On November 20, Reuters published an investigation revealing that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has increasingly integrated civilian roll-on/roll-off ferries and cargo ships into amphibious landing drills that closely resemble preparations for an invasion of Taiwan. Satellite imagery reviewed by defense experts, including Janes analyst Sean O’Connor, shows commercial vessels offloading vehicles directly onto beaches in Guangdong, highlighting the PLA’s growing utilization of civilian maritime assets to rapidly land troops and equipment.
Following the Senate’s recent passage of the PORCUPINE Act, the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA) urged the House to swiftly approve the measure to expedite the delivery of asymmetric arms to Taiwan, thereby bolstering deterrence and stability in the Indo-Pacific.
Why It Matters
For Taiwan, China’s growing use of civilian vessels in amphibious operations poses a significant challenge for the island nation’s defense planning. Retired Taiwanese naval officer Yuster Yu warns that this mobilization is more troubling than China’s carriers, as it signals Beijing’s intent to land troops.
Reuters observes that this emerging shadow navy reflects a doctrine of deception and ambiguity, providing the PLA multiple landing points and complicating Taiwan’s response. A recent CSIS report also highlights China’s use of unmarked fishing vessels to surveil and harass Taiwan, demonstrating persistent grey-zone pressure.
For the United States, China’s aggressive amphibious drills, using civilian ships to offload military supplies, mark a clear shift toward practical preparations for invasion. Admiral Paparo warned that these activities are no longer routine exercises but “rehearsals” for an invasion. CSIS experts urge the United States to expose China’s grey-zone activities and signal its resolve to counter them.
Congressional Support and FAPA Advocacy
China’s maritime drills using ostensibly civilian vessels exemplify the illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive actions collectively known as ICAD behavior. Senator Pete Ricketts (R-NE), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, has emphasized that countering China’s ICAD tactics requires boosting Taiwan’s resilience, readiness, and global support.
Consistent with this view, Senator Ricketts and Ranking Member Chris Coons (D-DE) introduced the PORCUPINE Act (S.1744), which designates Taiwan as a “NATO Plus” partner to address the arms backlog and enhance deterrence against ICAD activities. While the bill’s unanimous passage in the Senate on December 11 underscores strong bipartisan urgency, the lack of a House companion demands immediate action.
In a December 14 statement, FAPA commended the Senate’s decisive action and urged the House to act swiftly to pass the bill to accelerate the delivery of asymmetric capabilities to Taiwan. FAPA National President Dr. Su-Mei Kao emphasized that this congressional unity sends “an unmistakable message to Beijing: the U.S. Congress is united in its resolve to stand with Taiwan” and that “credible deterrence is the surest path to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.”
Implications
China’s use of civilian ships in amphibious drills and its assertive presence around Taiwan blur the line between grey-zone coercion and invasion rehearsal. A fully implemented PORCUPINE Act would accelerate the delivery of asymmetric capabilities such as anti-ship missiles or HIMARS to Taiwan, bolstering deterrence against PLA amphibious threats.
Sources:
[1] Reuters
[2] FAPA
[3] CSIS
[4] USNI
[5] Office of Sen. Pete Ricketts
[6] Congress.gov (S.1744)
[7] National Interest
[8] Focus Taiwan
Trump’s 2025 NSS Reaffirms Taiwan’s Vital Strategic Role in the First Island Chain and Beyond
The Trump Administration released its 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), defining an “America First” foreign policy for the President’s second term. While emphasizing the Western Hemisphere and U.S. economic priorities, the strategy reaffirms the U.S. commitment to a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Notably, the document explicitly identifies Taiwan not only as a semiconductor hub, but also highlights its vital geographic location within the First Island Chain—positioning Taiwan as a critical node linking the Northeast and Southeast Asian theaters and helping to secure access to the Second Island Chain.
The NSS also shifts the language on cross-Strait stability, stating that the U.S. “does not support” any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, rather than the stronger “opposes” used by previous administrations. Ryan Fedasiuk (AEI) suggests that this subtler phrasing softens the U.S. commitment in the event of unilateral action by China. Additionally, the NSS prioritizes countering Chinese economic coercion in the Western Hemisphere, an emphasis that CSIS analysis places within the broader tradition of the Monroe Doctrine.
Why It Matters
The 2025 NSS links economic security directly to national security. Taiwan’s location is essential for preserving freedom of navigation in critical sea lanes. By anchoring the First Island Chain, a sovereign Taiwan prevents the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from projecting power into the wider Pacific, directly serving U.S. defense interests. Losing this position would fracture the U.S. defense perimeter and significantly increase risks to Guam and Hawaii.
The strategy also demands increased “burden sharing” from allies. Taiwan has preemptively addressed this expectation with President Lai Ching-te’s recent US$40 billion special defense budget proposal. This substantial investment demonstrates Taiwan’s commitment to its own defense, and that it is willing to shoulder the costs of deterrence and be a serious security partner alongside the U.S., Japan, and South Korea.
Congressional Attention
Congress has long echoed the NSS’s emphasis on maintaining cross-Strait stability and reducing the risk of miscalculation by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) through several legislative efforts.
One such effort is the Six Assurances to Taiwan Act (S.3208 & H.R.3452), led by Sens. John Curtis (R-UT) and Jeff Merkley (D-OR) in the Senate, and Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL), alongside Reps. Gregory Meeks (D-NY), Greg Stanton (D-AZ), Young Kim (R-CA), Zach Nunn (R-IA), and Nicole Malliotakis (R-NY) in the House, which seeks to clarify and codify longstanding U.S. commitments.
Similarly, the Taiwan Partnership in the Americas Act (S.2684), introduced by Sens. Jeff Merkley (D-OR), John Curtis (R-UT), Tim Kaine (D-VA), and Pete Ricketts (R-NE), provides a framework for monitoring and responding to the PRC’s political and economic influence among Taiwan’s diplomatic partners in Latin America and the Caribbean, consistent with the NSS’s regional framing.
Implications
Under the strategic logic outlined in the NSS, Taiwan remains central to preserving freedom of navigation and maintaining access beyond the First Island Chain. Congress therefore has a critical role in reinforcing clarity and deterrence by affirming that U.S. support for Taiwan remains clear, consistent, and ironclad.
